Low level algorithm implementations have no business knowing about details
of the higher level CMS concept. This knowledge is therefore moved into the
CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
There is a large amount of CMS sepcific code in the algorithms. This is in
the wrong place and breaks layering. This code should be in the CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
There is quite a large amount of algorithm specific CMS code sitting in
the algorithm directories. However, this seems to break layering.
Algorithms really have no business knowing anything about CMS. Really it
should be the other way around. Where there is algorithm specific CMS code
it is the CMS layer that should know how to handle different algorithms.
Therefore we move this code into the CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
Automatically rename all instances of _with_libctx() to _ex() as per
our coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12970)
Also adds error output tests on loading key files with unsupported algorithms to 30-test_evp.t
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13023)
Fix this error:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3853: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r10'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3854: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r12'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3855: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orrs r11,r14'
CLA: trivial
Fixes#12848
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
GH: #12854
This was written before the ec key contained a library context,
now that it contains a libctx it can be passed correctly to the callback.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12877)
The function returns 1 when the encoding of a decoded EC key used
explicit encoding of the curve parameters.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12683)
Those functions were located in the EC files, but is really broader
than that, even thought currently only used for SM2. They should
therefore be in a more central location, which was also indicated by
diverse TODOs.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12789)
They get called "delayed parameters" because they may make it to the
implementation at a later time than when they're given.
This currently only covers the distinguished ID, as that's the only
EVP_PKEY operation parameter so far that has been possible to give
before the operation has been initialized.
This includes a re-implementation of EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(),
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id(), and EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len().
Also, the more rigorous controls of keytype and optype are restored.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12789)
In EC_GROUP_new_from_params(), ERR_R_EC_LIB was reported if
group_new_from_name() returned NULL. However, this shadows a possible
EC_R_INVALID_CURVE, making that harder to detect, which happens to be
important to do in test/evp_test.c.
This also extends key_unsupported() in test/evp_test.c to check for
this error alongside the check for EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12587)
For example, FreeBSD prepends "FreeBSD" to version string, e.g.,
FreeBSD clang version 11.0.0 (git@github.com:llvm/llvm-project.git llvmorg-11.0.0-rc2-0-g414f32a9e86)
Target: x86_64-unknown-freebsd13.0
Thread model: posix
InstalledDir: /usr/bin
This prevented us from properly detecting AVX support, etc.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12725)
This was added for backward compatability.
Added EC_GROUP_new_from_params() that supports explicit curve parameters.
This fixes the 15-test_genec.t TODO.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12604)
Just like d2i_PrivateKey() / d2i_PrivateKey_ex(), there's a need to
associate an EVP_PKEY extracted from a PUBKEY to a library context and
a property query string. Without it, a provider-native EVP_PKEY can
only fetch necessary internal algorithms from the default library
context, even though an application specific context should be used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12671)
Changed many tests so they also test fips (and removed 'availablein = default' from some tests).
Seperated the monolithic evppkey.txt file into smaller maintainable groups.
Changed the availablein option so it must be first - this then skips the entire test before any fetching happens.
Changed the code so that all the OPENSSL_NO_XXXX tests are done in code via methods such as is_cipher_disabled(alg),
before the fetch happens.
Added missing libctx's found by adding a libctx to test_evp.
Broke up large data files for cipher, kdf's and mac's into smaller pieces so they no longer need 'AvailableIn = default'
Added missing algorithm aliases for cipher/digests to the providers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12236)
The commit claimed to make things more consistent. In fact it makes it
less so. Revert back to the previous namig convention.
This reverts commit 765d04c946.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12186)
The following built-in curves do not have an assigned OID:
- Oakley-EC2N-3
- Oakley-EC2N-4
In general we shouldn't assume that an OID is always available.
This commit detects such cases, raises an error and returns appropriate
return values so that the condition can be detected and correctly
handled by the callers, when serializing EC parameters or EC keys with
the default `ec_param_enc:named_curve`.
Fixes#12306
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12313)
Creating an EC public key from the private key uses random numbers
internally, which require use of the proper libtx. Therefore we make
sure the libctx is used during this operation.
Fixes#12150
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12159)
Renames some "new_ex" functions to "new_with_libctx" and ensures that we
pass around the libctx AND the propq everywhere.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12159)
We rename these function to EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_group_name and
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name so that they can be used for other algorithms
other than EC.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11914)
The EVP_KDF_CTX_* functions have been relocated to the EVP_KDF_* namespace
for consistency.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11996)
`crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c` contained code sections guarded by a
`ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2` define.
The relevant comment read:
> /*
> * Note that by default ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is undefined. While it's great
> * code processing 4 points in parallel, corresponding serial operation
> * is several times slower, because it uses 29x29=58-bit multiplication
> * as opposite to 64x64=128-bit in integer-only scalar case. As result
> * it doesn't provide *significant* performance improvement. Note that
> * just defining ECP_NISTZ256_AVX2 is not sufficient to make it work,
> * you'd need to compile even asm/ecp_nistz256-avx.pl module.
> */
Without diminishing the quality of the original submission, it's evident
that this code has been basically unreachable without modifications to
the library source code and is under-tested.
This commit removes these sections from the codebase.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12019)
Renamed some values in core_names i.e Some DH specific names were changed to use DH instead of FFC.
Added some strings values related to RSA keys.
Moved set_params related docs out of EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod into its own file.
Updated Keyexchange and signature code and docs.
Moved some common DSA/DH docs into a shared EVP_PKEY-FFC.pod.
Moved Ed25519.pod into EVP_SIGNATURE-ED25519.pod and reworked it.
Added some usage examples. As a result of the usage examples the following change was also made:
ec allows OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH as a settable gen parameter.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11610)
This should fix 2 issues detected by Coverity and introduced with
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11807
- CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
- CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
In practice the tests seem to show that they both aren't real issues,
yet I believe this small change should appease the scanner and at the
same time improve clarity for the reader.
Here is the original report:
```
** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463577: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&point" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c: 1123 in EC_POINT_mul()
1117
1118 if (group->meth->mul != NULL)
1119 ret = group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1120 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1121 else
1122 /* use default */
CID 1463573: Memory - corruptions (ARRAY_VS_SINGLETON)
Passing "&p_scalar" to function "ec_wNAF_mul" which uses it as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret adjacent memory locations.
1123 ret = ec_wNAF_mul(group, r, g_scalar, point != NULL
1124 && p_scalar != NULL, &point, &p_scalar, ctx);
1125
1126 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
1127 BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
1128 #endif
```
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11919)
At various points we need to be able to retrieve the current library
context so we store it in the ECX_KEY structure.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11635)
ECX keys can very easily crete the public key from the private key.
Therefore when we import ecx keys it is sufficent to just have the private
key.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11635)
This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.
Fixes#11538
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
Previously import_to just took an EVP_PKEY as the argument. However we
need to some additional context data as well - specifically the libctx.
Therefore we pass an EVP_PKEY_CTX instead to hold the combination of
both of these things.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11536)
Don't wrap conditionally-compiled files in global ifndef tests.
Instead, test if the feature is disabled and, if so, do not
compile it.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11263)
The Ed448 private key deconding needs to use a library ctx. So we
implement a priv_decode_with_libctx function for it.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11494)
The macros are converted to functions, and are modified to support
provider implementations.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11328)
Ed25519 needs to fetch a digest and so needs to use the correct libctx.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11496)
The EC export_to function calls EC_POINT_point2buf that can later
generate a random number in some circumstances. Therefore we pass in a
BN_CTX associated with the library context. This means we have to change
the export_to function signature to accept the library context.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11493)
This was pointed out by a false-positive
-fsanitizer warning ;-)
However from the cryptographical POV the
code is wrong:
A point R^0 on the wrong curve
is infinity on the wrong curve.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475)
a9612d6c03 introduced possible memory leaks in EC_GROUP_cmp and EC_POINTs_mul, and a possible BN_CTX_end without BN_CTX_start in ec_field_inverse_mod_ord.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11452)
- Convert to affine coords on ladder entry. This lets us use more efficient
ladder step formulae.
- Convert to affine coords on ladder exit. This prevents the current code
awkwardness where conversion happens twice during serialization: first to
fetch the buffer size, then again to fetch the coords.
- Instead of projectively blinding the input point, blind both accumulators
independently.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)
Since this is public, it is best to make the underlying structure opaque.
This means converting from stack allocation to dynamic allocation for all
usages.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11390)
The catalyst for this is the difficult of passing BNs through the other
OSSL_PARAM APIs.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11390)
The provider key export functions for EC_KEY assumed that a public key
is always present, and would fail if not. This blocks any attempt to
export a key structure with only domain parameters.
This is similar to earlier work done in EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11394)
Downgrading EVP_PKEYs from containing provider side internal keys to
containing legacy keys demands support in the EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.
This became a bit elaborate because the code would be almost exactly
the same as the import functions int EVP_KEYMGMT. Therefore, we end
up moving most of the code to common backend support files that can be
used both by legacy backend code and by our providers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11375)
We can find no reason why everyone should have to call both
EC_curve_nist2nid() and ec_curve_name2nid() to find the NID for a
name, and it's too easy to forget EC_curve_nist2nid(), so we make life
simpler.
One could argue that FIPS only allows a limited set of names, but that
now gets handled internally, and those who really want to be really
sure to only get the NIST names can still do so with EC_curve_nist2nid()
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11391)
The export-to-provider functions for DH, DSA and EC_KEY assumed that a
public key is always present, and would fail if not. This blocks any
attempt to export a key structure with only domain parameters.
While fixing this, we also modify the selection declaration to
evp_keymgmt_import() to be more adaptive, the diverse selection bits
are now added when the corresponding data is added to the OSSL_PARAM
array.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11374)
This is largely based on the existing X25519 and X448 serializers - but
a few adjustments were necessary so that we can identify what type of key
we are using. Previously we used the keylen for this but X25519 and
ED25519 have the same keylen.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11272)
Note: This PR has not attempted to move the curves into the provider dispatch table.
Mappings between the curve name / nid have been added to the inbuilt curve table.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11133)
The EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD function export_to() must check that the key
we're trying to export has a known libcrypto method, i.e. is a built
in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD, etc. Otherwise, the method may be defined
by the calling application, by an engine, by another library, and we
simply cannot know all the quirks hidden behind that method, if we
have access to the key data, or much anything.
Such keys are simply deemed impossible to export to provider keys,
i.e. have export_to() return 0. This cascades back to functions like
evp_pkey_export_to_provider() and evp_pkey_upgrade_to_provider() and
their callers. In most cases, this is fine, but if these get mixed in
with provider side keys in any function, that function will fail.
Fixes#11179Fixes#9915
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11193)
At the moment we only provider support for these algorithms in the default
provider. These algorithms only support "one shot" EVP_DigestSign() and
EVP_DigestVerify() as per the existing libcrypto versions.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11261)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11175)
We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
holding the secret scalar.
This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
the called specifically set it.
The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
Setting the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag alone is never enough, we also have
to preallocate the `BIGNUM` internal buffer to a fixed public size big
enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
accesses.
Fixed Length
------------
The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
secret scalars.
For preallocating the `BIGNUM` storage we look at the number of "words"
required for the internal representation of the order, and we
preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
might temporarily overflow the order length.
Future work
-----------
A separate commit addresses further hardening of `BN_copy()` (and
indirectly `BN_dup()`).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length
of the secret scalar.
Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
scalar in the key.
For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length,
using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`.
When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
constant time implementations in the backend.
Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough
that operations performed during the processing never trigger a
realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
accesses.
Fixed length
------------
The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
secret scalars.
For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
converted to bytes (rounding up).
For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
required for the internal representation of the order, and we
preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
might temporarily overflow the order length.
Future work
-----------
To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon
`EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden
`EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`.
This is done in separate commits.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
A pair of internal functions related to EC_KEY handling could benefit
from declaring `EC_KEY *` variables as `const`, providing clarity for
callers and readers of the code, in addition to enlisting the compiler
in preventing some mistakes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
In https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883, I'd meant to exclude
the perlasm drivers since they aren't opening pipes and do not
particularly need it, but I only noticed x86_64-xlate.pl, so
arm-xlate.pl and ppc-xlate.pl got the change.
That seems to have been fine, so be consistent and also apply the change
to x86_64-xlate.pl. Checking for errors is generally a good idea.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930)
Add ref counting and control how we allocate storage for the private key.
We will need this type in following commits where we move the ecx code
to be provider aware.
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10964)
It is better, safer and smaller to let the library routine handle the
strlen(3) call.
Added a note to the documentation suggesting this.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11019)
Use of the low level ECDSA and EC_KEY_METHOD functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10960)
Use of the low level ECDH functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10960)
Added comments and cleared an intermediate result.
KAT tests already exist in evppkey.txt (Search for "KAS_ECC_CDH_PrimitiveTest")
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10838)
If one of the perlasm xlate drivers crashes, OpenSSL's build will
currently swallow the error and silently truncate the output to however
far the driver got. This will hopefully fail to build, but better to
check such things.
Handle this by checking for errors when closing STDOUT (which is a pipe
to the xlate driver).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883)
ECDSA signature lengths are calculated using i2d_ECDSA_SIG().
i2d_ECDSA_SIG() was changed in a previous PR to use a custom ASN1 encoder (using WPACKET)
so that the normal ASN1 encoder does not need to be pulled into the provider boundary.
For consistency ECDSA_size() has been changed to also use i2d_ECDSA_SIG() - this can now
be used directly inside the FIPS provider.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10577)
ECDSA_do_verify() is a function that verifies a ECDSA signature given a hash and a public EC key. The function is supposed to return 1 on valid signature, 0 on invalid signature and -1 on error. Previously, we returned 0 if the key did not have a verify_sig method. This is actually an error case and not an invalid signature. Consequently, this patch updates the return code to -1.
Fixes#8766
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10693)
This change addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in
the internals of nistz256 low level operations for armv8.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
This is only used if configured with
./config -DECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the
internals of some elliptic curve low level operations.
The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this
issue is rather low.
The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
Verifications are public, there is no need to clear the used storage before
freeing it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10475)
EC_POINT_bn2point() rejected BIGNUMs with a zero value.
This behavior indirectly caused failures when converting a point
at infinity through EC_POINT_point2hex() and then back to a point with
EC_POINT_hex2point().
With this change such BIGNUMs are treated like any other and exported to
an octet buffer filled with zero.
It is then EC_POINT_oct2point() (either the default implementation or
the custom one in group->meth->oct2point) to determine if such encoding
maps to a valid point (generally the point at infinity is encoded as
0x00).
Fixes#10258
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
...in constant time.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10339)
The s390x x448 implementation does not correctly reduce non-canonical
values i.e., u-coordinates >= p = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10339)
ecp_s390x_nistp.c and ecx_meth.c need to include s390x_arch.h.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10317)
Implementations are now spread across several libraries, so the assembler
related defines need to be applied to all affected libraries and modules.
AES_ASM define was missing from libimplementations.a which disabled AESNI
aarch64 changes were made by xkqian.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10180)
An unintended consequence of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808
is that when an explicit parameters curve is matched against one of the
well-known builtin curves we automatically inherit also the associated
seed parameter, even if the input parameters excluded such
parameter.
This later affects the serialization of such parsed keys, causing their
input DER encoding and output DER encoding to differ due to the
additional optional field.
This does not cause problems internally but could affect external
applications, as reported in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811#issuecomment-536153288
This commit fixes the issue by conditionally clearing the seed field if
the original input parameters did not include it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10140)
We put almost everything in these internal static libraries:
libcommon Block building code that can be used by all
our implementations, legacy and non-legacy
alike.
libimplementations All non-legacy algorithm implementations and
only them. All the code that ends up here is
agnostic to the definitions of FIPS_MODE.
liblegacy All legacy implementations.
libnonfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE undefined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE isn't defined must end
up in this library.
libfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE defined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE is defined must end up
in this library.
The FIPS provider module is built from providers/fips/*.c and linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libfips.
The Legacy provider module is built from providers/legacy/*.c and
linked with liblegacy, libcommon and libcrypto.
If module building is disabled, the object files from liblegacy and
libcommon are added to libcrypto and the Legacy provider becomes a
built-in provider.
The Default provider module is built-in, so it ends up being linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libnonfips. For libcrypto in
form of static library, the object files from those other libraries
are simply being added to libcrypto.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
Also added blanks lines after declarations in a couple of places.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9916)
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below
For the public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory), the guard
names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with
all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. For the
private header files files, an extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
using PCC and KDSA instructions.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
of instruction parameter blocks.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
They now generally conform to the following argument sequence:
script.pl "$(PERLASM_SCHEME)" [ C preprocessor arguments ... ] \
$(PROCESSOR) <output file>
However, in the spirit of being able to use these scripts manually,
they also allow for no argument, or for only the flavour, or for only
the output file. This is done by only using the last argument as
output file if it's a file (it has an extension), and only using the
first argument as flavour if it isn't a file (it doesn't have an
extension).
While we're at it, we make all $xlate calls the same, i.e. the $output
argument is always quoted, and we always die on error when trying to
start $xlate.
There's a perl lesson in this, regarding operator priority...
This will always succeed, even when it fails:
open FOO, "something" || die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that '||' has higher priority than list operators (a
function is essentially a list operator and gobbles up everything
following it that isn't lower priority), and since a non-empty string
is always true, so that ends up being exactly the same as:
open FOO, "something";
This, however, will fail if "something" can't be opened:
open FOO, "something" or die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that 'or' has lower priority that list operators,
i.e. it's performed after the 'open' call.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
Since the arguments are now generated in the build file templates,
they should be removed from the build.info files.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
The output C code was made to use ERR_func_error_string() to see if a
string table was already loaded or not. Since this function returns
NULL always, this check became useless.
Change it to use ERR_reason_error_string() instead, as there's no
reason to believe we will get rid of reason strings, ever.
To top it off, we rebuild all affected C sources.
Fixes#9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific
BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the
processed BIGNUM.
The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and
ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the
internal fixed length representation.
This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce
while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations.
The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack
varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the
ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the
size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM
representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture).
To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the
output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this
length is public.
Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and
BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top
through memory access patterns.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside
setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls
BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of
BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed
in the next commit.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.
This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code.
This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.
It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).
The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks.
CVE-2019-1547
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9827)
This function re-implements EVP_MD_meth_free(), but has a name that
isn't encumbered by legacy EVP_MD construction functionality.
We also refactor most of EVP_MD_meth_new() into an internal
evp_md_new() that's used when creating fetched methods.
EVP_MD_meth_new() and EVP_MD_meth_free() are rewritten in terms of
evp_md_new() and EVP_MD_free(). This means that at any time, we can
deprecate all the EVP_MD_meth_ functions with no harmful consequence.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9758)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9607)
for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using KDSA instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
which are already enabled for ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using PCC instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
When creating a BN_CTX, make sure we store it in the right variable!
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9546)
