mirror of
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25a807bcb9
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/996)
1240 lines
40 KiB
C
1240 lines
40 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
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/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
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{
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return (ssl->session);
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
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/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
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{
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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/*
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* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
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* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
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* and when we up the reference count.
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*/
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CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock);
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sess = ssl->session;
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if (sess)
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SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess);
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CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
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return sess;
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}
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int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
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}
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void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
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{
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return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
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{
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SSL_SESSION *ss;
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ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss));
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if (ss == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
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ss->references = 1;
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ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
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ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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if (ss->lock == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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OPENSSL_free(ss);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) {
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
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OPENSSL_free(ss);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ss;
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}
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/*
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* Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
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* ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
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*/
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SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
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{
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SSL_SESSION *dest;
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dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*src));
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if (dest == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
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/*
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* Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
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* the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
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dest->psk_identity = NULL;
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#endif
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dest->ciphers = NULL;
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dest->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
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dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
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#endif
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dest->tlsext_tick = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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dest->srp_username = NULL;
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#endif
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memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
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/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
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dest->prev = NULL;
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dest->next = NULL;
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dest->references = 1;
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dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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if (dest->lock == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (src->peer != NULL)
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X509_up_ref(src->peer);
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if (src->peer_chain != NULL) {
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dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain);
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if (dest->peer_chain == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
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dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
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if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (src->psk_identity) {
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dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity);
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if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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#endif
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if(src->ciphers != NULL) {
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dest->ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(src->ciphers);
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if (dest->ciphers == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
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&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (src->tlsext_hostname) {
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dest->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->tlsext_hostname);
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if (dest->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
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dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
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OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
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src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
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if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
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dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
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OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
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src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
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if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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#endif
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if (ticket != 0) {
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dest->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen);
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if(dest->tlsext_tick == NULL)
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goto err;
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} else {
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dest->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
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dest->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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if (src->srp_username) {
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dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username);
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if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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#endif
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return dest;
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err:
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
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return NULL;
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}
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const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
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unsigned int *len)
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{
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if (len)
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*len = s->session_id_length;
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return s->session_id;
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}
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unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
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{
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return s->compress_meth;
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}
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|
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/*
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* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
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* the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
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* complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
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* understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
|
|
* a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
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* RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
|
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* 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
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* is perhaps a more interesting question ...
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*/
|
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#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
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static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
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unsigned int *id_len)
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{
|
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unsigned int retry = 0;
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do
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if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
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return 0;
|
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while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
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(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
|
|
if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
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return 1;
|
|
/* else - woops a session_id match */
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
|
|
* a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
|
|
* creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
|
|
* means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
|
|
* a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
|
|
* internal cache as well).
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int tmp;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
|
|
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
|
|
|
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if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
|
|
if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
|
|
ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
|
|
else
|
|
ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (session) {
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
|
|
* Note that:
|
|
* (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
|
|
* ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
|
|
* When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
|
|
* ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
|
|
* At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
|
|
* however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
|
|
* whether a ticket is expected or not.
|
|
*
|
|
* (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
|
|
* ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
|
|
* ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
ss->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
goto sess_id_done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock);
|
|
if (s->generate_session_id)
|
|
cb = s->generate_session_id;
|
|
else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
|
|
cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
|
|
/* Choose a session ID */
|
|
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
|
|
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
|
|
/* The callback failed */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
|
|
* set it higher than it was.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
|
|
/* The callback set an illegal length */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
|
|
/* Finally, check for a conflict */
|
|
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
|
|
ss->session_id_length)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sess_id_done:
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
|
|
ss->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ss->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
|
|
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
s->session = ss;
|
|
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
|
|
ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
|
|
* connection. It is only called by servers.
|
|
*
|
|
* ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
|
|
* session_id: ClientHello session ID.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* -1: error
|
|
* 0: a session may have been found.
|
|
*
|
|
* Side effects:
|
|
* - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
|
|
* existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
|
|
* - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
|
|
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is used only by servers. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
|
|
int fatal = 0;
|
|
int try_session_cache = 1;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(session_id) == 0)
|
|
try_session_cache = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected and extended master secret flag */
|
|
r = tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(s, ext, session_id, &ret);
|
|
switch (r) {
|
|
case -1: /* Error during processing */
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
case 0: /* No ticket found */
|
|
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
|
|
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
|
|
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
|
|
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
|
|
try_session_cache = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
abort();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (try_session_cache &&
|
|
ret == NULL &&
|
|
!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION data;
|
|
size_t local_len;
|
|
data.ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id,
|
|
sizeof(data.session_id),
|
|
&local_len)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
data.session_id_length = local_len;
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock);
|
|
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
|
|
if (ret == NULL)
|
|
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (try_session_cache &&
|
|
ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
int copy = 1;
|
|
ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(session_id),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(session_id),
|
|
©);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
|
|
* to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
|
|
* callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
|
|
* reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
|
|
* thread-safe).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (copy)
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
|
|
* well if and only if we are supposed to.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!
|
|
(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
|
|
* very strange
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
|
|
|
|
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|
|
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
|
|
* use it in this context.
|
|
*/
|
|
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
|
|
* which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
|
|
* should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
|
|
* case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
|
|
* cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
|
|
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
|
|
* noticing).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
|
|
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
unsigned char buf[5], *p;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
p = buf;
|
|
l = ret->cipher_id;
|
|
l2n(l, p);
|
|
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
|
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
|
|
else
|
|
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
|
|
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
|
|
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
|
|
if (try_session_cache) {
|
|
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
|
|
}
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check extended master secret extension consistency */
|
|
if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
|
|
/* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */
|
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
|
|
/* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = ret;
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
if (!try_session_cache) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
|
|
* the new session
|
|
*/
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (fatal)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *s;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
|
|
* it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
|
|
* an lhash
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
|
|
/*
|
|
* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
|
|
s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
|
|
* case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
|
|
* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
|
|
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
/*
|
|
* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
|
|
* handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
|
|
* same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
|
|
* obtain the same session from an external cache)
|
|
*/
|
|
s = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
|
|
|
|
if (s != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
|
|
* count because it already takes into account the cache
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
|
|
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
|
|
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
|
|
break;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
|
|
{
|
|
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *r;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
|
|
if (lck)
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
|
|
if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (lck)
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
r->not_resumable = 1;
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (ss == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, -1, &i, ss->lock);
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
|
|
X509_free(ss->peer);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
|
|
#endif
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ss->references, 1, &i, ss->lock) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
|
|
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
|
if (s->ctx->method != s->method) {
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = session;
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = NULL;
|
|
if (s->ctx->method != s->method) {
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
s->timeout = t;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
return (s->timeout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
return (s->time);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
s->time = t;
|
|
return (t);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->tlsext_hostname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned char **tick,
|
|
size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
*len = s->tlsext_ticklen;
|
|
if (tick != NULL)
|
|
*tick = s->tlsext_tick;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->peer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
|
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
|
|
memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
long l;
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
l = s->session_timeout;
|
|
s->session_timeout = t;
|
|
return (l);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
return (s->session_timeout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
|
|
int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
|
|
void *secret,
|
|
int *secret_len,
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
|
|
*peer_ciphers,
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER
|
|
**cipher,
|
|
void *arg),
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
|
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
|
|
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket =
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
|
|
if (s->tlsext_session_ticket == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ext_data) {
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
|
|
memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
long time;
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
static void timeout_cb(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
|
|
/*
|
|
* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
|
|
* locking overhead
|
|
*/
|
|
(void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
|
|
s->not_resumable = 1;
|
|
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM);
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
tp.ctx = s;
|
|
tp.cache = s->sessions;
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
tp.time = t;
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock);
|
|
i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
|
|
CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
|
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_TIMEOUT_PARAM(tp.cache, timeout_cb, &tp);
|
|
CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->session != NULL) &&
|
|
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
} else
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
|
|
/* last element in list */
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
|
|
/* only one element in list */
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
|
|
s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
|
|
/* first element in list */
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
|
|
s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* middle of list */
|
|
s->next->prev = s->prev;
|
|
s->prev->next = s->next;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s->prev = s->next = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
|
|
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
s->next->prev = s;
|
|
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
|
|
return ctx->new_session_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess) {
|
|
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *data,
|
|
int len, int *copy))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *data,
|
|
int len, int *copy) {
|
|
return ctx->get_session_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->info_callback = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
|
|
int val) {
|
|
return ctx->info_callback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
|
|
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
unsigned int *cookie_len))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
unsigned int cookie_len))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
|
|
SSL_SESSION)
|