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01659135a1
It turned out that configuration options may affect the definition and use of diverse stacks and how they relate to the underlying types. For example, the configuration option 'no-rfc3779' results in a build error around STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) and related stacks. Previously, STACK_OF definitions were located near the definition of the underlying type, which are also affected by configuration options, which made this easier to maintain. We relocate the new stack definitions back to those locations for that reason. We apply the same type of relocation in other header files as well, following the general rule that it's better to use DEFINE_OR_DECLARE_STACK_OF after the type it defines a stack for has been defined. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11655)
265 lines
7.4 KiB
C
265 lines
7.4 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "crypto/x509.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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DEFINE_STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily)
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#endif
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
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ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
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ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
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/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
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extern void policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
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static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
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void *exarg)
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{
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X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
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switch (operation) {
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case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
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X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
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AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
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CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
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policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
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ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
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#endif
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->distinguishing_id);
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/* fall thru */
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case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
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ret->ex_cached = 0;
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ret->ex_kusage = 0;
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ret->ex_xkusage = 0;
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ret->ex_nscert = 0;
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ret->ex_flags = 0;
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ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
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ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
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ret->skid = NULL;
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ret->akid = NULL;
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ret->policy_cache = NULL;
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ret->altname = NULL;
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ret->nc = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
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ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
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#endif
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ret->distinguishing_id = NULL;
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ret->aux = NULL;
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ret->crldp = NULL;
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if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data))
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return 0;
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
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X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
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AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
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CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
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policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
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ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
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#endif
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->distinguishing_id);
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break;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
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int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *X509_get_ex_data(const X509 *r, int idx)
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{
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
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}
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/*
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* X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
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* extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
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* is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
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* reliable source such as local storage.
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*/
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X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
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{
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const unsigned char *q;
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X509 *ret;
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int freeret = 0;
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/* Save start position */
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q = *pp;
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if (a == NULL || *a == NULL)
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freeret = 1;
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ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
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/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
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if (ret == NULL)
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return NULL;
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/* update length */
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length -= q - *pp;
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if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
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goto err;
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*pp = q;
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return ret;
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err:
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if (freeret) {
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X509_free(ret);
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if (a)
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*a = NULL;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
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* length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
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* error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
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* Here we avoid compounding the problem.
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*/
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static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(const X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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int length, tmplen;
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unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
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/*
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* This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
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* not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
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* both just in case.
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*/
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length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
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if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
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return length;
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tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
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if (tmplen < 0) {
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if (start != NULL)
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*pp = start;
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return tmplen;
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}
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length += tmplen;
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return length;
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}
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/*
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* Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
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* length if pp == NULL.
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*
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* When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
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* we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
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* the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
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* allocated buffer.
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*/
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int i2d_X509_AUX(const X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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int length;
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unsigned char *tmp;
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/* Buffer provided by caller */
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if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
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return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
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/* Obtain the combined length */
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if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
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return length;
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/* Allocate requisite combined storage */
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*pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
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if (tmp == NULL) {
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X509err(X509_F_I2D_X509_AUX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
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length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
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if (length <= 0) {
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OPENSSL_free(*pp);
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*pp = NULL;
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}
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return length;
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}
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int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
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return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp);
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}
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void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
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const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x)
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{
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if (psig)
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*psig = &x->signature;
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if (palg)
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*palg = &x->sig_alg;
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}
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int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
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{
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return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm);
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}
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void X509_set0_distinguishing_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *d_id)
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{
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->distinguishing_id);
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x->distinguishing_id = d_id;
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}
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_distinguishing_id(X509 *x)
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{
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return x->distinguishing_id;
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}
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