This replaces LHASH in core_namemap with the new hashtable and adds
a reverse mapping in form of stack of stacks instead of iterating
the existing hash table members.
The new hashtable is used in lockless-read mode.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
(in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms,
which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used
for composite algorithms)
To make this implementation possible, wrappers were added around the hash
function itself, allowing the use of existing hash implementations through
their respective OSSL_DISPATCH tables, but also retaining the dynamic fetch
of hash implementations when the digest_sign / digest_verify functionality
is used. This wrapper allows implementing the RSA+hash composites through
simple initializer function and a custom OSSL_DISPATCH table for each.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
The following API groups are extended with a new init function, as well
as an update and final function, to allow the use of explicitly fetched
signature implementations for any composite signature algorithm, like
"sha1WithRSAEncryption":
- EVP_PKEY_sign
- EVP_PKEY_verify
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
To support this, providers are required to add a few new functions, not
the least one that declares what key types an signature implementation
supports.
While at this, the validity check in evp_signature_from_algorithm() is
also refactored; the SIGNATURE provider functionality is too complex for
counters. It's better, or at least more readable, to check function
combinations.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
If an HRR is sent then it MUST contain supported_versions according to the
RFC. We were sanity checking any supported_versions extension that was sent
but failed to verify that it was actually present.
Fixes#25041
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25068)
Fixes#5738: This change introduces a check for the version number of a CSR document before its signature is verified. If the version number is not 1 (encoded as zero), the verification function fails with an `X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION` error.
To minimize impact, this check is only applied when verifying a certificate signing request using the `-verify` argument, resulting in a `X509_REQ_verify` call. This ensures that malformed certificate requests are rejected by a certification authority, enhancing security and preventing potential issues.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24677)
Fixes#24300. The current values of SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL and
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND don't allow for a correct lookup of the
corresponding reason strings.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24351)
Introduce the capability to retrieve and update Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) in the CMP client, as specified in section 4.3.4 of RFC 9483.
To request a CRL update, the CMP client can send a genm message with the
option -infotype crlStatusList. The server will respond with a genp message
containing the updated CRL, using the -infoType id-it-crls. The client can
then save the CRL in a specified file using the -crlout parameter.
Co-authored-by: Rajeev Ranjan <ranjan.rajeev@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23768)
Change introduces a default limit on HTTP headers we expect to receive
from server to 256. If limit is exceeded http client library indicates
HTTP_R_RESPONSE_TOO_MANY_HDRLINES error. Application can use
OSSL_HTTP_REQ_CTX_set_max_response_hdr_lines() to change default.
Setting limit to 0 implies no limit (current behavior).
Fixes#22264
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23781)
ITU-T X.690 / ISO/IEC 8825-1 section 11.7 and section 11.8
impose specific constraints on how GeneralizedTime and UTCTime
can be encoded in BER/CER/DER. Following from these constraints
a minimum length can be derived.
Checking the length in this context can potentially help prevent
applications from interpreting an invalid GeneralizedTime as a
valid UTCTime.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23483)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23360)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23360)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19948)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
If a malformed config file is provided such as the following:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = provider_sect
[provider_sect]
= provider_sect
The config parsing library will crash overflowing the stack, as it
recursively parses the same provider_sect ad nauseum.
Prevent this by maintaing a list of visited nodes as we recurse through
referenced sections, and erroring out in the event we visit any given
section node more than once.
Note, adding the test for this revealed that our diagnostic code
inadvertently pops recorded errors off the error stack because
provider_conf_load returns success even in the event that a
configuration parse failed. The call path to provider_conf_load has been
updated in this commit to address that shortcoming, allowing recorded
errors to be visibile to calling applications.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22898)
Also add missing getter functionss OSSL_CMP_{CTX,HDR}_get0_geninfo_ITAVs() to CMP API.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21281)
We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
differ. DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
sets a flag for the excessively sized Q. This behaviour is mimicked in
DH_check_pub_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22453)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22459)
This improves tracking where the failure was triggered.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21700)
QUIC error code, frame type and reason is in error data
Fixes#21337
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21476)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21135)
Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19231)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20832)
Add support for the RFC7250 certificate-type extensions.
Alows the use of only private keys for connection (i.e. certs not needed).
Add APIs
Add unit tests
Add documentation
Add s_client/s_server support
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18185)
For example if would be helpful if we got more useful information if the
caller forgot to set the peer address.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20514)
Signed-off-by: Čestmír Kalina <ckalina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12256)
Similiar checks to the DSA code have been added for ECDSA also.
This should not be a problem when using named groups.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20384)
Fixes#20268
Values such as q=1 or priv=0 caused infinite loops when calling
DSA_sign() without these changes.
There are other cases where bad domain parameters may have caused
infinite loops where the retry counter has been added. The simpler case
of priv=0 also hits this case. q=1 caused an infinite loop in the setup.
The max retry value has been set to an arbitrary value of 8 (it is
unlikely to ever do a single retry for valid values).
The minimum q bits was set to an arbitrary value of 128 (160 is still
used for legacy reasons when using 512 bit keys).
Thanks @guidovranken for detecting this, and @davidben for his
insightful analysis.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20384)
