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6dacee485f
This issue has been discovered by osss-fuzzer [1]. The test function decodes RSA key created by fuzzer and calls EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check() which proceeds to ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime() check which takes too long exceeding timeout (45secs). The idea is to fix OSSL_DECODER_from_data() code path so invalid RSA keys will be refused. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=69134 Test case generated by the fuzzer is added. Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25190)
718 lines
24 KiB
C
718 lines
24 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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# include <openssl/x509.h>
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# include "crypto/asn1.h"
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#endif
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#include "internal/sizes.h"
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#include "internal/param_build_set.h"
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#include "crypto/rsa.h"
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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/*
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* The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support
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* for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider
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* implementations alike.
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*/
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DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
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static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
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const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[])
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
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int i;
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if (numbers == NULL)
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return 0;
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for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) {
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p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]);
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if (p != NULL) {
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BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp))
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return 0;
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if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) {
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BN_clear_free(tmp);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL;
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL;
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL;
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BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
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int is_private = 0;
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int derive_from_pq = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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if (rsa == NULL)
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return 0;
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param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
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param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
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if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
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|| (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (include_private) {
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param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
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OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ);
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if ((param_derive != NULL)
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq))
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goto err;
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param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
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if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (derive_from_pq) {
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ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* we need at minimum p, q */
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param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1);
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param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2);
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if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p))
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|| (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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is_private = (d != NULL);
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if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d))
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goto err;
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n = e = d = NULL;
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if (is_private) {
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if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names)
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|| !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names)
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|| !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names))
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goto err;
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if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0
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&& sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) {
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/*
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* If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we
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* need to have at least 2 factors
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have
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* been provided
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2
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&& (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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/* build our exponents and coefficients here */
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) {
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/* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */
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if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0),
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sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack
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* so we don't free them below
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*/
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sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
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/*
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* Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no
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* additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and
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* since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip
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* the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa,
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RSA_bits(rsa),
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NULL, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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/*
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* in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here
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* for each additional prime
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa),
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sk_BIGNUM_num(factors),
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rsa->e, factors, exps,
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coeffs)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Now we should have all our factors, exponents and
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* coefficients
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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#else
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/* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
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goto err;
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#endif
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}
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} else {
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/*
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* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d
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* but only if we're not using derive_from_pq
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
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&& !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
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goto err;
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}
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/* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
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|| sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0
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|| sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) {
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ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n",
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sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps),
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sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs));
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!ossl_rsa_check_factors(rsa)) {
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ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR,
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"RSA factors/exponents are too big for for n-modulus\n");
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goto err;
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}
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BN_clear_free(p);
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BN_clear_free(q);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 1;
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err:
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BN_free(n);
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BN_free(e);
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BN_free(d);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
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int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[],
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int include_private)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
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if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
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goto err;
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RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
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ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs);
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if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n)
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|| !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e))
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goto err;
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/* Check private key data integrity */
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if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) {
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if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D,
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rsa_d)
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|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names,
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factors)
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|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps)
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|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
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ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names,
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coeffs))
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goto err;
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}
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#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
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/* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */
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if (bld == NULL)
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ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params);
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#endif
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ret = 1;
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err:
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sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors);
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sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps);
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sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs);
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return ret;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss,
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OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
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int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
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int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss);
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int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
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int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
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int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL);
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int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
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int default_maskgenhashalg_nid =
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ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL);
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const char *mdname =
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(hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid
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? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid));
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const char *mgfname =
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(maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid
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? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid));
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const char *mgf1mdname =
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(maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid
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? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid));
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const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST;
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const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC;
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const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST;
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const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN;
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/*
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* To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient,
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* we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even
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* if it has a default value; saltlen.
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*/
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if ((mdname != NULL
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&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname))
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|| (mgfname != NULL
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&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
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key_mgf, mgfname))
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|| (mgf1mdname != NULL
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&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
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key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname))
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|| (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen)))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params,
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int *defaults_set,
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const OSSL_PARAM params[],
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OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen;
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq;
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const char *propq = NULL;
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EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
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int saltlen;
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int ret = 0;
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if (pss_params == NULL)
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return 0;
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param_propq =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS);
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param_md =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST);
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param_mgf =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC);
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param_mgf1md =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST);
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param_saltlen =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN);
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if (param_propq != NULL) {
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if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
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propq = param_propq->data;
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}
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/*
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* If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some
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* restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each
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* parameter override their specific restriction data.
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*/
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if (!*defaults_set
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&& (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL
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|| param_saltlen != NULL)) {
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if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params))
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return 0;
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*defaults_set = 1;
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}
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if (param_mgf != NULL) {
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int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
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const char *mgfname = NULL;
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if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
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mgfname = param_mgf->data;
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else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname))
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return 0;
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if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(param_mgf->data,
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ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0)
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the
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* exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below.
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*/
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if (param_md != NULL) {
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const char *mdname = NULL;
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if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
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mdname = param_md->data;
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else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname))
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goto err;
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if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL
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|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params,
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ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md)))
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goto err;
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}
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if (param_mgf1md != NULL) {
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const char *mgf1mdname = NULL;
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if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
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mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data;
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else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname))
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goto err;
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|
|
if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(
|
|
pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (param_saltlen != NULL) {
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen)
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_free(md);
|
|
EVP_MD_free(mgf1md);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f)
|
|
{
|
|
if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA *dupkey = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
int pnum, i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */
|
|
if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* public key */
|
|
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* private key */
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* factors and crt params */
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dupkey->version = rsa->version;
|
|
dupkey->flags = rsa->flags;
|
|
/* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */
|
|
dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
/* multiprime */
|
|
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
|
|
&& (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) {
|
|
dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
|
|
if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
|
const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* push first so cleanup in error case works */
|
|
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo);
|
|
|
|
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->pss != NULL) {
|
|
dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss);
|
|
if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL
|
|
&& dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) {
|
|
dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
|
if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA,
|
|
&dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return dupkey;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_free(dupkey);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
|
|
alg->parameter);
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) {
|
|
pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
|
if (pss->maskHash == NULL) {
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pss;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa != NULL
|
|
&& (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL
|
|
&& (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
|
|
int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just
|
|
* want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible
|
|
* to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
|
|
* a bad situation.
|
|
*
|
|
* Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will
|
|
* be checked, eventually.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md,
|
|
&saltlen, &trailerField))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
|
|
mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md);
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
|
|
mgf1md_nid)
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params,
|
|
trailerField))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pss = pss_params;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
|
|
int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the defaults from the ONE place */
|
|
(void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params);
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
|
|
if (*pmd == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash);
|
|
if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (pss->saltLength)
|
|
*psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
|
|
else
|
|
*psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params);
|
|
if (pss->trailerField)
|
|
*ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField);
|
|
else
|
|
*ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
|
|
const void *algp;
|
|
int algptype;
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL
|
|
|| !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) {
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
int pklen;
|
|
const X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
|
|
|
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen);
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
|
|
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
|
|
RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Leave the type bits zero */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|