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openssl/crypto/x509/x509_set.c
Tomas Mraz 7ed6de997f Copyright year updates 
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Release: yes
2024-09-05 09:35:49 +02:00

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "x509_local.h"
int X509_set_version(X509 *x, long version)
{
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
if (version == X509_get_version(x))
return 1; /* avoid needless modification even re-allocation */
if (version == X509_VERSION_1) {
ASN1_INTEGER_free(x->cert_info.version);
x->cert_info.version = NULL;
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
if (x->cert_info.version == NULL) {
if ((x->cert_info.version = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(x->cert_info.version, version))
return 0;
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *in;
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
in = &x->cert_info.serialNumber;
if (in != serial)
return ASN1_STRING_copy(in, serial);
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, const X509_NAME *name)
{
if (x == NULL || !X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.issuer, name))
return 0;
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, const X509_NAME *name)
{
if (x == NULL || !X509_NAME_set(&x->cert_info.subject, name))
return 0;
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int ossl_x509_set1_time(int *modified, ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
{
ASN1_TIME *new;
if (*ptm == tm)
return 1;
new = ASN1_STRING_dup(tm);
if (tm != NULL && new == NULL)
return 0;
ASN1_TIME_free(*ptm);
*ptm = new;
if (modified != NULL)
*modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int X509_set1_notBefore(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
{
if (x == NULL || tm == NULL)
return 0;
return ossl_x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.enc.modified,
&x->cert_info.validity.notBefore, tm);
}
int X509_set1_notAfter(X509 *x, const ASN1_TIME *tm)
{
if (x == NULL || tm == NULL)
return 0;
return ossl_x509_set1_time(&x->cert_info.enc.modified,
&x->cert_info.validity.notAfter, tm);
}
int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&(x->cert_info.key), pkey))
return 0;
x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
return 1;
}
int X509_up_ref(X509 *x)
{
int i;
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&x->references, &i) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("X509", x);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return i > 1;
}
long X509_get_version(const X509 *x)
{
return ASN1_INTEGER_get(x->cert_info.version);
}
const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notBefore(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
}
const ASN1_TIME *X509_get0_notAfter(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notBefore(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.validity.notBefore;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_getm_notAfter(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.validity.notAfter;
}
int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x)
{
return EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm));
}
X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.key;
}
const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x)
{
return x->cert_info.extensions;
}
void X509_get0_uids(const X509 *x, const ASN1_BIT_STRING **piuid,
const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psuid)
{
if (piuid != NULL)
*piuid = x->cert_info.issuerUID;
if (psuid != NULL)
*psuid = x->cert_info.subjectUID;
}
const X509_ALGOR *X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(const X509 *x)
{
return &x->cert_info.signature;
}
int X509_SIG_INFO_get(const X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int *mdnid, int *pknid,
int *secbits, uint32_t *flags)
{
if (mdnid != NULL)
*mdnid = siginf->mdnid;
if (pknid != NULL)
*pknid = siginf->pknid;
if (secbits != NULL)
*secbits = siginf->secbits;
if (flags != NULL)
*flags = siginf->flags;
return (siginf->flags & X509_SIG_INFO_VALID) != 0;
}
void X509_SIG_INFO_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, int mdnid, int pknid,
int secbits, uint32_t flags)
{
siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
siginf->pknid = pknid;
siginf->secbits = secbits;
siginf->flags = flags;
}
int X509_get_signature_info(X509 *x, int *mdnid, int *pknid, int *secbits,
uint32_t *flags)
{
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
return X509_SIG_INFO_get(&x->siginf, mdnid, pknid, secbits, flags);
}
/* Modify *siginf according to alg and sig. Return 1 on success, else 0. */
static int x509_sig_info_init(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
const ASN1_STRING *sig, const EVP_PKEY *pubkey)
{
int pknid, mdnid, md_size;
const EVP_MD *md;
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
siginf->mdnid = NID_undef;
siginf->pknid = NID_undef;
siginf->secbits = -1;
siginf->flags = 0;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid)
|| pknid == NID_undef) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_SIGID_ALGS);
return 0;
}
siginf->mdnid = mdnid;
siginf->pknid = pknid;
switch (mdnid) {
case NID_undef:
/* If we have one, use a custom handler for this algorithm */
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(NULL, pknid);
if (ameth != NULL && ameth->siginf_set != NULL
&& ameth->siginf_set(siginf, alg, sig))
break;
if (pubkey != NULL) {
int secbits;
secbits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pubkey);
if (secbits != 0) {
siginf->secbits = secbits;
break;
}
}
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ERROR_USING_SIGINF_SET);
return 0;
/*
* SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
* they're no longer accepted at security level 1.
* The real values don't really matter as long as they're lower than 80,
* which is our security level 1.
*/
case NID_sha1:
/*
* https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack
* for SHA1 at2^63.4
*/
siginf->secbits = 63;
break;
case NID_md5:
/*
* https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
* puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
*/
siginf->secbits = 39;
break;
case NID_id_GostR3411_94:
/*
* There is a collision attack on GOST R 34.11-94 at 2^105, see
* https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-85174-5_10
*/
siginf->secbits = 105;
break;
default:
/* Security bits: half number of bits in digest */
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ERROR_GETTING_MD_BY_NID);
return 0;
}
md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (md_size <= 0)
return 0;
siginf->secbits = md_size * 4;
break;
}
switch (mdnid) {
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
case NID_sha512:
siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_TLS;
}
siginf->flags |= X509_SIG_INFO_VALID;
return 1;
}
/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */
int ossl_x509_init_sig_info(X509 *x)
{
return x509_sig_info_init(&x->siginf, &x->sig_alg, &x->signature,
X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key));
}
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