/* * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions. */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #ifdef REF_CHECK # include #endif #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { /* * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library * bug */ (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) ssl_undefined_function, 0, /* finish_mac_length */ (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context))ssl_undefined_function, }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return (0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; } s->error = 0; s->hit = 0; s->shutdown = 0; if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->type = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version = s->method->version; s->client_version = s->version; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); s->first_packet = 0; /* * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert * back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return (0); } else s->method->ssl_clear(s); RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); return (1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method = meth; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return (NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return (NULL); } s = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL)); RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ s->options = ctx->options; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; /* * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead); s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb; s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx = ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx = ctx; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) goto err; s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; } if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) goto err; s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; # endif if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) goto err; memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; } #endif s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; s->method = ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->references = 1; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; if (!SSL_clear(s)) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; #endif return (s); err: SSL_free(s); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use * by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL", s); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if (s->wbio != s->rbio) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); #endif sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); RECORD_LAYER_release(&s->rlayer); SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (s->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) { if (s->rbio != rbio) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); s->rbio = rbio; } void SSL_set_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) { /* * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio = NULL; } } if (s->wbio != wbio && s->rbio != s->wbio) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->wbio = wbio; } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { SSL_set_wbio(s, wbio); SSL_set_rbio(s, rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return (s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_rbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_wbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return (ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret = 1; err: return (ret); } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return (s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return (ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback = callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, yes); } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) */ return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return (r); CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return (r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if * we are a server, it does not. */ return (r); } /* * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) { /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) { return 0; } /* * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ t->method = f->method; /* change method */ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ } CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); ssl_cert_free(t->cert); t->cert = f->cert; if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length)) { return 0; } return 1; } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); return (s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); return (s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return (s->method->get_timeout()); } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return (0); } return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return (-1); } return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used * (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); else return (1); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 0; return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a * handshake has finished */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer)); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, larg); return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (s->options |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (s->options &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (s->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; s->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: if (parg) { if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) return 0; *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw; return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen; } else return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) return -1; if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) return 1; else return 0; default: return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp)); } } LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */ if (ctx == NULL) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0); default: return 0; } } switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return (ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l = ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l = ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return (ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; return (l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return (ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions)); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return (ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return (ctx->options &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (ctx->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; l = a->id - b->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) { long l; l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id; if (l == 0L) return (0); else return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return (NULL); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers; int i; ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if (!ciphers) return NULL; ssl_set_client_disabled(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) { if (!sk) sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (!sk) return NULL; if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; } } } return sk; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return (s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return (NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return (NULL); sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return (NULL); c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return (NULL); return (c->name); } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert); /* * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len) { char *p; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) return (NULL); p = buf; sk = s->session->ciphers; if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { int n; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); n = strlen(c->name); if (n + 1 > len) { if (p != buf) --p; *p = '\0'; return buf; } strcpy(p, c->name); p += n; *(p++) = ':'; len -= n + 1; } p[-1] = '\0'; return (buf); } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) { int i, j = 0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return (0); q = p; if (put_cb == NULL) put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) continue; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) continue; else empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; } #endif j = put_cb(c, p); p += j; } /* * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add * applicable SCSVs. */ if (p != q) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = put_cb(&scsv, p); p += j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; j = put_cb(&scsv, p); p += j; } } return (p - q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i, n; if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return (NULL); } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ else { sk = *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } if (s->cert->ciphers_raw) OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw); s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num); if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num; for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) { /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; p += n; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); #endif continue; } /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected * downgrade. */ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); if (s->s3) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } p += n; continue; } c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p); p += n; if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (skp != NULL) *skp = sk; return (sk); err: if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return (NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } /* * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return status; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; } } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the * ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; } # endif /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len); if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned protos_len) { if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len); if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list) return 1; memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len); ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol * from the client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg) { ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from * |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context) { if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen, use_context); } static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { unsigned long l; l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) | ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L); return (l); } /* * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing * session with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return (1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return (1); return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length)); } /* * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed * via ssl.h. */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION) SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return (NULL); } if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return NULL; } if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX)); ret->method = meth; ret->cert_store = NULL; ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head = NULL; ret->session_cache_tail = NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); ret->new_session_cb = 0; ret->remove_session_cb = 0; ret->get_session_cb = 0; ret->generate_session_id = 0; memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references = 1; ret->quiet_shutdown = 0; ret->info_callback = NULL; ret->app_verify_callback = 0; ret->app_verify_arg = NULL; ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead = 0; ret->msg_callback = 0; ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL; ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; ret->sid_ctx_length = 0; ret->default_verify_callback = NULL; if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback = 0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL; ret->client_cert_cb = 0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0; ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs = NULL; /* No compression for DTLS */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)) ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0; ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0; # endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL; ret->psk_client_callback = NULL; ret->psk_server_callback = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret)) goto err; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO # define eng_strx(x) #x # define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } # endif #endif /* * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; return (ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: SSL_CTX_free(ret); return (NULL); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); ssl_cert_free(a->cert); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); a->comp_methods = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (a->srtp_profiles) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (a->psk_identity_hint) OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL) OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); #endif OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode = mode; ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign; int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl; unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok; X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0; #endif if (c == NULL) return; kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto); dh_tmp_export = !c->dh_tmp_auto && (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl)); #else dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto); #endif cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); dsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN; cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); dh_rsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl); cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID; #endif mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; emask_k = 0; emask_a = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa); #endif cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; } cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]); if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94; } if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) emask_k |= SSL_kRSA; if (dh_tmp_export) emask_k |= SSL_kDHE; if (dh_tmp) mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; if (dh_rsa) mask_k |= SSL_kDHr; if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k |= SSL_kDHr; if (dh_dsa) mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k |= SSL_kDHd; if (emask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) mask_a |= SSL_aDH; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; emask_a |= SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; emask_a |= SSL_aDSS; } mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; emask_a |= SSL_aNULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; #endif /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites * depending on the key usage extension. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (have_ecc_cert) { cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]; x = cpk->x509; /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) ecdsa_ok = 0; ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); } if (ecdh_ok) { if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) { mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr; emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; } } if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; mask_a |= SSL_aECDH; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) { emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; emask_a |= SSL_aECDH; } } } if (ecdsa_ok) { mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (have_ecdh_tmp) { mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; emask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; emask_k |= SSL_kPSK; emask_a |= SSL_aPSK; #endif c->mask_k = mask_k; c->mask_a = mask_a; c->export_mask_k = emask_k; c->export_mask_a = emask_a; c->valid = 1; } /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int keysize = 0; int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) return 0; keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (keysize > 163) return 0; } /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) { signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid); } if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) { /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT); return 0; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE); return 0; } } if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { /* signature alg must be RSA */ if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE); return 0; } } } if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } #endif static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { int idx; idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; if (idx == -1) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return idx; } CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { CERT *c; int i; c = s->cert; if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) return NULL; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* * Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch * the one expected. */ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) return c->key; #endif i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); /* This may or may not be an error. */ if (i < 0) return NULL; /* May be NULL. */ return &c->pkeys[i]; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd) { unsigned long alg_a; CERT *c; int idx = -1; alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL /* * Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one * expected. */ if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) idx = c->key - c->pkeys; else #endif if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; if (idx == -1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return (NULL); } if (pmd) *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest; return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length) { CERT *c = NULL; int i = 0; *serverinfo_length = 0; c = s->cert; i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s); if (i == -1) return 0; if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) return 0; *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo; *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; return 1; } #endif void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { int i; /* * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session)) && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->method; } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return (s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn = -1; int ret = 1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = meth; ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; } return (ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return (SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, * where we do encode the error */ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it * might be safer to keep it. */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret = 1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return (-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret = s->handshake_func(s); } return (ret); } /* * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these * calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 1; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 0; s->shutdown = 0; s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (0); } SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return (NULL); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) return ("TLSv1.2"); else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) return ("TLSv1.1"); else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return ("TLSv1"); else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return ("SSLv3"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) return ("DTLSv0.9"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) return ("DTLSv1"); else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) return ("DTLSv1.2"); else return ("unknown"); } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return (NULL); ret->version = s->version; ret->type = s->type; ret->method = s->method; if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s)) goto err; } else { /* * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both * point to the same object, and thus we can't use * SSL_copy_session_id. */ ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) goto err; } ret->options = s->options; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug = s->debug; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else ret->wbio = ret->rbio; } ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; ret->server = s->server; ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate; ret->new_session = s->new_session; ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; ret->state = s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, * though */ RECORD_LAYER_dup(&ret->rlayer, &s->rlayer); ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, * ret->init_off */ ret->hit = s->hit; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA = sk; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } } if (0) { err: SSL_free(ret); ret = NULL; } return (ret); } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; #endif } X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->x509); else return (NULL); } EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return (s->cert->key->privatekey); else return (NULL); } X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return (s->session->cipher); return (NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } #else const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->compress != NULL) return (s->compress->meth); return (NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { if (s->expand != NULL) return (s->expand->meth); return (NULL); } #endif int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return (0); s->bbio = bbio; } else { bbio = s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return (0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); } return (1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { /* callers ensure s is never null */ if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids * adding one more preprocessor symbol */ assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return (s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return (s->version); } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->ctx); } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { CERT *new_cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; #endif new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (new_cert == NULL) { return NULL; } /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */ if (ssl->server) { new_cert->peer_sigalgs = ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs; new_cert->peer_sigalgslen = ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen; ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; new_cert->ciphers_raw = ssl->cert->ciphers_raw; new_cert->ciphers_rawlen = ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen; ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = NULL; } ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = new_cert; /* * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. */ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); /* * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), * leave it unchanged. */ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); } CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return (ssl->ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath)); } #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ssl->info_callback = cb; } /* * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function * pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , int /* type */ , int /* val */ ) { return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->state); } void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state) { ssl->state = state; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return (ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return (1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return (ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store = store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return (s->rwstate); } /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN /** * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) { } #endif /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { if (s == NULL) return 0; if (s->session == NULL) return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */ if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity_hint); } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return (s->session->psk_identity); } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len)) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } /* * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly * allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL); return *hash; } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash); *hash = NULL; } /* Retrieve handshake hashes */ int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen) { unsigned char *p = out; int idx, ret = 0; long mask; EVP_MD_CTX ctx; const EVP_MD *md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) { int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > outlen) goto err; if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, p, NULL)) goto err; p += hashsize; outlen -= hashsize; } } ret = p - out; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ret; } void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { s->debug = debug; } int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s) { return s->hit; } int SSL_is_server(SSL *s) { return s->server; } void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) { s->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { s->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return s->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex) { s->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_ex; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level) { ctx->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex) { ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_ex; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);