openssl/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_sm4_gcm_hw.c
Tomas Mraz 143ca66cf0 Avoid another copy of key schedule pointer in PROV_GCM_CTX
This copy would need an update on dupctx but
rather than doing it just remove the copy.

This fixes failures of evp_test on Windows with
new CPUs.

Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22384)
2023-10-16 12:12:36 +02:00

96 lines
2.9 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2021-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*-
* Generic support for SM4 GCM.
*/
#include "cipher_sm4_gcm.h"
#include "crypto/sm4_platform.h"
# define SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, fn_set_enc_key, fn_block, fn_ctr) \
fn_set_enc_key(key, ks); \
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&ctx->gcm, ks, (block128_f)fn_block); \
ctx->ctr = (ctr128_f)fn_ctr; \
ctx->key_set = 1;
static int sm4_gcm_initkey(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
PROV_SM4_GCM_CTX *actx = (PROV_SM4_GCM_CTX *)ctx;
SM4_KEY *ks = &actx->ks.ks;
# ifdef HWSM4_CAPABLE
if (HWSM4_CAPABLE) {
# ifdef HWSM4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, HWSM4_set_encrypt_key, HWSM4_encrypt,
HWSM4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks);
# else /* HWSM4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks */
SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, HWSM4_set_encrypt_key, HWSM4_encrypt, NULL);
# endif
} else
# endif /* HWSM4_CAPABLE */
#ifdef VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE
if (VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE) {
SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, vpsm4_ex_set_encrypt_key, vpsm4_ex_encrypt,
vpsm4_ex_ctr32_encrypt_blocks);
} else
#endif /* VPSM4_EX_CAPABLE */
# ifdef VPSM4_CAPABLE
if (VPSM4_CAPABLE) {
SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, vpsm4_set_encrypt_key, vpsm4_encrypt,
vpsm4_ctr32_encrypt_blocks);
} else
# endif /* VPSM4_CAPABLE */
{
SM4_GCM_HW_SET_KEY_CTR_FN(ks, ossl_sm4_set_key, ossl_sm4_encrypt, NULL);
}
return 1;
}
static int hw_gcm_cipher_update(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
size_t len, unsigned char *out)
{
if (ctx->enc) {
if (ctx->ctr != NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&ctx->gcm, in, out, len, ctx->ctr))
return 0;
} else {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&ctx->gcm, in, out, len))
return 0;
}
} else {
if (ctx->ctr != NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&ctx->gcm, in, out, len, ctx->ctr))
return 0;
} else {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&ctx->gcm, in, out, len))
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static const PROV_GCM_HW sm4_gcm = {
sm4_gcm_initkey,
ossl_gcm_setiv,
ossl_gcm_aad_update,
hw_gcm_cipher_update,
ossl_gcm_cipher_final,
ossl_gcm_one_shot
};
const PROV_GCM_HW *ossl_prov_sm4_hw_gcm(size_t keybits)
{
return &sm4_gcm;
}