openssl/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
Matthias St. Pierre 5516d20226 rand: add callbacks to cleanup the user entropy resp. nonce
The `get_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks were add recently to the
dispatch table in commit 4cde7585ce. Instead of adding corresponding
`cleanup_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks, the `cleanup_{entropy,nonce}`
callbacks were reused. This can cause a problem in the case where the
seed source is replaced by a provider: the buffer gets allocated by
the provider but cleared by the core.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22423)
2023-10-20 09:48:34 +01:00

145 lines
4.1 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "rand_local.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "internal/core.h"
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
size_t ret = 0;
size_t entropy_available;
RAND_POOL *pool;
pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0) {
ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
}
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
size_t ossl_rand_get_user_entropy(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
unsigned char *buf;
EVP_RAND_CTX *rng = ossl_rand_get0_seed_noncreating(ctx);
size_t ret;
if (rng == NULL)
return ossl_rand_get_entropy(ctx, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
/* Determine how many bytes to generate */
ret = entropy > 0 ? (size_t)(7 + entropy) / 8 : min_len;
if (ret < min_len)
ret = min_len;
else if (ret > max_len)
ret = max_len;
/* Allocate the return buffer */
if ((buf = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(ret)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Fill the buffer */
if (!EVP_RAND_generate(rng, buf, ret, entropy, 0, NULL, 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return 0;
}
*pout = buf;
return ret;
}
void ossl_rand_cleanup_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(buf, len);
}
void ossl_rand_cleanup_user_entropy(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(buf, len);
}
size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char **pout,
size_t min_len, ossl_unused size_t max_len,
const void *salt, size_t salt_len)
{
size_t ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool;
pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool))
goto err;
if (salt != NULL && !ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
goto err;
ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
size_t ossl_rand_get_user_nonce(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char **pout,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
const void *salt, size_t salt_len)
{
unsigned char *buf;
EVP_RAND_CTX *rng = ossl_rand_get0_seed_noncreating(ctx);
if (rng == NULL)
return ossl_rand_get_nonce(ctx, pout, min_len, max_len, salt, salt_len);
if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!EVP_RAND_generate(rng, buf, min_len, 0, 0, salt, salt_len)) {
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return 0;
}
*pout = buf;
return min_len;
}
void ossl_rand_cleanup_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, len);
}
void ossl_rand_cleanup_user_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, len);
}