/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \ defined(__INTEL__) ) \ ) # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 #endif static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) { /* * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ int i, len, left; long align = 0; unsigned char *pkt; SSL3_BUFFER *rb; if (n <= 0) return n; rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); if (rb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return -1; left = rb->left; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (left == 0) rb->offset = align; else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload * alignment... */ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { /* * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer * overrun can be triggered. */ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); rb->offset = align; } } s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; s->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } /* * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into * the buffer). */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (left == 0 && extend) return 0; if (left > 0 && n > left) n = left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (left >= n) { s->packet_length += n; rb->left = left - n; rb->offset += n; return (n); } /* else we need to read more data */ len = s->packet_length; pkt = rb->buf + align; /* * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end */ if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); s->packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; } if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) /* ignore max parameter */ max = n; else { if (max < n) max = n; if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) max = rb->len - rb->offset; } while (left < n) { /* * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if * possible) */ clear_sys_error(); if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { rb->left = left; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) if (len + left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); return (i); } left += i; /* * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to * byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (n > left) n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ rb->offset += n; rb->left = left - n; s->packet_length += n; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (n); } /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size; size_t extra; unsigned empty_record_count = 0; rr = &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else extra = 0; if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { /* * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } again: /* check if we have the header */ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p = s->packet; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; n2s(p, rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i = rr->length; n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ /* * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * + rr->length */ } s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); if (rr->length < mac_size) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } rr->length -= mac_size; mac = rr->data + rr->length; i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } } enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length = 0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) { empty_record_count++; if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } goto again; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (ret); } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif return (1); } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *wr; wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); else wr->length = i; wr->input = wr->data; #endif return (1); } /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf = buf_; int tot; unsigned int n, nw; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK unsigned int max_send_fragment; #endif SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); int i; unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len; if (len < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH); return -1; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot = s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and * report the error in a way the user will notice */ if (len < tot) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return (-1); } /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) { i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */ } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK /* * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the * compromise is considered worthy. */ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) && s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { unsigned char aad[13]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; int packlen; /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) max_send_fragment -= 512; if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, max_send_fragment, NULL); if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8; else packlen *= 4; wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen); if(!wb->buf) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } wb->len = packlen; } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; return tot; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; break; } if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } } if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); else nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8); aad[8] = type; aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); aad[11] = 0; aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = nw; packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; break; } mb_param.out = wb->buf; mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; mb_param.len = nw; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) return -1; s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { int j = 6; while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; } wb->offset = 0; wb->left = packlen; s->s3->wpend_tot = nw; s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = nw; i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); if (i <= 0) { if (i < 0) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); wb->buf = NULL; } s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if (i == (int)n) { OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */ wb->buf = NULL; return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } else #endif if (tot == len) { /* done? */ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot; } n = (len - tot); for (;;) { if (n > s->max_send_fragment) nw = s->max_send_fragment; else nw = n; i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ s->s3->wnum = tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); return tot + i; } n -= i; tot += i; } } static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p, *plen; int i, mac_size, clear = 0; int prefix_len = 0; int eivlen; long align = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); SSL_SESSION *sess; /* * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This * will happen with non blocking IO */ if (wb->left != 0) return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return (i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (wb->buf == NULL) if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) return -1; if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr = &(s->s3->wrec); sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ mac_size = 0; } else { mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (mac_size < 0) goto err; } /* * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual * payload) */ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (prefix_len > (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } if (create_empty_fragment) { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 /* * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers. */ align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } else if (prefix_len) { p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; } else { #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); #endif p = wb->buf + align; wb->offset = align; } /* write the header */ *(p++) = type & 0xff; wr->type = type; *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); /* * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes * and record version number > TLS 1.0 */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) *(p++) = 0x1; else *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen = p; p += 2; /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; } else eivlen = 0; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ wr->data = p + eivlen; wr->length = (int)len; wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; /* * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); wr->input = wr->data; } /* * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the * wb->buf */ if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) goto err; wr->length += mac_size; } wr->input = p; wr->data = p; if (eivlen) { /* * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err; */ wr->length += eivlen; } if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) goto err; if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0) goto err; wr->length += mac_size; } /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(wr->length, plen); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (create_empty_fragment) { /* * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write * out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot = len; s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; s->s3->wpend_type = type; s->s3->wpend_ret = len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); err: return -1; } /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); /* XXXX */ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return (-1); } for (;;) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), (unsigned int)wb->left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i == wb->left) { wb->left = 0; wb->offset += i; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (s->s3->wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in * using a datagram service */ wb->left = 0; } return (i); } wb->offset += i; wb->left -= i; } } /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al, i, j, ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) return (-1); if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } /* * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } } start: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; /*- * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return (ret); } /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in * 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return (0); } if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ /* * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are * doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return (len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); if (!peek) { rr->length -= n; rr->off += n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off = 0; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); } } return (n); } /* * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { tls1_process_heartbeat(s); /* Exit and notify application to read again */ rr->length = 0; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); return (-1); } #endif if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } /*- * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } } } /* * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding && (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; */ rr->length = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return (0); } /* * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if * the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) return (0); #endif } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); return (0); } else { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a * shutdown */ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; rr->length = 0; return (0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly * what the record payload has to look like */ if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; rr->length = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; } /* * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; } i = s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ BIO *bio; /* * In the case where we try to read application data, but we * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty * problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return (-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: /* * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give * an unexpected message alert. */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not * happen when type != rr->type */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet * started), we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; return (-1); } else { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return (0); } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) return (0); /* * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it * before we read the finished message */ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; return (1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have * protocol_version alerts */ if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in * the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i, j; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; } else { /* * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not * worry too much. */ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); } } return (i); }