openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
Geoff Thorpe 385d81380c First step in tidying up the LHASH code. The callback prototypes (and
casts) used in the lhash code are about as horrible and evil as they can
be. For starters, the callback prototypes contain empty parameter lists.
Yuck.

This first change defines clearer prototypes - including "typedef"'d
function pointer types to use as "hash" and "compare" callbacks, as well as
the callbacks passed to the lh_doall and lh_doall_arg iteration functions.
Now at least more explicit (and clear) casting is required in all of the
dependant code - and that should be included in this commit.

The next step will be to hunt down and obliterate some of the function
pointer casting being used when it's not necessary - a particularly evil
variant exists in the implementation of lh_doall.
2000-12-01 20:31:52 +00:00

682 lines
18 KiB
C

/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
static int ssl_session_num=0;
static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_session_meth=NULL;
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
{
return(ssl->session);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
* non-null and when we up the reference count. */
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
sess = ssl->session;
if(sess)
sess->references++;
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
return(sess);
}
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
ssl_session_num++;
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1,
&ssl_session_meth,
argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
{
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
{
SSL_SESSION *ss;
ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
if (ss == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
ss->references=1;
ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
ss->time=time(NULL);
ss->prev=NULL;
ss->next=NULL;
ss->compress_meth=0;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data);
return(ss);
}
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
else
ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
if (s->session != NULL)
{
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=NULL;
}
if (session)
{
if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
{
ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
{
ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return(0);
}
for (;;)
{
SSL_SESSION *r;
RAND_pseudo_bytes(ss->session_id,ss->session_id_length);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions, ss);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (r == NULL) break;
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
* but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
* we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
* with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
* to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
* and make a reservation for it if it does not
* (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
*/
}
}
else
{
ss->session_id_length=0;
}
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session=ss;
ss->ssl_version=s->version;
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
return(1);
}
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
{
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
int fatal = 0;
data.ssl_version=s->version;
data.session_id_length=len;
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
goto err;
memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
{
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data);
if (ret != NULL)
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
if (ret == NULL)
{
int copy=1;
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
ret=NULL;
if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
&& (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,&copy))
!= NULL)
{
s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback
* asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
* returned by the callback are shared between threads,
* it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
* or things won't be thread-safe). */
if (copy)
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
* things are very strange */
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
}
/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
{
/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
* want to use it in this context. */
if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
{
/* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
* -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
* of this session, but then applications could effectively
* disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
else
{
#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
* so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
#endif
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
}
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
{
unsigned char buf[5],*p;
unsigned long l;
p=buf;
l=ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l,p);
if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
* it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
* be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
* later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
#endif
if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
{
s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
/* remove it from the cache */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
goto err;
}
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
/* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
/* again, just leave the session
* if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
* then decremented the reference count :-) */
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=ret;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return(1);
err:
if (ret != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
if (fatal)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
int ret=0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
* even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
* doubly linked list and an lhash */
CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
* In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
if (s != NULL && s != c)
{
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
* (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
* session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
* two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
* cache) */
s = NULL;
}
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
if (s == NULL)
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
if (s != NULL)
{
/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
* count because it already takes into account the cache */
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret=0;
}
else
{
/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
ret=1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
{
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
{
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
break;
else
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
}
}
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return(ret);
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
{
SSL_SESSION *r;
int ret=0;
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
{
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
if (r != NULL)
{
ret=1;
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
}
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret)
{
r->not_resumable=1;
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
}
}
else
ret=0;
return(ret);
}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
int i;
if(ss == NULL)
return;
i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
#endif
if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data);
memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
memset(ss->session_id,0,SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
memset(ss,0,sizeof(*ss));
OPENSSL_free(ss);
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
int ret=0;
SSL_METHOD *meth;
if (session != NULL)
{
meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL)
meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
return(0);
}
if (meth != s->method)
{
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
return(0);
if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
else
session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
}
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
if (s->session != NULL)
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=session;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
ret=1;
}
else
{
if (s->session != NULL)
{
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=NULL;
}
meth=s->ctx->method;
if (meth != s->method)
{
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
return(0);
}
ret=1;
}
return(ret);
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
if (s == NULL) return(0);
s->timeout=t;
return(1);
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL) return(0);
return(s->timeout);
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL) return(0);
return(s->time);
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
if (s == NULL) return(0);
s->time=t;
return(t);
}
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
long l;
if (s == NULL) return(0);
l=s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout=t;
return(l);
}
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *s)
{
if (s == NULL) return(0);
return(s->session_timeout);
}
typedef struct timeout_param_st
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
long time;
LHASH *cache;
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
{
if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
{
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
* save on locking overhead */
lh_delete(p->cache,s);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
s->not_resumable=1;
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
}
}
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
unsigned long i;
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
tp.ctx=s;
tp.cache=s->sessions;
if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
tp.time=t;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
i=tp.cache->down_load;
tp.cache->down_load=0;
lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, (LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE)timeout, &tp);
tp.cache->down_load=i;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
{
if ( (s->session != NULL) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
{
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
return(1);
}
else
return(0);
}
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
{ /* last element in list */
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
{ /* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
}
else
{
ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
}
else
{
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
{ /* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
}
else
{ /* middle of list */
s->next->prev=s->prev;
s->prev->next=s->next;
}
}
s->prev=s->next=NULL;
}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
{
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
else
{
s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
s->next->prev=s;
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
}
}