mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-12-15 06:01:37 +08:00
3ccfcd8a85
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6461)
716 lines
19 KiB
C
716 lines
19 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2004-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2004, EdelKey Project. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*
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* Originally written by Christophe Renou and Peter Sylvester,
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* for the EdelKey project.
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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# include "internal/evp_int.h"
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# include <openssl/sha.h>
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# include <openssl/srp.h>
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# include <openssl/evp.h>
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# include <openssl/buffer.h>
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# include <openssl/rand.h>
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# include <openssl/txt_db.h>
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# include <openssl/err.h>
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# define SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN 20
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# define MAX_LEN 2500
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/*
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* Note that SRP uses its own variant of base 64 encoding. A different base64
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* alphabet is used and no padding '=' characters are added. Instead we pad to
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* the front with 0 bytes and subsequently strip off leading encoded padding.
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* This variant is used for compatibility with other SRP implementations -
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* notably libsrp, but also others. It is also required for backwards
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* compatibility in order to load verifier files from other OpenSSL versions.
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*/
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/*
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* Convert a base64 string into raw byte array representation.
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* Returns the length of the decoded data, or -1 on error.
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*/
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static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
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{
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx;
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int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
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size_t size, padsize;
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const unsigned char *pad = (const unsigned char *)"00";
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while (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
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++src;
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size = strlen(src);
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padsize = 4 - (size & 3);
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padsize &= 3;
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/* Four bytes in src become three bytes output. */
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if (size > INT_MAX || ((size + padsize) / 4) * 3 > alen)
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return -1;
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ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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return -1;
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/*
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* This should never occur because 1 byte of data always requires 2 bytes of
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* encoding, i.e.
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* 0 bytes unencoded = 0 bytes encoded
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* 1 byte unencoded = 2 bytes encoded
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* 2 bytes unencoded = 3 bytes encoded
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* 3 bytes unencoded = 4 bytes encoded
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* 4 bytes unencoded = 6 bytes encoded
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* etc
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*/
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if (padsize == 3) {
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outl = -1;
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goto err;
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}
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/* Valid padsize values are now 0, 1 or 2 */
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EVP_DecodeInit(ctx);
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evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
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/* Add any encoded padding that is required */
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if (padsize != 0
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&& EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl, pad, padsize) < 0) {
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outl = -1;
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goto err;
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}
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if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, a, &outl2, (const unsigned char *)src, size) < 0) {
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outl = -1;
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goto err;
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}
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outl += outl2;
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EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, a + outl, &outl2);
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outl += outl2;
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/* Strip off the leading padding */
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if (padsize != 0) {
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if ((int)padsize >= outl) {
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outl = -1;
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* If we added 1 byte of padding prior to encoding then we have 2 bytes
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* of "real" data which gets spread across 4 encoded bytes like this:
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* (6 bits pad)(2 bits pad | 4 bits data)(6 bits data)(6 bits data)
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* So 1 byte of pre-encoding padding results in 1 full byte of encoded
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* padding.
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* If we added 2 bytes of padding prior to encoding this gets encoded
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* as:
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* (6 bits pad)(6 bits pad)(4 bits pad | 2 bits data)(6 bits data)
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* So 2 bytes of pre-encoding padding results in 2 full bytes of encoded
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* padding, i.e. we have to strip the same number of bytes of padding
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* from the encoded data as we added to the pre-encoded data.
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*/
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memmove(a, a + padsize, outl - padsize);
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outl -= padsize;
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}
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err:
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
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return outl;
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}
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/*
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* Convert a raw byte string into a null-terminated base64 ASCII string.
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* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
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*/
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static int t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
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{
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new();
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int outl = 0, outl2 = 0;
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unsigned char pad[2] = {0, 0};
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size_t leadz = 0;
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if (ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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EVP_EncodeInit(ctx);
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evp_encode_ctx_set_flags(ctx, EVP_ENCODE_CTX_NO_NEWLINES
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| EVP_ENCODE_CTX_USE_SRP_ALPHABET);
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/*
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* We pad at the front with zero bytes until the length is a multiple of 3
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* so that EVP_EncodeUpdate/EVP_EncodeFinal does not add any of its own "="
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* padding
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*/
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leadz = 3 - (size % 3);
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if (leadz != 3
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&& !EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst, &outl, pad,
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leadz)) {
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2, src,
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size)) {
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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outl += outl2;
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EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char *)dst + outl, &outl2);
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outl += outl2;
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/* Strip the encoded padding at the front */
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if (leadz != 3) {
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memmove(dst, dst + leadz, outl - leadz);
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dst[outl - leadz] = '\0';
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}
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EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 1;
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}
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void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
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{
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if (user_pwd == NULL)
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return;
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BN_free(user_pwd->s);
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BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
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OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
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OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
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OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
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}
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static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
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{
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SRP_user_pwd *ret;
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if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
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/* SRPerr(SRP_F_SRP_USER_PWD_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ /*ckerr_ignore*/
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->N = NULL;
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ret->g = NULL;
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ret->s = NULL;
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ret->v = NULL;
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ret->id = NULL;
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ret->info = NULL;
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return ret;
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}
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static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
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const BIGNUM *N)
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{
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vinfo->N = N;
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vinfo->g = g;
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}
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static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
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const char *info)
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{
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if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
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return 0;
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return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
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}
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static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
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const char *v)
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{
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unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
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int len;
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vinfo->v = NULL;
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vinfo->s = NULL;
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len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), v);
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if (len < 0)
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return 0;
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if (NULL == (vinfo->v = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
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return 0;
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len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), s);
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if (len < 0)
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goto err;
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vinfo->s = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
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if (vinfo->s == NULL)
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goto err;
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return 1;
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err:
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BN_free(vinfo->v);
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vinfo->v = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
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{
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vinfo->v = v;
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vinfo->s = s;
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return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
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}
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static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
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{
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SRP_user_pwd *ret;
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if (src == NULL)
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return NULL;
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if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
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if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
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|| !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
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SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
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{
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SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
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if (vb == NULL)
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return NULL;
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if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
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|| (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(vb);
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return NULL;
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}
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vb->default_g = NULL;
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vb->default_N = NULL;
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vb->seed_key = NULL;
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if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
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sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
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sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
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OPENSSL_free(vb);
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return NULL;
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}
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return vb;
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}
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void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
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{
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if (!vb)
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return;
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sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
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sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
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OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
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OPENSSL_free(vb);
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}
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static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
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{
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unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
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int len;
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SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
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if (newgN == NULL)
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return NULL;
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len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ch);
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if (len < 0)
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goto err;
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if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
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return newgN;
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OPENSSL_free(newgN->b64_bn);
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err:
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OPENSSL_free(newgN);
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return NULL;
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}
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static void SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_cache *gN_cache)
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{
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if (gN_cache == NULL)
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return;
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OPENSSL_free(gN_cache->b64_bn);
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BN_free(gN_cache->bn);
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OPENSSL_free(gN_cache);
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}
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static SRP_gN *SRP_get_gN_by_id(const char *id, STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *gN_tab)
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{
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int i;
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SRP_gN *gN;
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if (gN_tab != NULL)
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for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_num(gN_tab); i++) {
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gN = sk_SRP_gN_value(gN_tab, i);
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if (gN && (id == NULL || strcmp(gN->id, id) == 0))
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return gN;
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}
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return SRP_get_default_gN(id);
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}
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static BIGNUM *SRP_gN_place_bn(STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache, char *ch)
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{
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int i;
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if (gN_cache == NULL)
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return NULL;
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/* search if we have already one... */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_gN_cache_num(gN_cache); i++) {
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SRP_gN_cache *cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_value(gN_cache, i);
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if (strcmp(cache->b64_bn, ch) == 0)
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return cache->bn;
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}
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{ /* it is the first time that we find it */
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SRP_gN_cache *newgN = SRP_gN_new_init(ch);
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if (newgN) {
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if (sk_SRP_gN_cache_insert(gN_cache, newgN, 0) > 0)
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return newgN->bn;
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SRP_gN_free(newgN);
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* this function parses verifier file. Format is:
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* string(index):base64(N):base64(g):0
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* string(username):base64(v):base64(salt):int(index)
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*/
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int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
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{
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int error_code;
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STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
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char *last_index = NULL;
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int i;
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char **pp;
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SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
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SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
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TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
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BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
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error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
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if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
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goto err;
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error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
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if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
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if (vb->seed_key) {
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last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
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pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
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if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
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/*
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* we add this couple in the internal Stack
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*/
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if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
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|| (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
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== NULL
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|| (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
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== NULL
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|| sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
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goto err;
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gN = NULL;
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if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
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last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
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}
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} else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
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/* it is a user .... */
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const SRP_gN *lgN;
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if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
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error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
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if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
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if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
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(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
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goto err;
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error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
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if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
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(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
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goto err;
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if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
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goto err;
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user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
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}
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}
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}
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if (last_index != NULL) {
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/* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
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if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
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error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
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goto err;
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}
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vb->default_g = gN->g;
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vb->default_N = gN->N;
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gN = NULL;
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}
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error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
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err:
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/*
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* there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
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* terminates most likely
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*/
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if (gN != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
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OPENSSL_free(gN);
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}
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SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
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TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
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BIO_free_all(in);
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sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
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return error_code;
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}
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static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
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{
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int i;
|
|
SRP_user_pwd *user;
|
|
|
|
if (vb == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
|
|
user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
|
|
if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
|
|
return user;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
|
|
/*
|
|
* DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
|
|
* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
|
|
* Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
|
|
* In other words, caller must not free the result.
|
|
*/
|
|
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
|
|
{
|
|
return find_user(vb, username);
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
|
|
* In other words, caller must free the result once done.
|
|
*/
|
|
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
|
|
{
|
|
SRP_user_pwd *user;
|
|
unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (vb == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
|
|
return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
|
|
|
|
if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* if the user is unknown we set parameters as well if we have a seed_key */
|
|
|
|
if ((user = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user, vb->default_g, vb->default_N);
|
|
|
|
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_priv_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ctxt == NULL
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
|
|
ctxt = NULL;
|
|
if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
|
|
BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
|
|
BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
|
|
return user;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
|
|
SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are in base64)
|
|
*/
|
|
char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
|
|
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
|
|
{
|
|
int len;
|
|
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
|
|
const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
|
|
BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
|
|
char *defgNid = NULL;
|
|
int vfsize = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((user == NULL) ||
|
|
(pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (N) {
|
|
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
|
|
N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
|
|
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
|
|
g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
|
|
defgNid = "*";
|
|
} else {
|
|
SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
|
|
if (gN == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
N_bn = gN->N;
|
|
g_bn = gN->g;
|
|
defgNid = gN->id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*salt == NULL) {
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SRP_create_verifier_BN(user, pass, &s, &v, N_bn, g_bn))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
|
|
vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
|
|
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
|
|
|
|
if (*salt == NULL) {
|
|
char *tmp_salt;
|
|
|
|
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
|
|
*salt = tmp_salt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*verifier = vf;
|
|
vf = NULL;
|
|
result = defgNid;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
|
|
BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
|
|
BN_clear_free(s);
|
|
BN_clear_free(v);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
|
|
* then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
|
|
* to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
|
|
* provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
|
|
* random salt.
|
|
* The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
|
|
* BIGNUMS.
|
|
*/
|
|
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
|
|
BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
|
|
const BIGNUM *g)
|
|
{
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
|
|
BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((user == NULL) ||
|
|
(pass == NULL) ||
|
|
(salt == NULL) ||
|
|
(verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (*salt == NULL) {
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
salttmp = *salt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
|
|
|
|
*verifier = BN_new();
|
|
if (*verifier == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!BN_mod_exp(*verifier, g, x, N, bn_ctx)) {
|
|
BN_clear_free(*verifier);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result = 1;
|
|
*salt = salttmp;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
|
|
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
|
|
BN_clear_free(x);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|