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ed576acdf5
For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define. Fixes #15236 Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_, EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_, EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_, EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
383 lines
13 KiB
C
383 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* Low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */
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#include "testutil.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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# include <openssl/evp.h>
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# include <openssl/bn.h>
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# include <openssl/ec.h>
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# include <openssl/rand.h>
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# include "internal/nelem.h"
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# include "ecdsatest.h"
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static fake_random_generate_cb fbytes;
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static const char *numbers[2];
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static size_t crv_len = 0;
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static EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
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static OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rand = NULL;
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static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num, ossl_unused const char *name,
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EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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static int fbytes_counter = 0;
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BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
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fake_rand_set_callback(ctx, NULL);
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if (!TEST_ptr(tmp = BN_new())
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|| !TEST_int_lt(fbytes_counter, OSSL_NELEM(numbers))
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|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter]))
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/* tmp might need leading zeros so pad it out */
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|| !TEST_int_le(BN_num_bytes(tmp), num)
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|| !TEST_true(BN_bn2binpad(tmp, buf, num)))
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goto err;
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fbytes_counter = (fbytes_counter + 1) % OSSL_NELEM(numbers);
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_free(tmp);
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return ret;
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}
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/*-
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* This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce.
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* The ECDSA KATs are from:
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* - the X9.62 draft (4)
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* - NIST CAVP (720)
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*
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* It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG.
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* NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing.
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*
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* Tests the library can successfully:
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* - generate public keys that matches those KATs
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* - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs
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* - accept those signatures as valid
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*/
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static int x9_62_tests(int n)
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{
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int nid, md_nid, ret = 0;
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const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL;
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unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL;
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unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
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long q_len, msg_len = 0;
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size_t p_len;
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EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
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EC_KEY *key = NULL;
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ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
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BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
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BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
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const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
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nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid;
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md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid;
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r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r;
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s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s;
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tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg;
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numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d;
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numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k;
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TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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if (EC_curve_nid2nist(nid) == NULL)
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return TEST_skip("skip non approved curves");
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
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/* get the message digest */
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|| !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len))
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/* create the key */
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|| !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
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/* load KAT variables */
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|| !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new())
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|| !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new())
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|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in))
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|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in)))
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goto err;
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/* public key must match KAT */
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fake_rand_set_callback(RAND_get0_private(NULL), &fbytes);
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if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
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|| !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
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&pbuf, NULL))
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|| !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len)
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|| !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len))
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goto err;
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/* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
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fake_rand_set_callback(RAND_get0_private(NULL), &fbytes);
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if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
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|| !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len,
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kinv, rp, key))
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/* verify the signature */
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|| !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1))
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goto err;
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/* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
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ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
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if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r)
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|| !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_free(message);
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OPENSSL_free(pbuf);
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OPENSSL_free(qbuf);
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EC_KEY_free(key);
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ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
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BN_free(r);
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BN_free(s);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
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BN_clear_free(kinv);
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BN_clear_free(rp);
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return ret;
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}
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/*-
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* Positive and negative ECDSA testing through EVP interface:
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* - EVP_DigestSign (this is the one-shot version)
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* - EVP_DigestVerify
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*
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* Tests the library can successfully:
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* - create a key
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* - create a signature
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* - accept that signature
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* - reject that signature with a different public key
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* - reject that signature if its length is not correct
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* - reject that signature after modifying the message
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* - accept that signature after un-modifying the message
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* - reject that signature after modifying the signature
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* - accept that signature after un-modifying the signature
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*/
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static int set_sm2_id(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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/* With the SM2 key type, the SM2 ID is mandatory */
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static const char sm2_id[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 'l', 'e', 't', 't', 'e', 'r' };
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
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if (!TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mctx))
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|| !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, sm2_id, sizeof(sm2_id)), 0))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int test_builtin(int n, int as)
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{
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EC_KEY *eckey_neg = NULL, *eckey = NULL;
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unsigned char dirt, offset, tbs[128];
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unsigned char *sig = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey_neg = NULL, *pkey = NULL, *dup_pk = NULL;
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EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
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size_t sig_len;
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int nid, ret = 0;
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int temp;
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nid = curves[n].nid;
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/* skip built-in curves where ord(G) is not prime */
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if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_ipsec3) {
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TEST_info("skipped: ECDSA unsupported for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* skip SM2 curve if 'as' is equal to EVP_PKEY_EC or, skip all curves
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* except SM2 curve if 'as' is equal to EVP_PKEY_SM2
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*/
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if (nid == NID_sm2 && as == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
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TEST_info("skipped: EC key type unsupported for curve %s",
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OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
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return 1;
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} else if (nid != NID_sm2 && as == EVP_PKEY_SM2) {
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TEST_info("skipped: SM2 key type unsupported for curve %s",
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OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
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return 1;
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}
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TEST_info("testing ECDSA for curve %s as %s key type", OBJ_nid2sn(nid),
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as == EVP_PKEY_EC ? "EC" : "SM2");
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if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
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/* get some random message data */
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|| !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
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/* real key */
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|| !TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
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|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
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|| !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new())
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey))
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/* fake key for negative testing */
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|| !TEST_ptr(eckey_neg = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
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|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey_neg))
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|| !TEST_ptr(pkey_neg = EVP_PKEY_new())
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|| !TEST_false(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, NULL))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, eckey_neg)))
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goto err;
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if (!TEST_ptr(dup_pk = EVP_PKEY_dup(pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey, dup_pk), 1))
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goto err;
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temp = ECDSA_size(eckey);
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if (!TEST_int_ge(temp, 0)
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|| !TEST_ptr(sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len = (size_t)temp))
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/* create a signature */
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
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|| !TEST_int_le(sig_len, ECDSA_size(eckey))
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
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/* negative test, verify with wrong key, 0 return */
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey_neg))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey_neg))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
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/* negative test, verify with wrong signature length, -1 return */
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len - 1, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), -1)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
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/* positive test, verify with correct key, 1 return */
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)))
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goto err;
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/* muck with the message, test it fails with 0 return */
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tbs[0] ^= 1;
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if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)))
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goto err;
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/* un-muck and test it verifies */
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tbs[0] ^= 1;
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if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)))
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goto err;
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/*-
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* Muck with the ECDSA signature. The DER encoding is one of:
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* - 30 LL 02 ..
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* - 30 81 LL 02 ..
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*
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* - Sometimes this mucks with the high level DER sequence wrapper:
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* in that case, DER-parsing of the whole signature should fail.
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*
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* - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.r:
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* in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.r should fail.
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*
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* - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.s:
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* in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.s should fail.
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*
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* - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.r:
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* in that case, the signature verification should fail.
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*
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* - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.s:
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* in that case, the signature verification should fail.
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*
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* The usual case is changing the integer value of ECDSA.r or ECDSA.s.
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* Because the ratio of DER overhead to signature bytes is small.
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* So most of the time it will be one of the last two cases.
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*
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* In any case, EVP_PKEY_verify should not return 1 for valid.
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*/
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offset = tbs[0] % sig_len;
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dirt = tbs[1] ? tbs[1] : 1;
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sig[offset] ^= dirt;
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if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_ne(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)))
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goto err;
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/* un-muck and test it verifies */
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sig[offset] ^= dirt;
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if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
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|| (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey))
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|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1)
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|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_neg);
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EVP_PKEY_free(dup_pk);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
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OPENSSL_free(sig);
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return ret;
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}
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static int test_builtin_as_ec(int n)
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{
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return test_builtin(n, EVP_PKEY_EC);
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}
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
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static int test_builtin_as_sm2(int n)
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{
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return test_builtin(n, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
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}
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# endif
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
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int setup_tests(void)
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{
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
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#else
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fake_rand = fake_rand_start(NULL);
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if (fake_rand == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* get a list of all internal curves */
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crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
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if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len))
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|| !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len))) {
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fake_rand_finish(fake_rand);
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return 0;
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}
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ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin_as_ec, crv_len);
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
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ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin_as_sm2, crv_len);
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# endif
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ADD_ALL_TESTS(x9_62_tests, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_cavs_kats));
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#endif
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return 1;
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}
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void cleanup_tests(void)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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fake_rand_finish(fake_rand);
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OPENSSL_free(curves);
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#endif
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}
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