openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
Richard Levitte 15671090f4 RSA: Add a less loaded PSS-parameter structure
RSA_PSS_PARAMS carries with it a lot of baggage in form of X509_ALGOR
and ASN1_INTEGER, which we would rather avoid in our providers.
Therefore, we create a parallell structure - RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 - that
contains the same information, but uses numeric identities (*) and C
integers (**).  This makes it simpler to handle.

Note that neither this structure nor its contents are passed between
libcrypto and the providers.  Instead, the numeric identities are
translated to and from names, which are then passed over that
boundary.

For future considerations, we might consider dropping RSA_PSS_PARAMS
entirely.  For now, it's still reserved for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD code,
which RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 is (almost entirely) reserved for use in our
providers.

(*) We use NIDs in this case, because we already have them and because
only algorithms that libcrypto knows about are permitted in PSS
restrictions.  We could use any number series we want, as long as we
know for sure what they represent.

(**) That's for saltlen and for trailerfield, which are never expect
to surpass the set of numbers that fit in a regular 'int'.

Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11710)
2020-05-14 12:16:35 +02:00

291 lines
10 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/param_build_set.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp for Windows() */
/*
* The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support
* for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider
* implementations alike.
*/
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
int i;
if (numbers == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++){
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]);
if (p != NULL) {
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp)
|| sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0)
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d;
BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
int is_private = 0;
if (rsa == NULL)
return 0;
param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
|| (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))
|| (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)))
goto err;
is_private = (d != NULL);
if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d))
goto err;
n = e = d = NULL;
if (is_private) {
if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
rsa_mp_factor_names)
|| !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
rsa_mp_exp_names)
|| !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
rsa_mp_coeff_names))
goto err;
/* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
&& !rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
goto err;
}
sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
return 1;
err:
BN_free(n);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(d);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free);
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
int rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
int ret = 0;
const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
goto err;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs);
/* Check private key data integrity */
if (rsa_d != NULL) {
int numprimes = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(factors);
int numexps = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(exps);
int numcoeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(coeffs);
/*
* It's permisssible to have zero primes, i.e. no CRT params.
* Otherwise, there must be at least two, as many exponents,
* and one coefficient less.
*/
if (numprimes != 0
&& (numprimes < 2 || numexps < 2 || numcoeffs < 1))
goto err;
}
if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, rsa_d)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, rsa_mp_factor_names,
factors)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, rsa_mp_exp_names,
exps)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, rsa_mp_coeff_names,
coeffs))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps);
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs);
return ret;
}
int rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, const char *propq,
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
int hashalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
int maskgenalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss);
int maskgenhashalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
int saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
int default_hashalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL);
int default_maskgenalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL);
const char *mdname =
(hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid
? NULL : rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid));
const char *mgfname =
(maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid
? NULL : rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid));
const char *mgf1mdname =
(maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid
? NULL : rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid));
const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST;
const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC;
const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST;
const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN;
/*
* To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient,
* we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even
* if it has a default value; saltlen.
*/
if ((mdname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname))
|| (mgfname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
key_mgf, mgfname))
|| (mgf1mdname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname))
|| (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen)))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params,
const OSSL_PARAM params[], OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen;
EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
int saltlen;
int ret = 0;
if (pss_params == NULL)
return 0;
param_md =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST);
param_mgf =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC);
param_mgf1md =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST);
param_saltlen =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN);
/*
* If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some
* restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each
* parameter override their specific restriction data.
*/
if (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL
|| param_saltlen != NULL)
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params))
return 0;
if (param_mgf != NULL) {
int default_maskgenalg_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
const char *mgfname = NULL;
if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mgfname = param_mgf->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname))
return 0;
/* TODO Revisit this if / when a new MGF algorithm appears */
if (strcasecmp(param_mgf->data,
rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0)
return 0;
}
/*
* We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the
* exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below.
*/
if (param_md != NULL) {
const char *mdname = NULL;
if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mdname = param_md->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname))
goto err;
if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, NULL)) == NULL
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params,
rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md)))
goto err;
}
if (param_mgf1md != NULL) {
const char *mgf1mdname = NULL;
if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname))
goto err;
if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, NULL)) == NULL
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(pss_params,
rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md)))
goto err;
}
if (param_saltlen != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen)
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_free(md);
EVP_MD_free(mgf1md);
return ret;
}