mirror of
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da1c088f59
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Release: yes
866 lines
31 KiB
C
866 lines
31 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
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* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
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#include "cmp_local.h"
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#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
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/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/cmp.h>
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#include <openssl/crmf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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/* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
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static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
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{
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OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
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EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
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BIO *bio;
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int res = 0;
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if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
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return 0;
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bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
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if (bio == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
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if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
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&& (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
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if (pubkey == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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prot_part.header = msg->header;
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prot_part.body = msg->body;
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if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
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msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection,
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&prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx,
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cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) {
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res = 1;
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goto end;
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}
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sig_err:
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res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
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if (res)
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ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
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res = 0;
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end:
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EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
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BIO_free(bio);
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return res;
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}
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/* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
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static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
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{
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
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int valid = 0;
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/* generate expected protection for the message */
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if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)
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return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
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valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
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&& msg->protection->type == protection->type
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&& msg->protection->length == protection->length
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&& CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
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protection->length) == 0;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
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if (!valid)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
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return valid;
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}
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/*-
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* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
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* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
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* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
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*
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* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
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*/
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int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
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{
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int valid = 0;
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X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
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int err;
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if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (trusted_store == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL
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|| !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
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cert, ctx->untrusted))
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goto err;
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valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
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/* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
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err = ERR_peek_last_error();
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if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
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err:
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/* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
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OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
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X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
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return valid;
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}
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/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
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static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
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const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
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const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
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{
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char *str;
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if (expect_name == NULL)
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return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
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/* make sure that a matching name is there */
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if (actual_name == NULL) {
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ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
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return 0;
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}
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str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
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if (log_success && str != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
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str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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return 1;
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}
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if (str != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
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static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
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{
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char *str;
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if (skid == NULL)
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return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
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/* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
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if (ckid == NULL) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
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return 0;
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}
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str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, ckid);
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if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
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if (str != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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return 1;
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}
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if (str != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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if ((str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
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if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*-
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* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
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* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
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* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
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* Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
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*
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* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
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*/
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static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
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{
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X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
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int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
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char *str;
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
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int time_cmp;
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ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
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self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
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if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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if (!self_issued) {
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str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
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if (str != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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}
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if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
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|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
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ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
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return 0;
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}
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time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
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X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
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if (time_cmp != 0) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
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: "cert is not yet valid");
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return 0;
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}
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if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
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"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
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"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
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return 0;
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if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
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return 0;
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/* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
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if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
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return 0;
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}
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if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
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return 0;
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}
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/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
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ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
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return 1;
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}
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static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
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X509 *scrt)
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{
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if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
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return 1;
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
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"msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
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* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
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* and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
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* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert -
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* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
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*/
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static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt)
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{
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int valid = 0;
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X509_STORE *store;
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if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
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return 0;
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if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
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|| !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
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1 /* self-issued only */))
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goto err;
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/* store does not include CRLs */
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valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
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if (!valid) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
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"also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
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} else {
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/*
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* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
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* OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
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*/
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OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
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ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
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OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
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X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(ctx, crep);
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/*
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* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
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* errors
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*/
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valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
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X509_free(newcrt);
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}
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err:
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X509_STORE_free(store);
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return valid;
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}
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static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
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{
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return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
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cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
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&& (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)
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|| check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert));
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}
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/*-
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* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
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* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
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* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
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*/
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static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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const char *desc,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
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{
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int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
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int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
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int i;
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if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
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ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
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return 0;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
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X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
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return 0;
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if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
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already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
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continue;
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n_acceptable_certs++;
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if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)
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: check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) {
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/* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
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return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert);
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}
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}
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if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
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return 0;
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}
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/*-
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* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts
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* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
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* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
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*/
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static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
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int mode_3gpp)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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if (mode_3gpp
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&& ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
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|| OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
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return 0;
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ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
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mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
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: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
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if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
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NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
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return 1;
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if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs",
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msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
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return 1;
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if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
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: "no trusted store");
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} else {
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STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
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ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
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mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
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: "certs in trusted store",
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msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted,
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msg, mode_3gpp);
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OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(trusted);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
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OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
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{
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return 1;
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}
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/*-
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* Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
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* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
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*/
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static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
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{
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X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
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GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
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char *sname = NULL;
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char *skid_str = NULL;
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
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OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
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int res = 0;
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if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
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return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
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if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
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/* So far, only X509_NAME is supported */
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
|
|
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
|
|
(void)ERR_set_mark();
|
|
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
|
|
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
|
|
*/
|
|
if (scrt != NULL) {
|
|
if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
|
|
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
|
|
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
|
|
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
|
|
/* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
|
|
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
|
|
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
|
|
(void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|
|
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
|
|
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
|
|
if (res) {
|
|
/* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
|
|
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
|
|
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
|
|
|
|
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
|
|
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL : i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid);
|
|
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
|
|
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
|
|
if (sname != NULL)
|
|
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
|
|
if (skid_str != NULL)
|
|
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
|
|
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
|
|
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
|
|
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
|
|
if (sname != NULL) {
|
|
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
|
|
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
|
|
}
|
|
if (skid_str != NULL) {
|
|
ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
|
|
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sname);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
|
|
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
|
|
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
|
|
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted
|
|
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
|
|
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert().
|
|
*
|
|
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
|
|
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
|
|
* if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
|
|
* validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
|
|
* This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *scrt;
|
|
|
|
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message");
|
|
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
|
|
|| msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
|
|
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
|
|
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
|
|
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
|
|
if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
|
|
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
|
|
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
|
|
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
|
|
* certificate by the initiator.'
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
|
|
case -1:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
|
|
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
|
|
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
|
|
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
|
|
"successfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed");
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
|
|
* Not yet supported
|
|
*/
|
|
case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
|
|
*/
|
|
default:
|
|
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
|
|
if (scrt == NULL) {
|
|
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
|
|
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_ANCHOR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) {
|
|
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
|
|
"successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using trust store");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else { /* use pinned sender cert */
|
|
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
|
|
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
|
|
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
|
|
"successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection using pinned server cert");
|
|
return ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_validatedSrvCert(ctx, scrt);
|
|
}
|
|
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed");
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_transactionID_or_nonce(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *expected,
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *actual, int reason)
|
|
{
|
|
if (expected != NULL
|
|
&& (actual == NULL || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(expected, actual) != 0)) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
char *expected_str, *actual_str;
|
|
|
|
expected_str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, expected);
|
|
actual_str = actual == NULL ? NULL: i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, actual);
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, reason,
|
|
"expected = %s, actual = %s",
|
|
expected_str == NULL ? "?" : expected_str,
|
|
actual == NULL ? "(none)" :
|
|
actual_str == NULL ? "?" : actual_str);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(expected_str);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(actual_str);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
|
|
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted.
|
|
*
|
|
* Ensures that:
|
|
* its sender is of appropriate type (currently only X509_NAME) and
|
|
* matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
|
|
* it has a valid body type
|
|
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
|
|
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
|
|
* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
|
|
* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
|
|
*
|
|
* If everything is fine:
|
|
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
|
|
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
|
|
* and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
|
|
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
|
|
const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
|
|
|
|
/* validate sender name of received msg */
|
|
if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
|
|
* Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
|
|
* or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
|
|
*/
|
|
expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
|
|
if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
|
|
expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
|
|
if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
|
|
"expected sender", expected_sender))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
|
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
|
|
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
|
|
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
|
|
* and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
|
|
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
|
|
* Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
|
|
* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
|
|
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
|
|
/* this allows self-signed certs */
|
|
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
|
|
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* validate message protection */
|
|
if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
|
|
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
|
|
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
|
|
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
|
|
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check CMP version number in header */
|
|
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_2
|
|
&& ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO_3) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
|
|
if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->transactionID, hdr->transactionID,
|
|
CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
|
|
if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->senderNonce, hdr->recipNonce,
|
|
CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
|
|
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
|
|
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
|
|
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
|
|
* --> Store for setting in next message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
|
|
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
|
|
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
|
|
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
|
|
/* this allows self-signed certs */
|
|
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
|
|
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
|
|
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
|
|
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
|
|
* certificate by the initiator.'
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
|
|
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
|
|
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
|
|
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
switch (msg->body->type) {
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
|
|
{
|
|
X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
|
|
|
|
if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx,
|
|
ctx->propq) <= 0) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
|
|
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
|
|
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
|
|
acceptRAVerified,
|
|
ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) {
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|