/* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Original version from Steven Schoch */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "dsa_locl.h" #include #include static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen); static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { "OpenSSL DSA method", dsa_do_sign, dsa_sign_setup_no_digest, dsa_do_verify, NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */ NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */ dsa_init, dsa_finish, DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, NULL, NULL, NULL }; const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) { return &openssl_dsa_meth; } static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) { BIGNUM *kinv = NULL; BIGNUM *m; BIGNUM *xr; BIGNUM *r, *s; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; int rv = 0; m = BN_new(); xr = BN_new(); if (m == NULL || xr == NULL) goto err; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; goto err; } ret = DSA_SIG_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; DSA_SIG_get0(&r, &s, ret); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; redo: if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r, dgst, dlen)) goto err; if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL) goto err; /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* s = xr */ if (!BN_add(s, xr, m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */ if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) if (!BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very * unlikely. */ if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) goto redo; rv = 1; err: if (rv == 0) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason); DSA_SIG_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(m); BN_clear_free(xr); BN_clear_free(kinv); return ret; } static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) { return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0); } static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen) { BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *k, *kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; int ret = 0; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } k = BN_new(); kq = BN_new(); if (k == NULL || kq == NULL) goto err; if (ctx_in == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; } else ctx = ctx_in; /* Get random k */ do { if (dgst != NULL) { /* * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random). * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG. */ if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst, dlen, ctx)) goto err; } else if (!BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q)) goto err; } while (BN_is_zero(k)); if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { if (!BN_copy(kq, k)) goto err; /* * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */ if (!BN_add(kq, kq, dsa->q)) goto err; if (BN_num_bits(kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) { if (!BN_add(kq, kq, dsa->q)) goto err; } K = kq; } else { K = k; } if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; } if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; BN_clear_free(*kinvp); *kinvp = kinv; kinv = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); if (ctx != ctx_in) BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_clear_free(k); BN_clear_free(kq); return ret; } static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; BIGNUM *r, *s; int ret = -1, i; if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */ if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); return -1; } if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } u1 = BN_new(); u2 = BN_new(); t1 = BN_new(); ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL) goto err; DSA_SIG_get0(&r, &s, sig); if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) || BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) || BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } /* * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2 */ if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) goto err; /* save M in u1 */ if (dgst_len > (i >> 3)) /* * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3, * 4.2 */ dgst_len = (i >> 3); if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL) goto err; /* u1 = M * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx); if (!mont) goto err; } if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) { if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) goto err; } /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx)) goto err; /* * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R. */ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0); err: if (ret < 0) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(u1); BN_free(u2); BN_free(t1); return (ret); } static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa) { dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; return (1); } static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) { BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); return (1); }