In fips mode SHA1 should not be allowed for signing, but may be present for verifying.
Add keysize check.
Add missing 'ossl_unused' to gettable and settable methods.
Update fips related tests that have these restrictions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12745)
The new lhash changes have confused some of the perl scripts so we add
some fixes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12860)
lhash.h had some workaround code for the issue where static inline
functions contained references to libcrypto symbols in public header
files. Since this issue no longer exists this workaround code can be
removed.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12860)
Following on from the earlier safestack work we provide the basis for
fixing the lhash code such that unused static inline functions do not
cause linker errors for applications including those headers.
This brings the lhash code into line with the safestack code.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12860)
Fixes#11622Fixes#12378
Due to a missing else it was setting up the stream for BSAES and then using this incorrect stream with VPAES.
The correct behaviour is not to use VPAES at all in this case.
Also note that the original code in e_aes could set up VPAES and then would overwrite it with the generic implementation.
On a machine that supported both BSAES and VPAES the code was changed locally to force it to run both cases to verify
both paths produce the correct known answers.
Debugged using mageia 7.1, but is also highly likely to fix FreeBSD also.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12887)
The function does much more than just checking extensions.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12683)
The check is applied only with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Fixes#12139
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12683)
The function returns 1 when the encoding of a decoded EC key used
explicit encoding of the curve parameters.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12683)
bugfix: #12872
strncpy here has compiling warning of -Wstringop-truncation, change
into BIO_snprintf as before.
Change-Id: I362872c4ad328cadd4c7a5a5da3165655fa26c0d
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12889)
Also add more test cases
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12826)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12826)
Adds documentation for EVP_PKEY_get0_first_alg_name() and
EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_first_name().
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12850)
We run two HMAC operations on the same file and confirm that both provide
us with the expected values.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12850)
In OpenSSL 1.1.1 doing an HMAC operation with (say) SHA1 would produce
output like this:
HMAC-SHA1(README.md)= 553154e4c0109ddc320bb495735906ad7135c2f1
Prior to this change master would instead display this like so:
SHA1(README.md)= 553154e4c0109ddc320bb495735906ad7135c2f1
The problem is that dgst was using EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to get
the algorithm name from the EVP_PKEY. This doesn't work with provider
based keys. Instead we introduce a new EVP_PKEY_get0_first_alg_name()
function, and an equivalent EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_first_name() function.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12850)
Prior to OpenSSL 3.0 calling EVP_DigestInit_ex() on an mdctx previously
initialised with EVP_DigestSignInit() would retain information about the
key, and re-initialise for another sign operation. To emulate that we
redirect calls to EVP_DigestInit() to EVP_DigestSignInit_ex() if
appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12850)
The dgst app was using an undocumented behaviour in the
EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() function when setting a key length for
a MAC. The old EVP_PKEY to MAC bridge, probably by accident, converts a
-1 length to a strlen() call, by virtue of the fact that it eventually
calls ASN1_STRING_set() which has this feature.
As noted above this is undocumented, and unexpected since the len
parameter to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() is an unsigned value (size_t).
In the old bridge it was later (silently) cast to an int, and therefore
the original -1 value was restored. This only works because sizeof(int) <=
sizeof(size_t). If we ever run on a platform where sizeof(int) >
sizeof(size_t) then it would have failed. The behaviour also doesn't hold
for EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() in general - only when the old MAC
bridge was in use.
Rather than restore the original behaviour I think it is best to simply
fix the dgst app to not assume it exists. We should not bake in this
backwards and inconsistent behaviour.
Fixes#12837
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12850)
When building in the source tree, a rebuilt Makefile detected both
include/openssl/foo.h.in and include/openssl/foo.h, so promptly added
include/openssl/foo.h twice to the list of headers to parse in 'make
update'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12882)
Function bodies in headers weren't a thing when OpenSSL::ParseC was
created, at least not as clearly as they are nowadays. This module
must evolve to recognise them (and promptly ignore them).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12882)
SP800-56br2 requires seperate KAT's (fips self tests) to be tested for both encryption and decryption
using the RSA primitive (i.e. no padding). This is specified in FIPS140-2 IG D.9
A copy of the methods EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(), EVP_PKEY_encrypt(), EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(), EVP_PKEY_decrypt()
are now in the fips module.
Removed the #ifdef FIPS_MODULE in evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops().
Added corruption test
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12835)
Instead of sometimes, and sometimes not reporting an error in the
caller of EVP_XXX_fetch(), where the error may or may not be very
accurate, it's now centralised to the inner EVP fetch functionality.
It's made in such a way that it can determine if an error occured
because the algorithm in question is not there, or if something else
went wrong, and will report EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM for the
former, and EVP_R_FETCH_FAILED for the latter.
This helps our own test/evp_test.c when it tries to figure out why an
EVP_PKEY it tried to load failed to do so.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12857)
Some compilers are very picky about unused return values.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
util/mkerr.pl detects if a header is now a '.in' template, and adjusts
the header file it reads accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
'make ordinals' assumed that all headers reside in the source tree,
which is no longer true, now that we generate a number of them. This
needed some refactoring.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
'or' has lower priority than '||' in perl, which affects evaluation order.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
The safestack code generation was generating a little too much. Some of
it could be done with a normal macro.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
... and add SKM_DEFINE_STACK_OF_INTERNAL
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12781)
