mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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da1c088f59
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Release: yes
402 lines
12 KiB
C
402 lines
12 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2005-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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static const unsigned char zeroes[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
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#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_ARM_)
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# pragma optimize("g", off)
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#endif
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int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
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const EVP_MD *Hash, const unsigned char *EM,
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int sLen)
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{
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return RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, mHash, Hash, NULL, EM, sLen);
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}
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int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
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const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
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const unsigned char *EM, int sLen)
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{
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int i;
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int ret = 0;
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int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
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const unsigned char *H;
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unsigned char *DB = NULL;
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
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mgf1Hash = Hash;
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hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
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if (hLen < 0)
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goto err;
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/*-
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* Negative sLen has special meanings:
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* -1 sLen == hLen
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* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
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* -3 salt length is maximized
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* -4 salt length is autorecovered from signature
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* -N reserved
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*/
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if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
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sLen = hLen;
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} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
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emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
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if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
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goto err;
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}
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if (MSBits == 0) {
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EM++;
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emLen--;
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}
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if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
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} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
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goto err;
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}
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maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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H = EM + maskedDBLen;
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DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
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if (DB == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash) < 0)
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goto err;
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for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
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DB[i] ^= EM[i];
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if (MSBits)
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DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
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for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) ;
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if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
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&& sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX
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&& (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
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ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED,
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"expected: %d retrieved: %d", sLen,
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maskedDBLen - i);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
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|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
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|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
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goto err;
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if (maskedDBLen - i) {
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H_, NULL))
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goto err;
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if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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ret = 0;
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} else {
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ret = 1;
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}
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err:
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OPENSSL_free(DB);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
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const unsigned char *mHash,
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const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen)
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{
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return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, EM, mHash, Hash, NULL, sLen);
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}
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int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
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const unsigned char *mHash,
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const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
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int sLen)
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{
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int i;
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int ret = 0;
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int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
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unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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int sLenMax = -1;
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if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
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mgf1Hash = Hash;
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hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
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if (hLen < 0)
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goto err;
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/*-
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* Negative sLen has special meanings:
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* -1 sLen == hLen
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* -2 salt length is maximized
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* -3 same as above (on signing)
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* -4 salt length is min(hLen, maximum salt length)
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* -N reserved
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*/
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/* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
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* 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
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* salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
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* the hash function output block (in bytes)."
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*
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* Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
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* not violate FIPS 186-4. */
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if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
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sLen = hLen;
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} else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN
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|| sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
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sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
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} else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
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sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
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sLenMax = hLen;
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} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
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emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
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if (MSBits == 0) {
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*EM++ = 0;
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emLen--;
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}
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if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
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sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
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if (sLenMax >= 0 && sLen > sLenMax)
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sLen = sLenMax;
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} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (sLen > 0) {
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salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
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if (salt == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (RAND_bytes_ex(rsa->libctx, salt, sLen, 0) <= 0)
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goto err;
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}
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maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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H = EM + maskedDBLen;
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ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, Hash, NULL)
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|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))
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|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, mHash, hLen))
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goto err;
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if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, sLen))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, H, NULL))
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goto err;
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/* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
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if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash))
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goto err;
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p = EM;
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/*
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* Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update pointer.
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* Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to be non-negative.
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*/
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p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
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*p++ ^= 0x1;
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if (sLen > 0) {
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for (i = 0; i < sLen; i++)
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*p++ ^= salt[i];
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}
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if (MSBits)
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EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
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/* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
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EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(salt, (size_t)sLen); /* salt != NULL implies sLen > 0 */
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* The defaults for PSS restrictions are defined in RFC 8017, A.2.3 RSASSA-PSS
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* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#appendix-A.2.3):
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*
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* If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and
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* trailerField fields of RSASSA-PSS-params are used, then the algorithm
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* identifier will have the following value:
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*
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* rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
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* algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
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* parameters RSASSA-PSS-params : {
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* hashAlgorithm sha1,
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* maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1,
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* saltLength 20,
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* trailerField trailerFieldBC
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* }
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* }
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*
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* RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
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* {PKCS1Algorithms}
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* }
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*/
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static const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 default_RSASSA_PSS_params = {
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NID_sha1, /* default hashAlgorithm */
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{
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NID_mgf1, /* default maskGenAlgorithm */
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NID_sha1 /* default MGF1 hash */
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},
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20, /* default saltLength */
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1 /* default trailerField (0xBC) */
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};
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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*rsa_pss_params = default_RSASSA_PSS_params;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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static RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params_cmp = { 0, };
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return rsa_pss_params == NULL
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|| memcmp(rsa_pss_params, &pss_params_cmp,
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sizeof(*rsa_pss_params)) == 0;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_copy(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *to,
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const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *from)
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{
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memcpy(to, from, sizeof(*to));
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
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int hashalg_nid)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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rsa_pss_params->hash_algorithm_nid = hashalg_nid;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
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int maskgenhashalg_nid)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.hash_algorithm_nid = maskgenhashalg_nid;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
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int saltlen)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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rsa_pss_params->salt_len = saltlen;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params,
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int trailerfield)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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rsa_pss_params->trailer_field = trailerfield;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.hash_algorithm_nid;
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return rsa_pss_params->hash_algorithm_nid;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.mask_gen.algorithm_nid;
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return rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.algorithm_nid;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.hash_algorithm_nid;
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return rsa_pss_params->mask_gen.hash_algorithm_nid;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.salt_len;
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return rsa_pss_params->salt_len;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *rsa_pss_params)
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{
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if (rsa_pss_params == NULL)
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return default_RSASSA_PSS_params.trailer_field;
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return rsa_pss_params->trailer_field;
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}
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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# pragma optimize("",on)
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#endif
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