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b05fbac1fc
We fix dtls_get_max_record_overhead() to give a better value for the max record overhead. We can't realistically handle the compression case so we just ignore that. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19516)
324 lines
11 KiB
C
324 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include "../../ssl_local.h"
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#include "../record_local.h"
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#include "recmethod_local.h"
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static int tls13_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
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unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
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unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
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unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
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const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
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size_t taglen,
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int mactype,
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const EVP_MD *md,
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COMP_METHOD *comp)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
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int mode;
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int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
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if (ivlen > sizeof(rl->iv)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
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}
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memcpy(rl->iv, iv, ivlen);
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ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (ciph_ctx == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
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}
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mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
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if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) <= 0
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|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen,
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NULL) <= 0
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|| (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
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&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen,
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NULL) <= 0)
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|| EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc) <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
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}
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return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
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}
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static int tls13_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
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int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
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unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], recheader[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
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size_t ivlen, offset, loop, hdrlen;
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unsigned char *staticiv;
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unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence;
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int lenu, lenf;
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SSL3_RECORD *rec = &recs[0];
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WPACKET wpkt;
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
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int mode;
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if (n_recs != 1) {
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/* Should not happen */
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
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staticiv = rl->iv;
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cipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
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if (cipher == NULL) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(cipher);
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/*
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* If we're sending an alert and ctx != NULL then we must be forcing
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* plaintext alerts. If we're reading and ctx != NULL then we allow
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* plaintext alerts at certain points in the handshake. If we've got this
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* far then we have already validated that a plaintext alert is ok here.
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*/
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if (ctx == NULL || rec->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
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memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
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rec->input = rec->data;
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return 1;
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}
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ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
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if (!sending) {
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/*
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* Take off tag. There must be at least one byte of content type as
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* well as the tag
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*/
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if (rec->length < rl->taglen + 1)
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return 0;
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rec->length -= rl->taglen;
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}
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/* Set up IV */
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if (ivlen < SEQ_NUM_SIZE) {
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/* Should not happen */
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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offset = ivlen - SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
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memcpy(iv, staticiv, offset);
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for (loop = 0; loop < SEQ_NUM_SIZE; loop++)
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iv[offset + loop] = staticiv[offset + loop] ^ seq[loop];
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if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
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/* RLAYERfatal already called */
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return 0;
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}
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if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, sending) <= 0
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|| (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
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rl->taglen,
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rec->data + rec->length) <= 0)) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Set up the AAD */
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if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, recheader, sizeof(recheader), 0)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, rec->type)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->rec_version)
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|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, rec->length + rl->taglen)
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|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdrlen)
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|| hdrlen != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
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|| !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* For CCM we must explicitly set the total plaintext length before we add
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* any AAD.
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*/
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if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
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&& EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, NULL,
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(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0)
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|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, NULL, &lenu, recheader,
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sizeof(recheader)) <= 0
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|| EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx, rec->data, &lenu, rec->input,
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(unsigned int)rec->length) <= 0
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|| EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, rec->data + lenu, &lenf) <= 0
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|| (size_t)(lenu + lenf) != rec->length) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (sending) {
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/* Add the tag */
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, rl->taglen,
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rec->data + rec->length) <= 0) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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rec->length += rl->taglen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int tls13_validate_record_header(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec)
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{
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if (rec->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
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&& (rec->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
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|| !rl->is_first_handshake)
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&& (rec->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT || !rl->allow_plain_alerts)) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rec->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rec->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
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SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int tls13_post_process_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec)
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{
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/* Skip this if we've received a plaintext alert */
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if (rec->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
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size_t end;
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if (rec->length == 0
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|| rec->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
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SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Strip trailing padding */
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for (end = rec->length - 1; end > 0 && rec->data[end] == 0; end--)
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continue;
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rec->length = end;
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rec->type = rec->data[end];
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}
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if (rec->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!tls13_common_post_process_record(rl, rec)) {
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/* RLAYERfatal already called */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static unsigned int tls13_get_record_type(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
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OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *template)
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{
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if (rl->allow_plain_alerts && template->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
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return SSL3_RT_ALERT;
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/*
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* Aside from the above case we always use the application data record type
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* when encrypting in TLSv1.3. The "inner" record type encodes the "real"
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* record type from the template.
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*/
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return SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
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}
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static int tls13_add_record_padding(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
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OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *thistempl,
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WPACKET *thispkt,
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SSL3_RECORD *thiswr)
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{
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size_t rlen;
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/* Nothing to be done in the case of a plaintext alert */
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if (rl->allow_plain_alerts && thistempl->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)
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return 1;
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if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, thistempl->type)) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
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/* Add TLS1.3 padding */
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rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
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if (rlen < rl->max_frag_len) {
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size_t padding = 0;
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size_t max_padding = rl->max_frag_len - rlen;
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if (rl->padding != NULL) {
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padding = rl->padding(rl->cbarg, thistempl->type, rlen);
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} else if (rl->block_padding > 0) {
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size_t mask = rl->block_padding - 1;
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size_t remainder;
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/* optimize for power of 2 */
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if ((rl->block_padding & mask) == 0)
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remainder = rlen & mask;
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else
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remainder = rlen % rl->block_padding;
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/* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
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if (remainder == 0)
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padding = 0;
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else
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padding = rl->block_padding - remainder;
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}
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if (padding > 0) {
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/* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
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if (padding > max_padding)
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padding = max_padding;
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if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
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RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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struct record_functions_st tls_1_3_funcs = {
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tls13_set_crypto_state,
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tls13_cipher,
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NULL,
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tls_default_set_protocol_version,
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tls_default_read_n,
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tls_get_more_records,
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tls13_validate_record_header,
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tls13_post_process_record,
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tls_get_max_records_default,
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tls_write_records_default,
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tls_allocate_write_buffers_default,
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tls_initialise_write_packets_default,
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tls13_get_record_type,
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tls_prepare_record_header_default,
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tls13_add_record_padding,
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tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
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tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
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NULL
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};
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