/* * Copyright 2019-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * This implements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final * section 5.1 ("counter mode") and section 5.2 ("feedback mode") in both HMAC * and CMAC. That document does not name the KDFs it defines; the name is * derived from * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/Key-Derivation * * Note that section 5.3 ("double-pipeline mode") is not implemented, though * it would be possible to do so in the future. * * These versions all assume the counter is used. It would be relatively * straightforward to expose a configuration handle should the need arise. * * Variable names attempt to match those of SP800-108. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "crypto/evp.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include "internal/endian.h" #include "prov/implementations.h" #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" #include "prov/provider_util.h" #include "prov/providercommon.h" #include "prov/securitycheck.h" #include "prov/fipscommon.h" #include "prov/fipsindicator.h" #include "internal/e_os.h" #include "internal/params.h" #define ossl_min(a, b) ((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b) typedef enum { COUNTER = 0, FEEDBACK } kbkdf_mode; /* Our context structure. */ typedef struct { void *provctx; kbkdf_mode mode; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init; /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */ int r; unsigned char *ki; size_t ki_len; unsigned char *label; size_t label_len; unsigned char *context; size_t context_len; unsigned char *iv; size_t iv_len; int use_l; int is_kmac; int use_separator; OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE } KBKDF; /* Definitions needed for typechecking. */ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kbkdf_new; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kbkdf_dup; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kbkdf_free; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn kbkdf_reset; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kbkdf_derive; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_settable_ctx_params; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_set_ctx_params; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params; static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_get_ctx_params; /* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */ static uint32_t be32(uint32_t host) { uint32_t big = 0; DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN; if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) return host; big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24; big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8; big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8; big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24; return big; } static void init(KBKDF *ctx) { ctx->r = 32; ctx->use_l = 1; ctx->use_separator = 1; ctx->is_kmac = 0; } static void *kbkdf_new(void *provctx) { KBKDF *ctx; if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) return NULL; ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) return NULL; ctx->provctx = provctx; OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(ctx) init(ctx); return ctx; } static void kbkdf_free(void *vctx) { KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; if (ctx != NULL) { kbkdf_reset(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx) { KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; void *provctx = ctx->provctx; EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len); OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->provctx = provctx; init(ctx); } static void *kbkdf_dup(void *vctx) { const KBKDF *src = (const KBKDF *)vctx; KBKDF *dest; dest = kbkdf_new(src->provctx); if (dest != NULL) { dest->ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(src->ctx_init); if (dest->ctx_init == NULL || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->ki, src->ki_len, &dest->ki, &dest->ki_len) || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->label, src->label_len, &dest->label, &dest->label_len) || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->context, src->context_len, &dest->context, &dest->context_len) || !ossl_prov_memdup(src->iv, src->iv_len, &dest->iv, &dest->iv_len)) goto err; dest->mode = src->mode; dest->r = src->r; dest->use_l = src->use_l; dest->use_separator = src->use_separator; dest->is_kmac = src->is_kmac; OSSL_FIPS_IND_COPY(dest, src) } return dest; err: kbkdf_free(dest); return NULL; } #ifdef FIPS_MODULE static int fips_kbkdf_key_check_passed(KBKDF *ctx) { OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); int key_approved = ossl_kdf_check_key_size(ctx->ki_len); if (!key_approved) { if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, libctx, "KBKDF", "Key size", FIPS_kbkdf_key_check)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif /* SP800-108 section 5.1 or section 5.2 depending on mode. */ static int derive(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init, kbkdf_mode mode, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, unsigned char *context, size_t context_len, unsigned char *k_i, size_t h, uint32_t l, int has_separator, unsigned char *ko, size_t ko_len, int r) { int ret = 0; EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL; size_t written = 0, to_write, k_i_len = iv_len; const unsigned char zero = 0; uint32_t counter, i; /* * From SP800-108: * The fixed input data is a concatenation of a Label, * a separation indicator 0x00, the Context, and L. * One or more of these fixed input data fields may be omitted. * * has_separator == 0 means that the separator is omitted. * Passing a value of l == 0 means that L is omitted. * The Context and L are omitted automatically if a NULL buffer is passed. */ int has_l = (l != 0); /* Setup K(0) for feedback mode. */ if (iv_len > 0) memcpy(k_i, iv, iv_len); for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) { i = be32(counter); ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init); if (ctx == NULL) goto done; /* Perform feedback, if appropriate. */ if (mode == FEEDBACK && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, k_i, k_i_len)) goto done; if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, 4 - (r / 8) + (unsigned char *)&i, r / 8) || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, label, label_len) || (has_separator && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &zero, 1)) || !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, context_len) || (has_l && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&l, 4)) || !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, k_i, NULL, h)) goto done; to_write = ko_len - written; memcpy(ko + written, k_i, ossl_min(to_write, h)); written += h; k_i_len = h; EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; } ret = 1; done: EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } /* This must be run before the key is set */ static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom, size_t customlen) { OSSL_PARAM params[2]; if (custom == NULL || customlen == 0) return 1; params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM, (void *)custom, customlen); params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) > 0; } static int kmac_derive(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen) { OSSL_PARAM params[2]; params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &outlen); params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) > 0 && EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, contextlen) && EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, outlen); } static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) { KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; int ret = 0; unsigned char *k_i = NULL; uint32_t l = 0; size_t h = 0; uint64_t counter_max; if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kbkdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params)) return 0; /* label, context, and iv are permitted to be empty. Check everything * else. */ if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL) { if (ctx->ki_len == 0 || ctx->ki == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); return 0; } /* Could either be missing MAC or missing message digest or missing * cipher - arbitrarily, I pick this one. */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC); return 0; } /* Fail if the output length is zero */ if (keylen == 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } if (ctx->is_kmac) { ret = kmac_derive(ctx->ctx_init, key, keylen, ctx->context, ctx->context_len); goto done; } h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init); if (h == 0) goto done; if (ctx->iv_len != 0 && ctx->iv_len != h) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH); goto done; } if (ctx->mode == COUNTER) { /* Fail if keylen is too large for r */ counter_max = (uint64_t)1 << (uint64_t)ctx->r; if ((uint64_t)(keylen / h) >= counter_max) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto done; } } if (ctx->use_l != 0) l = be32(keylen * 8); k_i = OPENSSL_zalloc(h); if (k_i == NULL) goto done; ret = derive(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->mode, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len, ctx->label, ctx->label_len, ctx->context, ctx->context_len, k_i, h, l, ctx->use_separator, key, keylen, ctx->r); done: if (ret != 1) OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); OPENSSL_clear_free(k_i, h); return ret; } static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) { KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx); const OSSL_PARAM *p; if (params == NULL) return 1; if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)) return 0; if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->ctx_init, params, NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx)) return 0; if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL) { ctx->is_kmac = 0; if (EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128) || EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) { ctx->is_kmac = 1; } else if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC) && !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC); return 0; } } p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE); if (p != NULL && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { ctx->mode = COUNTER; } else if (p != NULL && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("feedback", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { ctx->mode = FEEDBACK; } else if (p != NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE); return 0; } p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY); if (p != NULL) { if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(p, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, &ctx->ki, &ctx->ki_len) == 0) return 0; #ifdef FIPS_MODULE if (!fips_kbkdf_key_check_passed(ctx)) return 0; #endif } if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, &ctx->label, &ctx->label_len) == 0) return 0; if (ossl_param_get1_concat_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, &ctx->context, &ctx->context_len, 0) == 0) return 0; if (ossl_param_get1_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, &ctx->iv, &ctx->iv_len) == 0) return 0; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_L); if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_l)) return 0; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_R); if (p != NULL) { int new_r = 0; if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &new_r)) return 0; if (new_r != 8 && new_r != 16 && new_r != 24 && new_r != 32) return 0; ctx->r = new_r; } p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_SEPARATOR); if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_separator)) return 0; /* Set up digest context, if we can. */ if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL && ctx->ki_len != 0) { if ((ctx->is_kmac && !kmac_init(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->label, ctx->label_len)) || !EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len, NULL)) return 0; } return 1; } static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, ossl_unused void *provctx) { static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_L, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_USE_SEPARATOR, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KBKDF_R, NULL), OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK) OSSL_PARAM_END, }; return known_settable_ctx_params; } static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) { #ifdef FIPS_MODULE KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx; #endif OSSL_PARAM *p; /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE); if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX)) return 0; if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, params)) return 0; return 1; } static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx, ossl_unused void *provctx) { static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM() OSSL_PARAM_END }; return known_gettable_ctx_params; } const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_kbkdf_functions[] = { { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_new }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_dup }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_free }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_reset }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_derive }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_settable_ctx_params }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_set_ctx_params }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params }, { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_get_ctx_params }, OSSL_DISPATCH_END, };