To accelerate the performance of the AES-GCM mode, in this patch, we
have the specialized multi-block implementations for AES-128-GCM,
AES-192-GCM and AES-256-GCM.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Support zvbb-zvkned based rvv AES-128/192/256-CTR encryption.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
This patch supports SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256 on platforms with
vlen greater than 128,
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Keep SHA-256 constant values in registers to save the loading time.
Move the constant loading for sha256 into a separate subroutine.
By creating a dedicated sub routine for loading sha256 constants, the
code can be made more modular and easier to modify in the future.
Relaxing the SHA256 constraint, zvknhb also supports SHA256.
Simplify the H and mask initialization flows.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Use rvv and zvbb extensions for CHACHA20 cipher.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-128/192/256-CBC block cipher
encryption, we used the vaesz, vaesem and vaesef instructions, which
implement a single round of AES encryption.
Similarly, to optimize the performance of AES-128/192/256-CBC block
cipher decryption, we have utilized the vaesz, vaesdm, and vaesdf
instructions, which facilitate a single round of AES decryption.
Furthermore, we optimize the key and initialization vector (IV) step by
keeping the rounding key in vector registers.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
c8ddeb7e64/doc/vector/riscv-crypto-vector-zvkb.adoc
Create `RISCV_HAS_ZVKB()` macro.
Use zvkb for SM4 instead of zvbb.
Use zvkb for ghash instead of zvbb.
We could just use the zvbb's subset `zvkb` for flexibility.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Interleave key loading and aes decrypt computing for single block aes.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Interleave key loading and aes encrypt computing for single block aes.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Added helper functions and opcode encoding functions
in riscv.pm perl module to avoid pointless code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Changed "mutiple" to "multiple" for improved clarity and correctness.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Even though the RISC-V vector instructions only support AES-128 and
AES-256 for key generation, the round instructions themselves can
easily be used to implement AES-192 too - we just need to fallback to
the generic key generation routines in this case.
Note that the vector instructions use the encryption key schedule (but
in reverse order) so we need to generate the encryption key schedule
even when doing decryption using the vector instructions.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvksh extension, that provides SM3-specific istructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvksed extension, that provides SM4-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvknhb extension, that provides sha512-specific istructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Currently, architectures have to decide if they want the C code or an
arch-specific implementation. Let's add a macro, that allows to keep the C
code even if SHA512_ASM is defined (but rename it from sha512_block_data_order
to sha512_block_data_order_c). The macro INCLUDE_C_SHA512 can be used by
architectures, that want the C code as fallback code.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvknha extension, that provides sha256-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Currently, architectures have to decide if they want the C code or an
arch-specific implementation. Let's add a macro, that allows to keep the C
code even if SHA256_ASM is defined (but rename it from sha256_block_data_order
to sha256_block_data_order_c). The macro INCLUDE_C_SHA256 can be used by
architectures, that want the C code as fallback code.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions provide
the Zvkned extension, that provides a AES-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvkg extension, that provides a vghmac.vv instruction.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The RISC-V vector crypto extensions features a Zvbc extension
that provides a carryless multiplication ('vclmul.vv') instruction.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The RISC-V vector extension comes with an implementation-defined
number of bits per vector register (VLEN), which can be read out at
run-time using the CSR 'vlenb' (which returns VLEN/8) followed by a
multiplication by 8 (to convert bytes to bits).
This patch introduces a RISC-V capability 'V' to specify the
availability of the vector extension. If this extension is found at
run-time, then we read out VLEN as described above and cache it.
Caching ensures that we only read the CSR once at startup.
This is necessary because reading out CSR can be expensive
(e.g. if CSR readout is implemented using trap-and-emulate).
Follow-up patches can make use of VLEN and chose the best strategy
based on the available length of the vector registers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Calling X509_NAME_print_ex with XN_FLAG_COMPAT falls back to calling
X509_NAME_print(). The obase parameter to X509_NAME_print() is not
used, so setting it to a different value has no effect.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19963)
Similar to the bug fixed in 02db7354fe (Fix bug in X509_print_ex).
The error return value from X509_NAME_print_ex() is different
depending on whether the flags are XN_FLAG_COMPAT or not.
Apply a similar fix to what was done for X509_print_ex here as well.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19963)
The X509_FLAG_COMPAT constant is defined as a value of the
X509_print_ex() cflags argument, and so it should not be used
to compare against values for use with X509_NAME_print flags.
Use XN_FLAG_COMPAT, which has the same value, instead.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19963)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22450)
Replace the random suffix with a counter, to make the
build reproducible.
Fixes#20954
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22415)
Test case amended from code initially written by Bernd Edlinger.
Fixes#21110
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22421)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22504)
(cherry picked from commit f0d88b4d07)
BLAKE2 is not really an extensible output function unlike SHAKE
as the digest size must be set during the context initialization.
Thus it makes no sense to use OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_XOFLEN.
We also need to adjust EVP_DigestFinal_ex() to query the
OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_SIZE as gettable ctx param for the size.
Fixes#22488
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22491)
The callback that makes -debug print the data sent/received needed extending
for the new QUIC callback codes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22480)
The code did not yet check that the length of the RSA key is positive
and even.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22403)
Added notes to OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_filename and
OPENSSL_INIT_set_config_appname explaining why strdup
is used instead of OPENSSL_strdup.
CLA: trivial
Co-authored-by: Jean Apolo <jean.apolo@garmin.com>
Signed-off-by: Jean Apolo <jean.apolo@garmin.com>
Signed-off-by: Nate Karstens <nate.karstens@garmin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21742)
evp_cipher_init_internal() takes a params array argument and this is processed
late in the initialisation process for some ciphers (AEAD ones).
This means that changing the IV length as a parameter will either truncate the
IV (very bad if SP 800-38d section 8.2.1 is used) or grab extra uninitialised
bytes.
Truncation is very bad if SP 800-38d section 8.2.1 is being used to
contruct a deterministic IV. This leads to an instant loss of confidentiality.
Grabbing extra bytes isn't so serious, it will most likely result in a bad
decryption.
Problem reported by Tony Battersby of Cybernetics.com but earlier discovered
and raised as issue #19822.
Fixes CVE-2023-5363
Fixes#19822
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The 'rand_generate' method is not well suited for being used with
weak entropy sources in the 'get_entropy' callback, because the
caller needs to provide a preallocated buffer without knowing
how much bytes are actually needed to collect the required entropy.
Instead we use the 'rand_get_seed' and 'rand_clear_seed' methods
which were exactly designed for this purpose: it's the callee who
allocates and fills the buffer, and finally cleans it up again.
The 'rand_get_seed' and 'rand_clear_seed' methods are currently
optional for a provided random generator. We could fall back to
using 'rand_generate' if those methods are not implemented.
However, imo it would be better to simply make them an officially
documented requirement for seed sources.
Fixes#22332
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22394)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22394)
We shouldn't ever have the case where the data flags indicate that
err_data has been malloc'd, but the err_data field is NULL.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22368)
The `get_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks were add recently to the
dispatch table in commit 4cde7585ce. Instead of adding corresponding
`cleanup_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks, the `cleanup_{entropy,nonce}`
callbacks were reused. This can cause a problem in the case where the
seed source is replaced by a provider: the buffer gets allocated by
the provider but cleared by the core.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22423)
This is unnecessary and conceptualy wrong as
headers from internal should not include headers from crypto
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22432)
Its not required that crt params be available in an RSA key, so don't
perform an error check on them
Fixes#29135
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22334)
Theres no reason we should gate ossl_rsa_todata on there being a minimum
set of parameters. EVP_PKEY_todata makes no guarantees about the
validity of a key, it only returns the parameters that are set in the
requested key, whatever they may be. Remove the check.
Fixes#21935
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22334)
This makes them zeroes otherwise
where NULLs actually mean the values aren't present.
Fixes#21935
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22334)
external calls to OBJ_new_nid will fail on an attempt to lock the
ossl_obj_nid_lock as it won't have been initalized yet.
Bifurcate OBJ_new_nid into an external and internal variant, in which
the former calls ossl_obj_write_lock (ensuring that the nid_lock is
initalized), while OBJ_create (the sole internal caller) uses the latter
to avoid having to drop and re-acquire the lock
Fixes#22337
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22350)
Fixes#22225
In OBJ_nid2obj(), if the NID does not have an OID, then a pointer to
the special "undefined" ASN1_OBJECT is returned. Check for the
undefined-ASN1_OBJECT and return an error. Also, add a test for this
in 80-test_cms.t.
Testing:
#!/bin/bash -x
shopt -s expand_aliases
alias openssl="LD_LIBRARY_PATH=~/git/openssl ~/git/openssl/apps/openssl"
echo "This is a confidential message. It should be encrypted." > msg.txt
## this should fail b/c there is no OID for aes-256-ctr
openssl cms -encrypt -in msg.txt -aes-256-ctr -out msg.txt.cms -recip demos/cms/signer.pem
echo $?
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22392)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22108)
According to the manual page, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label()
should accept NULL as the label argument, though the function
currently rejects it while setting the corresponding octet string
parameter with OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string, which expects
non-NULL input. This adds a workaround to the caller for backward
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22397)
This is used for memory allocation failure debugging only
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22347)
