1. Add OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function for EVP_MD, which is used to copy algctx from the old EVP_MD_CTX to the new one.
2. Add implementation of OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function for default providers.
3. Modify EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex: When the fetched digest is the same in in and out contexts, use the copy function to copy the members in EVP_MD_CTX if the OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function exists. Otherwise, use the previous method to copy.
4. Add documentation for OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx function in doc/man7/provider-digest.pod.
5. Add testcase.
Fixes#25703
Signed-off-by: wangcheng <bangwangnj@163.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25726)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25297)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25297)
Explicitely document what semantic meaning do various EVP_KDF
algorithms produce.
PBKDF2 produces cryptographic keys that are subject to cryptographic
security measures, for example as defined in NIST SP 800-132.
All other algorithms produce keying material, not subject to explicit
output length checks in any known standards.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25610)
Similar to other KDFs, the input key should be 112 bits long.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25529)
The details for RSA and EdDSA have already been documented, albeit the
RSA documentation wasn't conforming properly to the POD format.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25422)
Also improve related documentation.
- The BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL flag did not behave as advertised, only
leading and trailing, but not internal, whitespace was supported:
$ echo 'AA AA' | openssl base64 -A -d | wc -c
0
- Switching from ignored leading input to valid base64 input misbehaved
when the length of the skipped input was one more than the length of
the second and subsequent valid base64 lines in the internal 1k
buffer:
$ printf '#foo\n#bar\nA\nAAA\nAAAA\n' | openssl base64 -d | wc -c
0
- When the underlying BIO is retriable, and a read returns less than
1k of data, some of the already buffered input lines that could have
been decoded and returned were retained internally for a retry by the
caller. This is somewhat surprising, and the new code decodes as many
of the buffered lines as possible. Issue reported by Michał Trojnara.
- After all valid data has been read, the next BIO_read(3) should
return 0 when the input was all valid or -1 if an error was detected.
This now occurs in more consistently, but further tests and code
refactoring may be needed to ensure this always happens.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25253)
The Argon2 KDF uses OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES to fetch implementations
of blake2bmac and blake2b512 if ctx->mac and ctx->md are NULL. This
isn't documented in the manpage, so users that might, for example, want
to fetch an instance of Argon2 with the -fips property query to obtain
a working Argon2 KDF even though the default property query requires
fips=yes are left wondering why this fails.
Fortunately, EVP_KDF(3)/PARAMETERS already explains what the properties
are used for, so we really just need to add a single line.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25306)
Add EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify}_message support for our Ed25519 and Ed448
implementations, including ph and ctx variants.
Tests are added with test_evp stanzas.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24975)
Added the function EVP_MD_CTX_get_size_ex() which checks for XOF and
does a ctx get rather than just returning EVP_MD_size().
SHAKE did not have a get_ctx_params() so that had to be added to return the xoflen.
Added a helper function EVP_MD_xof()
EVP_MD_CTX_size() was just an aliased macro for EVP_MD_size(), so to
keep it the same I added an extra function.
EVP_MD_size() always returns 0 for SHAKE now, since it caches the value
of md_size at the time of an EVP_MD_fetch(). This is probably better
than returning the incorrect initial value it was before e.g (16 for
SHAKE128) and returning tht always instead of the set xoflen.
Note BLAKE2B uses "size" instead of "xoflen" to do a similar thing.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25285)
X25519 and X448 are unapproved in FIPS 140-3
So always trigger the indicator callback if these Keys are used,
and add "fips-indicator" getters that return 0.
This has been added to keygen and key exchange.
(KEM will also require it if ever becomes a FIPS algorithm).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25246)
After December 31, 2023, SP 800-131Ar2 [0] no longer allows PKCS#1 v1.5
padding for RSA "key-transport" (aka encryption and decryption).
There's a few good options to replace this usage in the RSA PCT, but
the simplest is verifying m = (m^e)^d mod n, (where 1 < m < (n − 1)).
This is specified in SP 800-56Br2 (Section 6.4.1.1) [1] and allowed by
FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A. In OpenSSL, this corresponds to RSA_NO_PADDING.
[0]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23832)
This adds a FIPS indicator for KMAC key size.
Note that 112 bits keys are still smaller than the
sizes required to reach 128 bits for KMAC128 and
256 bits for KMAC256
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check.
HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC,
so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC.
A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider
for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore
the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the
check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches
HMAC directly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
(in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms,
which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used
for composite algorithms)
To make this implementation possible, wrappers were added around the hash
function itself, allowing the use of existing hash implementations through
their respective OSSL_DISPATCH tables, but also retaining the dynamic fetch
of hash implementations when the digest_sign / digest_verify functionality
is used. This wrapper allows implementing the RSA+hash composites through
simple initializer function and a custom OSSL_DISPATCH table for each.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
>=112 bits
Add a FIPS indicator to EC keygen
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25008)
FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
See FIPS 140-3 IG Section 10.3.A Part 11
Indicates ECDSA requires a sign and verify test.
Note 11 states that HashEdDSA is not required to be tested if PureEdDSA is tested.
Note 12 indicates that both ED25519 and X448 need to be tested.
Since ED uses the oneshot interface, additional API's needed to be exposed to the
FIPS provider using #ifdef FIPS_MODULE.
Changed ED25518 and ED448 to use fips=true in the FIPS provider.
Updated documentation for provider lists for EDDSA.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22112)
This uses a FIPS indicator.
Since DSA KeyGen is only useful for DSA signing,
it reuses the DSA signing FIPS configuration option and settable ctx name.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
Added OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_get_params() and
OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_gettable_params()
This will allow a FIPS indicator parameter to be queried after keygen.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
There is a issue currently related to CMAC TDES, when the new provider
is tested against older branches.
The new strict check caused backwards compatibility issues when
using old branch with the new FIPS provider.
To get around this CMAC now allows TDES by default, but it can be either
enabled via config or a settable. (i.e it uses an indicator)
Where the TDES cipher check can be done turned out to be problematic.
Shifting the check in the TDES cipherout of the init doesnt work because
ciphers can run thru either final or cipher (and checking on every
cipher call seemed bad). This means it needs to stay in the cipher init.
So the check needs to be done in CMAC BEFORE the underlying TDES cipher
does it check.
When using an indicator the TDES cipher needs its "encrypt-check" set
so that needs to be propagated from the CMAC object. This requires
the ability to set the param at the time the cipher ctx is inited.
An internal function was required in order to pass params to CMAC_Init.
Note also that the check was done where it is, because EVP_Q_mac() calls
EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, cipher_param)
EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
EVP_MAC_init(ctx, key, keylen, params)
Where the second call to set_params would set up "encrypt-check" after
"cipher".
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25022)
