mirror of
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7ed6de997f
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Release: yes
724 lines
23 KiB
C
724 lines
23 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2004-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/trace.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "pcy_local.h"
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/*
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* If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
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* a generous default of 1000 nodes.
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*
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* Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
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* door on CVE-2023-0464.
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
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# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
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#endif
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static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
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static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
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int indent)
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{
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if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK))
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BIO_puts(channel, " Not Mapped\n");
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else {
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int i;
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
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BIO_puts(channel, " Expected: ");
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) {
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oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i);
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if (i)
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BIO_puts(channel, ", ");
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i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(channel, oid);
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}
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BIO_puts(channel, "\n");
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}
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}
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static void tree_print(BIO *channel,
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char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
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if (!curr)
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curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
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else
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curr++;
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BIO_printf(channel, "Level print after %s\n", str);
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BIO_printf(channel, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n",
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(long)(curr - tree->levels));
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for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
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int i;
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BIO_printf(channel, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
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(long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node =
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(channel, node, 2);
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expected_print(channel, plev, node, 2);
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BIO_printf(channel, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
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}
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if (plev->anyPolicy)
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X509_POLICY_NODE_print(channel, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
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}
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}
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#define TREE_PRINT(str, tree, curr) \
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OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(X509V3_POLICY) { \
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tree_print(trc_out, "before tree_prune()", tree, curr); \
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} OSSL_TRACE_END(X509V3_POLICY)
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/*-
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* Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask:
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*
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* X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
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* X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case)
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* X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required
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*/
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static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree;
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
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int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
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int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */
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int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1;
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int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1;
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int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1;
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int i;
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*ptree = NULL;
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if (n < 0)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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/* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
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if (n == 0)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
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/*
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* First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be
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* used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all
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* certificates with invalid policy extensions.
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*/
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for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
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/* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */
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if (ossl_policy_cache_set(x) == NULL)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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}
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/*
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* At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy.
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* Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the
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* requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is
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* decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may
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* be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate.
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*
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* The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along
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* the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit
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* policy is required we're done.
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*/
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for (i = n - 1;
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i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0);
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i--) {
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X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
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/* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */
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if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID;
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/* Access the cache which we now know exists */
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cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(x);
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if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL)
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ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
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if (explicit_policy > 0) {
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if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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explicit_policy--;
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if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0)
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&& (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
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explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
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}
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}
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if (explicit_policy == 0)
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ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT;
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if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0)
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return ret;
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/* If we get this far initialize the tree */
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if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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/* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
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tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
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/*
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* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
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*
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* The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected
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* policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at
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* depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n).
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*/
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if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(tree);
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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}
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tree->nlevel = n+1;
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level = tree->levels;
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if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
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OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
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goto bad_tree;
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if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
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ossl_policy_data_free(data);
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goto bad_tree;
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}
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/*
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* In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and
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* policy mapping are inhibited at each level.
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*/
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for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
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/* Access the cache which we now know exists */
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cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(x);
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X509_up_ref(x);
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(++level)->cert = x;
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if (!cache->anyPolicy)
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
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/* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
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if (any_skip == 0) {
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/*
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* Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not
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* the last in the chain.
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*/
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if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
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} else {
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if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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any_skip--;
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if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
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any_skip = cache->any_skip;
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}
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if (map_skip == 0)
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level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
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else {
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if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
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map_skip--;
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if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
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map_skip = cache->map_skip;
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}
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}
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*ptree = tree;
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return ret;
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bad_tree:
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X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
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return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
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}
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/*
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
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*/
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static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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int i, matched = 0;
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/* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
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if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
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if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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matched = 1;
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}
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}
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if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
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if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
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* CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
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*
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
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/* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
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if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
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* policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
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*
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
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if (id == NULL)
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id = node->data->valid_policy;
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/*
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* Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
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* node.
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*/
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if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
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data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
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data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
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if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
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ossl_policy_data_free(data);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
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*/
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static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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int i;
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if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
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|| !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) {
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/* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */
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if (node->nchild)
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return 1;
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree))
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return 0;
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/* Add it */
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} else {
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/* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set;
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if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset))
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return 1;
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/* Locate unmatched nodes */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) {
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ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i);
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if (ossl_policy_level_find_node(curr, node, oid))
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continue;
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if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree))
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
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*/
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static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
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const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
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X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
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{
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int i;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
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if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
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return 0;
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}
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/* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
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if (last->anyPolicy &&
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ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
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last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/*-
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* Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then
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* proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no
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* data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
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*
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* Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
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*
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* X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
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* X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
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*/
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static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
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{
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int i;
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nodes = curr->nodes;
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if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) {
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
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/* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */
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if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) {
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node->parent->nchild--;
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OPENSSL_free(node);
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(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
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}
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}
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}
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for (;;) {
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--curr;
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nodes = curr->nodes;
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for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
|
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if (node->nchild == 0) {
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node->parent->nchild--;
|
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OPENSSL_free(node);
|
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(void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i);
|
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}
|
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}
|
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if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) {
|
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if (curr->anyPolicy->parent)
|
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curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--;
|
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OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy);
|
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curr->anyPolicy = NULL;
|
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}
|
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if (curr == tree->levels) {
|
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/* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
|
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if (!curr->anyPolicy)
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return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
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break;
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}
|
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}
|
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return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
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* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
|
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X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
|
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{
|
|
if (*pnodes == NULL &&
|
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(*pnodes = ossl_policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL)
|
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return 0;
|
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if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) >= 0)
|
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return 1;
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return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0;
|
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}
|
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|
|
#define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0
|
|
#define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1
|
|
#define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is
|
|
* used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set.
|
|
* If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the
|
|
* authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of
|
|
* valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return value:
|
|
* TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure,
|
|
* TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed,
|
|
* TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes;
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1;
|
|
|
|
/* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
|
|
if (curr->anyPolicy) {
|
|
if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
|
|
return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
|
|
addnodes = pnodes;
|
|
} else
|
|
/* Add policies to authority set */
|
|
addnodes = &tree->auth_policies;
|
|
|
|
curr = tree->levels;
|
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no anyPolicy node on this level it can't appear on lower
|
|
* levels so end search.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
curr++;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
|
|
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
|
|
if ((node->parent == anyptr)
|
|
&& !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
|
|
if (addnodes == pnodes) {
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes);
|
|
*pnodes = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (addnodes == pnodes)
|
|
return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE;
|
|
|
|
*pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
|
|
return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
|
|
X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
|
|
* will happen if it is a leaf node.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
|
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) {
|
|
tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) {
|
|
oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i);
|
|
node = ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid);
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
if (!anyPolicy)
|
|
continue;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers
|
|
* from anyPolicy.
|
|
*/
|
|
extra = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
|
|
if (extra == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
|
|
extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
|
|
| POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
|
|
node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
|
|
tree, 1);
|
|
if (node == NULL) {
|
|
ossl_policy_data_free(extra);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tree->user_policies) {
|
|
tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
|
|
if (!tree->user_policies) {
|
|
exnode_free(node);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) {
|
|
exnode_free(node);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
|
|
* (see tree_prune()).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1;
|
|
const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
|
|
cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
|
|
if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
|
if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
|
|
&& !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
|
|
TREE_PRINT("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
|
|
ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
|
|
if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
|
|
{
|
|
if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE))
|
|
OPENSSL_free(node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies);
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
|
|
X509_free(curr->cert);
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, ossl_policy_node_free);
|
|
ossl_policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, ossl_policy_data_free);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tree);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Application policy checking function.
|
|
* Return codes:
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc
|
|
* X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA)
|
|
*/
|
|
int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int init_ret;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
int calc_ret;
|
|
X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*ptree = NULL;
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 0;
|
|
init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (init_ret <= 0)
|
|
return init_ret;
|
|
|
|
if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) {
|
|
if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
*pexplicit_policy = 1;
|
|
/* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */
|
|
if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY)
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
|
|
TREE_PRINT("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
|
|
if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT)
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tree is not empty: continue */
|
|
|
|
if ((calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(auth_nodes);
|
|
ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes);
|
|
if (calc_ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE)
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
*ptree = tree;
|
|
|
|
if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) {
|
|
nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
|
|
if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
|
|
return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
|
|
}
|