=pod =head1 NAME CMS_decrypt, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey, CMS_decrypt_set1_password - decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags); int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, X509 *peer); int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert); int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen); =head1 DESCRIPTION CMS_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData or AuthEnvelopedData structure. I is the private key of the recipient, I is the recipient's certificate, I is a BIO to write the content to and I is an optional set of flags. The I parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content is detached. It will normally be set to NULL. CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() associates the private key I, the corresponding certificate I and the originator certificate I with the CMS_ContentInfo structure I. CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey() associates the private key I and the corresponding certificate I with the CMS_ContentInfo structure I. CMS_decrypt_set1_password() associates the secret I of length I with the CMS_ContentInfo structure I. =head1 NOTES Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS structure. If I is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B is set then the above behaviour is modified and an error B returned if no recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B generating a random content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with B especially in automated gateways as it can leave them open to attack. It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this case both I and I should be set to NULL. To process KEKRecipientInfo types CMS_set1_key() or CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() and CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() should be called before CMS_decrypt() and I and I set to NULL. The following flags can be passed in the I parameter. If the B flag is set MIME headers for type C are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type C then an error is returned. =head1 RETURN VALUES CMS_decrypt(), CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(), CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(), and CMS_decrypt_set1_password() return either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3). =head1 BUGS The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in CMS_verify() also applies to CMS_decrypt(). =head1 SEE ALSO L, L =head1 HISTORY CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer() and CMS_decrypt_set1_password() were added in OpenSSL 3.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut