openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
Olivier Chéron f3652dff2f Handle PBMAC1 with absent PBKDF2 PRF
PRF in PBKDF2-params is optional and defaults to hmacWithSHA1.

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25568)
2024-10-07 17:51:54 +02:00

530 lines
17 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 1999-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include "p12_local.h"
static int pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
int id, int iter, int keylen,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12)
{
return p12->mac ? 1 : 0;
}
void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac,
const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt,
const ASN1_INTEGER **piter,
const PKCS12 *p12)
{
if (p12->mac) {
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, pmacalg, pmac);
if (psalt)
*psalt = p12->mac->salt;
if (piter)
*piter = p12->mac->iter;
} else {
if (pmac)
*pmac = NULL;
if (pmacalg)
*pmacalg = NULL;
if (psalt)
*psalt = NULL;
if (piter)
*piter = NULL;
}
}
#define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *key,
const EVP_MD *digest)
{
unsigned char out[96];
if (keylen != TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN) {
return 0;
}
if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
digest, sizeof(out), out)) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(key, out + sizeof(out) - TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN, TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
return 1;
}
PBKDF2PARAM *PBMAC1_get1_pbkdf2_param(const X509_ALGOR *macalg)
{
PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
PBKDF2PARAM *pbkdf2_param = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid;
param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), macalg->parameter);
if (param == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_oid, NULL, NULL, param->keyDerivationFunc);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(kdf_oid) != NID_id_pbkdf2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
return NULL;
}
pbkdf2_param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM),
param->keyDerivationFunc->parameter);
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
return pbkdf2_param;
}
static int PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq,
const char *pass, int passlen,
const X509_ALGOR *macalg, unsigned char *key)
{
PBKDF2PARAM *pbkdf2_param = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_hmac_oid;
int kdf_hmac_nid;
int ret = -1;
int keylen = 0;
EVP_MD *kdf_md = NULL;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pbkdf2_salt = NULL;
pbkdf2_param = PBMAC1_get1_pbkdf2_param(macalg);
if (pbkdf2_param == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
keylen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->keylength);
pbkdf2_salt = pbkdf2_param->salt->value.octet_string;
if (pbkdf2_param->prf == NULL) {
kdf_hmac_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
} else {
X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_hmac_oid, NULL, NULL, pbkdf2_param->prf);
kdf_hmac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf_hmac_oid);
}
kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(ossl_hmac2mdnid(kdf_hmac_nid)), propq);
if (kdf_md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_FETCH_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, pbkdf2_salt->data, pbkdf2_salt->length,
ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->iter), kdf_md, keylen, key) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = keylen;
err:
EVP_MD_free(kdf_md);
PBKDF2PARAM_free(pbkdf2_param);
return ret;
}
/* Generate a MAC, also used for verification */
static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
int pbmac1_md_nid, int pbmac1_kdf_nid,
int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int slen,
int id, int iter, int n,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type))
{
int ret = 0;
const EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD *md_fetch;
HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
int saltlen, iter;
char md_name[80];
int keylen = 0;
int md_nid = NID_undef;
const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
iter = 1;
else
iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(macoid) == NID_pbmac1) {
if (OBJ_obj2txt(md_name, sizeof(md_name), OBJ_nid2obj(pbmac1_md_nid), 0) < 0)
return 0;
} else {
if (OBJ_obj2txt(md_name, sizeof(md_name), macoid, 0) < 0)
return 0;
}
(void)ERR_set_mark();
md = md_fetch = EVP_MD_fetch(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, md_name,
p12->authsafes->ctx.propq);
if (md == NULL)
md = EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(macoid));
if (md == NULL) {
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
keylen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
if (keylen <= 0)
goto err;
/* For PBMAC1 we use a special keygen callback if not provided (e.g. on verification) */
if (pbmac1_md_nid != NID_undef && pkcs12_key_gen == NULL) {
keylen = PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->authsafes->ctx.propq,
pass, passlen, macalg, key);
if (keylen < 0)
goto err;
} else if ((md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94
|| md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
|| md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512)
&& ossl_safe_getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12") == NULL) {
keylen = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN;
if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
keylen, key, md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
EVP_MD *hmac_md = (EVP_MD *)md;
int fetched = 0;
if (pbmac1_kdf_nid != NID_undef) {
char hmac_md_name[128];
if (OBJ_obj2txt(hmac_md_name, sizeof(hmac_md_name), OBJ_nid2obj(pbmac1_kdf_nid), 0) < 0)
goto err;
hmac_md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, hmac_md_name, NULL);
if (hmac_md == NULL)
goto err;
fetched = 1;
}
if (pkcs12_key_gen != NULL) {
int res = (*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
iter, keylen, key, hmac_md);
if (fetched)
EVP_MD_free(hmac_md);
if (res != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (fetched)
EVP_MD_free(hmac_md);
/* Default to UTF-8 password */
if (!PKCS12_key_gen_utf8_ex(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
iter, keylen, key, md,
p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->authsafes->ctx.propq)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
}
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL
|| !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, keylen, md, NULL)
|| !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
|| !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
EVP_MD_free(md_fetch);
return ret;
}
int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
{
return pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL);
}
/* Verify the mac */
int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
{
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int maclen;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
if (p12->mac == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(macoid) == NID_pbmac1) {
PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
const ASN1_OBJECT *hmac_oid;
int md_nid = NID_undef;
param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), macalg->parameter);
if (param == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&hmac_oid, NULL, NULL, param->messageAuthScheme);
md_nid = ossl_hmac2mdnid(OBJ_obj2nid(hmac_oid));
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, md_nid, NID_undef, NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
return 0;
}
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
} else {
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* Set a mac */
int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *md_type)
{
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int maclen;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
if (md_type == NULL)
/* No need to do a fetch as the md_type is used only to get a NID */
md_type = EVP_sha256();
if (!iter)
iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
*/
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen(const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
int id, int iter, int keylen,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type)
{
return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
md_type, keylen, out);
}
static int pkcs12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
int nid)
{
X509_ALGOR *macalg;
PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac);
p12->mac = NULL;
if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL)
return PKCS12_ERROR;
if (iter > 1) {
if ((p12->mac->iter = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
}
if (saltlen == 0)
saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
else if (saltlen < 0)
return 0;
if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL)
return 0;
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
if (salt == NULL) {
if (RAND_bytes_ex(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->mac->salt->data,
(size_t)saltlen, 0) <= 0)
return 0;
} else {
memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
}
X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(macalg, OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Set up a mac structure */
int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
const EVP_MD *md_type)
{
return pkcs12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, EVP_MD_get_type(md_type));
}
int PKCS12_set_pbmac1_pbkdf2(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *md_type, const char *prf_md_name)
{
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int maclen;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int prf_md_nid = NID_undef, prf_nid = NID_undef, hmac_nid;
unsigned char *known_salt = NULL;
int keylen = 0;
PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *hmac_alg = NULL, *macalg = NULL;
if (md_type == NULL)
/* No need to do a fetch as the md_type is used only to get a NID */
md_type = EVP_sha256();
if (prf_md_name == NULL)
prf_md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md_type);
else
prf_md_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(prf_md_name);
if (iter == 0)
iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
keylen = EVP_MD_get_size(md_type);
prf_nid = ossl_md2hmacnid(prf_md_nid);
hmac_nid = ossl_md2hmacnid(EVP_MD_get_type(md_type));
if (prf_nid == NID_undef || hmac_nid == NID_undef) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (salt == NULL) {
known_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen);
if (known_salt == NULL)
goto err;
if (RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, known_salt, saltlen, 0) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param = PBMAC1PARAM_new();
hmac_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
alg = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, salt ? salt : known_salt, saltlen, prf_nid, keylen);
if (param == NULL || hmac_alg == NULL || alg == NULL)
goto err;
if (pkcs12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt ? salt : known_salt, saltlen,
NID_pbmac1) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(hmac_alg, OBJ_nid2obj(hmac_nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
X509_ALGOR_free(param->keyDerivationFunc);
X509_ALGOR_free(param->messageAuthScheme);
param->keyDerivationFunc = alg;
param->messageAuthScheme = hmac_alg;
X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, &macoct);
if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), param, &macalg->parameter))
goto err;
/*
* Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
*/
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
EVP_MD_get_type(md_type), prf_md_nid,
pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
OPENSSL_free(known_salt);
return ret;
}