If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
RT#4615
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix some indentation at the same time
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1292)
In light of potential UKS (unknown key share) attacks on some
applications, primarily browsers, despite RFC761, name checks are
by default applied with DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. Applications for
which UKS is not a problem can optionally disable DANE-EE(3) name
checks via the new SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags() and friends.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
New hostname checking function asn1_valid_host()
Check commonName entries against nameConstraints: any CN components in
EE certificate which look like hostnames are checked against
nameConstraints.
Note that RFC5280 et al only require checking subject alt name against
DNS name constraints.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
When the proxy cert code was initially added, some application authors
wanted to get them verified without having to change their code, so a
check of the env var OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS was added.
Since then, the use of this variable has become irrelevant, as it's
likely that code has been changed since, so it's time it gets removed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
While travelling up the certificate chain, the internal
proxy_path_length must be updated with the pCPathLengthConstraint
value, or verification will not work properly. This corresponds to
RFC 3820, 4.1.4 (a).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The subject name MUST be the same as the issuer name, with a single CN
entry added.
RT#1852
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1074)
Since with SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the connection may continue and the
session may even be cached, we should save some evidence that the
chain was not sufficiently verified and would have been rejected
with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. To that end when a CT callback returs failure
we set the verify result to X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS.
Note: We only run the CT callback in the first place if the verify
result is still X509_V_OK prior to start of the callback.
RT #4502
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure. Also, when X509_verify_cert()
returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain
X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
just in case some code path returns an error without setting an
appropriate value of ctx->error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
An if checks the value of |type| to see if it is V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING
twice. We only need to do it once.
GitHub Issue #656
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add a status return value instead of void.
Add some sanity checks on reference counter value.
Update the docs.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The name length limit check in x509_name_ex_d2i() includes
the containing structure as well as the actual X509_NAME. This will
cause large CRLs to be rejected.
Fix by limiting the length passed to ASN1_item_ex_d2i() which will
then return an error if the passed X509_NAME exceeds the length.
RT#4531
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
