The functiontls12_get_pkey_idx is only used to see if a certificate index is
enabled: call ssl_cert_is_disabled instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3858)
Add certificate table giving properties of each certificate index:
specifically the NID associated with the index and the the auth mask
value for any cipher the certificate can be used with.
This will be used to generalise certificate handling instead of hard coding
algorithm specific cases.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3858)
In most scenarios the length of the input data is the hashsize, or 0 if
the data is NULL. However with the new ticket_nonce changes the length can
be different.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3852)
This just adds the processing for sending and receiving the newly added
ticket_nonce field. It doesn't actually use it yet.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3852)
If the result of a SSL_{CTX_,}set_{min,max}_proto_version() call
leaves the min and max version identical, and support for that version
is compiled out of the library, return an error. Such an object has
no hope of successfully completing a handshake, and this error may
be easier to decipher than the resulting handshake failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3422)
We need to use the hashsize in generating the exportsecret not 0! Otherwise
we end up with random garbage for the secret.
It was pure chance that this passed the tests previously. It so happens
that, because we call SSL_export_keying_material() repeatedly for different
scenarios in the test, we end up in the tls13_export_keying_material() at
exactly the same position in the stack each time and therefore end up using
the same random garbage secret each time!
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3810)
There are no public TLSv1_3_*method() functions so
OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3_METHOD doesn't make any sense and should be removed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3800)
Properly copy ext.alpn_session in ssl_session_dup()
Use OPENSSL_strndup() as that's used in ssl_asn1.c
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3770)
In draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 Appendix B we find that:
This section describes protocol types and constants. Values listed
as _RESERVED were used in previous versions of TLS and are listed
here for completeness. TLS 1.3 implementations MUST NOT send them
but might receive them from older TLS implementations.
Similarly, in section 4.2.3 we see:
Legacy algorithms Indicates algorithms which are being deprecated
because they use algorithms with known weaknesses, specifically
SHA-1 which is used in this context with either with RSA using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA. These values refer solely to
signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and
are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages.
Endpoints SHOULD NOT negotiate these algorithms but are permitted
to do so solely for backward compatibility. Clients offering
these values MUST list them as the lowest priority (listed after
all other algorithms in SignatureSchemeList). TLS 1.3 servers
MUST NOT offer a SHA-1 signed certificate unless no valid
certificate chain can be produced without it (see
Section 4.4.2.2).
However, we are currently sending the SHA2-based DSA signature schemes
and many SHA1-based schemes, which is in contradiction with the specification.
Because TLS 1.3 support will appear in OpenSSL 1.1, we are bound by
stability requirements to continue to offer the DSA signature schemes
and the deprecated hash algorithms. at least until OpenSSL 1.2.
However, for pure TLS 1.3 clients that do not offer lower TLS versions,
we can be compliant. Do so, and leave a note to revisit the issue when
we are permitted to break with sacred historical tradition.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3326)
Following on from the previous commit this fixes another instance where
we need to treat a -ve return from EVP_DigestVerify() as a bad signature.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
Prior to 72ceb6a we treated all failures from the call to
EVP_DigestVerifyFinal() as if it were a bad signature, and failures in
EVP_DigestUpdate() as an internal error. After that commit we replaced
this with the one-shot function EVP_DigestVerify() and treated a 0 return
as a bad signature and a negative return as an internal error. However,
some signature errors can be negative (e.g. according to the docs if the
form of the signature is wrong). Therefore we should treat all <=0
returns as a bad signature.
This fixes a boringssl test failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3756)
Per RFC 7905, the cipher suite names end in "_SHA256". The original
implementation targeted the -03 draft, but there was a -04 draft right
before the RFC was published to make the names consistent.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3748)
initialize some local variables
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3741)
The value of BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was clashing with the value for
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. In an SCTP enabled build
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE was used unconditionally with
the reasoning that it would be ignored if SCTP wasn't in use. Unfortunately
due to this clash, this wasn't the case. The BIO ended up going into peek
mode and was continually reading the same data over and over - throwing it
away as a replay.
Fixes#3723
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3724)
