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e077455e9e
Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
77 lines
2.2 KiB
C
77 lines
2.2 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "crypto/rand.h"
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#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
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#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
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unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
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size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
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{
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size_t ret = 0;
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size_t entropy_available;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
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entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
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if (entropy_available > 0) {
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ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
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*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
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}
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ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
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return ret;
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}
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void ossl_rand_cleanup_entropy(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
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{
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OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(buf, len);
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}
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size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
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unsigned char **pout, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
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const void *salt, size_t salt_len)
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{
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size_t ret = 0;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool))
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goto err;
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if (salt != NULL && !ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
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goto err;
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ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
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*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
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err:
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ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
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return ret;
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}
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void ossl_rand_cleanup_nonce(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
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{
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OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, len);
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}
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