/* * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0 /* * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen, * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing. */ #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \ + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) /* * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes + * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie */ #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \ + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \ + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE) /* * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int ilen; const unsigned char *data; /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } /*- * The servername extension is treated as follows: * * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, * in which case an fatal alert is generated. * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches * the value of the Host: field. * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername * extension. * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */ int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int servname_type; PACKET sni, hostname; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations, * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types. * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. * * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname); s->session->ext.hostname = NULL; if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->servername_done = 1; } else { /* * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST * fall back to a full handshake. */ s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int value; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */ if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session * including session resumptions. * We should receive the same code as in resumed session ! */ if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello. */ s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET srp_I; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. */ if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET supported_sig_algs; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET supported_sig_algs; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET responder_id_list, exts; /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */ if (s->hit) return 1; /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ if (x != NULL) return 1; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { /* * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. */ s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; return 1; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 */ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else { s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; } while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; PACKET responder_id; const unsigned char *id_data; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); if (id == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } /* Read in request_extensions */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->ext.ocsp.exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. */ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif /* * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } save_protocol_list = protocol_list; do { /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; int i, srtp_pref; PACKET subpkt; /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) return 1; /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); s->srtp_profile = NULL; /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } /* * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than * current match. * If no profiles have been have been configured then this * does nothing. */ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); if (sprof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = sprof; srtp_pref = i; break; } } } /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); return 0; } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } /* * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 PACKET psk_kex_modes; unsigned int mode; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; } #endif return 1; } /* * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups; size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups; int found = 0; if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) return 1; /* Sanity check */ if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* Get our list of supported groups */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups); /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); if (clnt_num_groups == 0) { /* * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent, * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that * extension. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) { /* * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an * error */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. */ if (found) continue; /* * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent. */ if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) { /* Share not suitable */ continue; } if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } s->s3->group_id = group_id; if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } found = 1; } #endif return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id; EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie; WPACKET hrrpkt; const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata; unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE]; size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen; unsigned long tm, now; /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */ if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) return 1; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } raw = cookie; data = PACKET_data(&raw); rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw); if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } mdin = PACKET_data(&raw); /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */ hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext .cookie_hmac_key)); if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */ if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) return 1; /* * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the * HMAC above. */ /* Check the version number is sane */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie); if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (group_id != s->s3->group_id || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) { /* * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is * in the cookie. Something must have changed. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie) || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */ now = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) { /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */ return 1; } /* Verify the app cookie */ if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie), PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash. * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions */ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION) || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id, s->tmp_session_id_len) || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt, &ciphlen) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) { WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix this before release */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version_draft) || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (key_share) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id) || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen) || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */ || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen) || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) { WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash), PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr, hrrlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ s->hello_retry_request = 1; s->ext.cookieok = 1; #endif return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET supported_groups_list; /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups); s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL; s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list, &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* The extension must always be empty */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; return 1; } int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } return 1; } static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick, SSL_SESSION **sess) { SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) { case 0: return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH: break; default: return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; } tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick), SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); if (tmpsess == NULL) return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; *sess = tmpsess; return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; } int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET identities, binders, binder; size_t binderoffset, hashsize; SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; /* * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so * ignore this extension */ if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) return 1; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { PACKET identity; unsigned long ticket_agel; size_t idlen; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity); if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen, &sess)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if(sess == NULL && s->psk_server_callback != NULL && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { char *pskid = NULL; unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; unsigned int pskdatalen; if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata, sizeof(pskdata)); OPENSSL_free(pskid); if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } else if (pskdatalen > 0) { const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; /* * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (sess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata, pskdatalen) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ if (sess != NULL) { /* We found a PSK */ SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0); if (sesstmp == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); sess = sesstmp; /* * We've just been told to use this session for this context so * make sure the sid_ctx matches up. */ memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; ext = 1; if (id == 0) s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; } else { uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; int ret; /* * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there * is no point in using full stateless tickets. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 || s->max_early_data > 0) ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess); else ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess); if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) continue; /* Check for replay */ if (s->max_early_data > 0 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); sess = NULL; continue; } ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; /* * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency). * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for * rounding errors. */ if (id == 0 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { /* * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it * for early data */ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; } } md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) { /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); sess = NULL; s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; continue; } break; } if (sess == NULL) return 1; binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } } if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, ext) != 1) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } sess->ext.tick_identity = id; SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = sess; return 1; err: SSL_SESSION_free(sess); return 0; } int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; return 1; } /* * Add the server's renegotiation binding */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /*- * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; if (!using_ecc) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const uint16_t *groups; size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ if (s->s3->group_id == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Get our list of supported groups */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups); if (numgroups == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Copy group ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) { uint16_t group = groups[i]; if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (first) { /* * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If * so we don't need to add this extension */ if (s->s3->group_id == group) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add extension header */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } first = 0; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!s->ext.status_expected) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a * separate message */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char *npa; unsigned int npalen; int ret; int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; s->s3->npn_seen = 0; if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->s3->npn_seen = 1; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!s->ext.use_etm) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable * for other cases too. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { s->ext.use_etm = 0; return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* TODO(TLS1.3): Update to remove the TLSv1.3 draft indicator */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version_draft) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned char *encodedPoint; size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { if (ckey != NULL) { /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } if (ckey == NULL) { /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */ if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); if (skey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Generate encoding of server key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie; unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2; size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen; EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen) || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &ciphlen) /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL)) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then * subsequently allocate them (below) */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2) || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Generate the application cookie */ if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2) || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen) || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; totcookielen -= startlen; if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* HMAC the cookie */ hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext .cookie_hmac_key)); if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie, totcookielen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2) || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2) || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return ret; #else return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { if (s->max_early_data == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!s->hit) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; }