mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-11-21 01:15:20 +08:00
931 lines
35 KiB
C
931 lines
35 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "ssl_local.h"
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#include "internal/ktls.h"
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#include "record/record_local.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
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/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
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static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20";
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/*
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* Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
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* |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
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* secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
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* The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
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* |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
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* If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
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const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
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unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error)
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{
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EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq);
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EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
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OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
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int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
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const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
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int ret;
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size_t hashlen;
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kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
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EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
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if (kctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
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if (raise_error)
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/*
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* Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
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* or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
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*/
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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if (raise_error)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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hashlen = (size_t)ret;
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
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(char *)mdname, 0);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
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(unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
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(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
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sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
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(unsigned char *)label, labellen);
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if (data != NULL)
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
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(unsigned char *)data,
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datalen);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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if (ret != 0) {
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if (raise_error)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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}
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return ret == 0;
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}
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int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
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unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
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{
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int ret;
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SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
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ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md,
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secret, label, labellen, data, datalen,
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out, outlen, !fatal);
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if (ret == 0 && fatal)
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
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* success 0 on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
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{
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/* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
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static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79";
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return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
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NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
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}
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/*
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* Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
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* success 0 on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
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{
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/* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
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static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76";
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return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
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NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
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}
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int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
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{
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/* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
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static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64";
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return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
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sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
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}
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/*
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* Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
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* length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
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* pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *prevsecret,
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const unsigned char *insecret,
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size_t insecretlen,
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unsigned char *outsecret)
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{
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size_t mdlen;
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int mdleni;
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int ret;
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EVP_KDF *kdf;
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EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
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OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
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int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
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const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
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/* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
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static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64";
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SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
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kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq);
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kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
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EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
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if (kctx == NULL) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
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if (!ossl_assert(mdleni > 0)) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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return 0;
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}
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mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
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(char *)mdname, 0);
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if (insecret != NULL)
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
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(unsigned char *)insecret,
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insecretlen);
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if (prevsecret != NULL)
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
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(unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
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(unsigned char *)label_prefix,
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sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
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(unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
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sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
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if (ret != 0)
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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return ret == 0;
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}
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/*
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* Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
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* handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
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* generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
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const unsigned char *insecret,
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size_t insecretlen)
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{
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/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
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return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
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insecret, insecretlen,
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(unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
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}
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/*
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* Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
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* secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
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* failure.
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*/
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int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
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unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
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size_t *secret_size)
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{
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const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
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int md_size;
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md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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if (md_size <= 0) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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*secret_size = (size_t)md_size;
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/* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
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return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
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}
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/*
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* Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
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* 0 on error.
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*/
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size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
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unsigned char *out)
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{
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const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
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const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
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unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned char *key = NULL;
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size_t len = 0, hashlen;
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OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
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SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
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if (md == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
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if (sctx->propq != NULL)
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*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
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(char *)sctx->propq,
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0);
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*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
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if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
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/* SSLfatal() already called */
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goto err;
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}
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if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
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key = s->server_finished_secret;
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} else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
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key = s->client_finished_secret;
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} else {
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if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
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s->client_app_traffic_secret,
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finsecret, hashlen))
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goto err;
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key = finsecret;
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}
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if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname,
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params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
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/* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
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out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
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return len;
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}
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/*
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* There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
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* for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
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*/
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int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
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{
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const EVP_CIPHER *c;
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const EVP_MD *hash;
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int mac_type = NID_undef;
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size_t mac_secret_size = 0;
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s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
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if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
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&mac_type, &mac_secret_size, NULL, 0)) {
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/* Error is already recorded */
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SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
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s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
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ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
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s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
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s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
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s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
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return 1;
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}
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static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
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const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
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int mac_type,
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const EVP_MD *mac_md,
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const unsigned char *insecret,
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const unsigned char *hash,
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const unsigned char *label,
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size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
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unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen,
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unsigned char **iv, size_t *ivlen,
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size_t *taglen)
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{
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int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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size_t hashlen;
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int mode, mac_mdleni;
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/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
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if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
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if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
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secret, hashlen, 1)) {
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/* SSLfatal() already called */
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return 0;
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}
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/* if ciph is NULL cipher, then use new_hash to calculate keylen */
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if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "NULL")
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&& mac_md != NULL
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&& mac_type == NID_hmac) {
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mac_mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(mac_md);
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if (mac_mdleni <= 0) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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*ivlen = *taglen = (size_t)mac_mdleni;
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*keylen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
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} else {
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*keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
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mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
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uint32_t algenc;
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*ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
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if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
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algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
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} else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
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/* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
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algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
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} else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
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/* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
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algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
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} else {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
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*taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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else
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*taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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} else {
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int iivlen;
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
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*taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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} else {
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/* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */
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*taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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}
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iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
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if (iivlen < 0) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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*ivlen = iivlen;
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}
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}
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if (*ivlen > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
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*iv = OPENSSL_malloc(*ivlen);
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if (*iv == NULL) {
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen)
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|| !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, *iv, *ivlen)) {
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/* SSLfatal() already called */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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|
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int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
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{
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/* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
|
|
/* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
|
|
/* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
|
|
/* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
|
|
/* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63";
|
|
/* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
|
|
/* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
|
|
/* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72";
|
|
unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *iv = iv_intern;
|
|
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char *hash = hashval;
|
|
unsigned char *insecret;
|
|
unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
|
|
const char *log_label = NULL;
|
|
int finsecretlen = 0;
|
|
const unsigned char *label;
|
|
size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mac_md = NULL;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
|
|
int mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
size_t keylen, ivlen = EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH, taglen;
|
|
int level;
|
|
int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
|
|
: OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
|
|
|| ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
|
|
if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
|
|
long handlen;
|
|
void *hdata;
|
|
unsigned int hashlenui;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
|
|
|
|
insecret = s->early_secret;
|
|
label = client_early_traffic;
|
|
labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
|
|
log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
|
|
|
|
handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
|
if (handlen <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
|
|
&& s->max_early_data > 0
|
|
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
|
|
* actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
|
|
* must be using an external PSK.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
|
|
&& s->max_early_data ==
|
|
s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
|
|
}
|
|
if (sslcipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
|
|
* it again
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
|
|
/* Error is already recorded */
|
|
SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0)
|
|
&& (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(sctx, sslcipher, &mac_md,
|
|
&mac_pkey_type, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
|
|
* the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
|
|
* use ssl_handshake_md().
|
|
*/
|
|
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
if (mdctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
|
|
if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
|
|
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
hashlen = hashlenui;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
|
|
early_exporter_master_secret,
|
|
sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
|
|
hashval, hashlen,
|
|
s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
|
|
1)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
|
|
s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
|
|
finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
|
|
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
|
|
if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
label = client_handshake_traffic;
|
|
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
|
|
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
|
|
* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
|
|
* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
|
|
* processed early data then we delay changing the server
|
|
* read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
|
|
* hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
|
|
* when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
|
|
*/
|
|
hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
|
|
} else {
|
|
insecret = s->master_secret;
|
|
label = client_application_traffic;
|
|
labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
|
|
log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
|
|
* Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
|
|
* what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
|
|
* previously saved value.
|
|
*/
|
|
hash = s->server_finished_hash;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
|
|
if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
insecret = s->handshake_secret;
|
|
finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
|
|
finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
|
|
if (finsecretlen <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
label = server_handshake_traffic;
|
|
labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
|
|
log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
insecret = s->master_secret;
|
|
label = server_application_traffic;
|
|
labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
|
|
log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) == 0) {
|
|
md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
|
|
cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
|
|
mac_md = s->s3.tmp.new_hash;
|
|
mac_pkey_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
|
|
|| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
|
|
* client application traffic secret
|
|
*/
|
|
if (label == server_application_traffic)
|
|
memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
|
|
|
|
if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
|
|
memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
|
|
|
|
if (label == client_application_traffic) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
|
|
* hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
|
|
resumption_master_secret,
|
|
sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
|
|
hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
|
|
hashlen, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check whether cipher is known */
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, cipher, mac_pkey_type, mac_md,
|
|
insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
|
|
&keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (label == server_application_traffic) {
|
|
memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
|
|
/* Now we create the exporter master secret */
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
|
|
exporter_master_secret,
|
|
sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
|
|
hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
|
|
hashlen, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
|
|
hashlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (label == client_application_traffic)
|
|
memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (finsecret != NULL
|
|
&& !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
|
|
finsecret, (size_t)finsecretlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) {
|
|
if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
|
|
s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1);
|
|
else
|
|
s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0
|
|
? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
|
|
: ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0
|
|
? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
|
|
: OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
|
|
direction,
|
|
level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv,
|
|
ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen,
|
|
mac_pkey_type, mac_md, NULL, md)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
|
|
/* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
|
|
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0)
|
|
ssl_evp_md_free(mac_md);
|
|
ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
|
|
if (iv != iv_intern)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(iv);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64";
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
|
|
size_t hashlen;
|
|
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *insecret;
|
|
unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
char *log_label;
|
|
size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
|
|
int ret = 0, l;
|
|
int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
|
|
: OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ;
|
|
unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *iv = iv_intern;
|
|
|
|
if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
hashlen = (size_t)l;
|
|
|
|
if (s->server == sending)
|
|
insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
|
|
else
|
|
insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
|
|
|
|
if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md,
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc,
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type, s->s3.tmp.new_hash,
|
|
insecret, NULL,
|
|
application_traffic,
|
|
sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
|
|
&keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
|
|
direction,
|
|
OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
|
|
insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL,
|
|
NULL, md)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */
|
|
log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL;
|
|
if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
|
|
if (iv != iv_intern)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(iv);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_alert_code(int code)
|
|
{
|
|
/* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
|
|
if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
|
|
return code;
|
|
|
|
return tls1_alert_code(code);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen,
|
|
const unsigned char *context,
|
|
size_t contextlen, int use_context)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
/* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
|
|
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!use_context)
|
|
contextlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
|
|
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
|
|
(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
|
|
data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
|
|
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
|
|
sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
|
|
out, olen, 0))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
|
const char *label, size_t llen,
|
|
const unsigned char *context,
|
|
size_t contextlen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */
|
|
static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72";
|
|
unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
|
|
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
|
|
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
|
|
else
|
|
sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
|
|
|
|
md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
|
|
* the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
|
|
* is like so:
|
|
*
|
|
* TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
|
|
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
|
|
* "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
|
|
*
|
|
* Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
|
|
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
|
|
* Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
|
|
*
|
|
* Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (md == NULL
|
|
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
|
|
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
|
|
(const unsigned char *)label, llen,
|
|
data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
|
|
|| !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
|
|
sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
|
|
out, olen, 0))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|