Make sure we free process_data_dest if it is not actually used.
Found by the reproducible error patch in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21741)
issue: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/21718
build break reported:
crypto/threads_pthread.c:76:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'pthread_mutexattr_settype'; did you mean 'pthread_mutexattr_destroy'? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
76 | pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| pthread_mutexattr_destroy
crypto/threads_pthread.c:76:38: error: 'PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'PTHREAD_MUTEX_TIMED_NP'?
76 | pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| PTHREAD_MUTEX_TIMED_NP
This occurs because PTHREAD_MUTEX_NORMAL is only defined in glibc if
__USE_UNIX98 or __USE_XOPEN2K8 is defined, which is derived from setting
__USE_POSIX_C_SOURCE or __XOPEN_SOURCE is selected in the glibc feature
set for a build. Since openssl selects no specific feature set from
glibc, the build break occurs
We could select a feature set of course, but that seems like a
significant discussion to have prior to doing so. Instead, the simpler
solution is to just not set the mutex type at all, given that
pthread_mutexattr_init sets the default mutex type, which should be akin
to normal anyway (i.e. no mutex error checking or allowed-recursive
behavior)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21726)
Fixes#21198
decoder objects were setting propq as NULL.
Added a set_ctx/settable_ctx to all decoders that should supply
a property query parameter to internal functions.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21219)
Recent leak discovered by valgrind:
==1007580== at 0x483C815: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:431)
==1007580== by 0x2C2689: CRYPTO_zalloc (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x295A17: BUF_MEM_new (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x295A78: BUF_MEM_new_ex (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x28CACE: mem_new (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x285EA8: BIO_new_ex (in /home/vien/microedge-c/test)
==1007580== by 0x231894: convert_pubkey_ECC (tpm2_driver.c:221)
==1007580== by 0x232B73: create_ephemeral_key (tpm2_driver.c:641)
==1007580== by 0x232E1F: tpm_gen_keypair (tpm2_driver.c:695)
==1007580== by 0x22D60A: gen_keypair (se_driver_api.c:275)
==1007580== by 0x21FF35: generate_keypair (dhkey.c:142)
==1007580== by 0x24D4C8: __test_dhkey (dhkey_test.c:55)
led me to find that BIO_get_mem_data is informative only, it does not
transer ownership of a BIO_s_mems data structure to the caller.
Additionally treating it as such leads to the above leak, or possibly
data corruption in the event that BIO_set_close(bio, BIO_NOCLOSE) is not
set properly prior to calling BIO_free.
Made an attempt to fix it in a minimally invasive manner in the 3.1
branch, but based on discussion, its just not safe to do in an API
compatible way, so just document the sematics a little more clearly
here, and fix it properly in a future release
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21724)
(cherry picked from commit 66d1658b4d)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21033)
Found via the reproducible error injection in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21723)
The comments in quic_tls.c claimed that the dummybio was never used by
us. In fact that is not entirely correct since we set and cleared the
retry flags on it. This means that we have to manage it properly, and update
it in the event of set1_bio() call on the record layer method.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
This should result in a QUIC PROTOCOL_VIOLATION
We also add tests for a post-handshake KeyUpdate, and a NewSessionTicket
with an invalid max_early_data value.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
We already disallowed the sending of TLS KeyUpdate messages. We also treat
the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as an unexpected message.
RFC 9001 section 6:
Endpoints MUST treat the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as a connection
error of type 0x010a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message;
see Section 4.8.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
The max_early_data value must be 0xffffffff if the extension is present in
a NewSessionTicket message in QUIC. Otherwise it is a PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
We should retain the TLS1_FLAGS_QUIC setting in in s3.flags even after a
"clear" operation.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
An OpenSSL QUIC client does not send the post_handshake_auth extension.
Therefore if a server sends a post-handsahke CertificateRequest then this
would be treated as a TLS protocol violation with an "unexpected message"
alert code. However RFC 9001 specifically requires us to treat this as
QUIC PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. So we have to translate the "unexpected message"
alert code in this one instance.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21686)
The routines declared in there are entirely libcrypto internal, so
include/crypto/decoder.h is better suited for them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21733)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21722)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21722)
as both algorithms are really needed.
Fixes#21625
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21677)
Fixes#21624
With OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO or OPENSSL_NO_SOCK the function
wait_until_sock_readable() currently does not exist.
Define empty wait_until_sock_readable() when building
with no-posix-io.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21677)
Fixes#21623
Also do not build quicserver with no-stdio as it is a test
utility and tests are disabled with no-stdio anyway.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21677)
bn_wexpand can fail as the result of a memory allocation failure. We
should not be calling ossl_assert() on its result because it can fail in
normal operation.
Found via the reproducible error injection in #21668
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21725)
