Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24754)
After December 31, 2023, SP 800-131Ar2 [0] no longer allows PKCS#1 v1.5
padding for RSA "key-transport" (aka encryption and decryption).
There's a few good options to replace this usage in the RSA PCT, but
the simplest is verifying m = (m^e)^d mod n, (where 1 < m < (n − 1)).
This is specified in SP 800-56Br2 (Section 6.4.1.1) [1] and allowed by
FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A. In OpenSSL, this corresponds to RSA_NO_PADDING.
[0]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23832)
This adds a FIPS indicator for KMAC key size.
Note that 112 bits keys are still smaller than the
sizes required to reach 128 bits for KMAC128 and
256 bits for KMAC256
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check.
HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC,
so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC.
A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider
for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore
the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the
check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches
HMAC directly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
This replaces LHASH in core_namemap with the new hashtable and adds
a reverse mapping in form of stack of stacks instead of iterating
the existing hash table members.
The new hashtable is used in lockless-read mode.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
Also build it in the FIPS provider too and properly
report error on insert when hashtable cannot be grown.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
Add full key matching to hashtable
the idea is that on a hash value match we do a full memory comparison of
the unhashed key to validate that its actually the key we're looking for
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
(in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms,
which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used
for composite algorithms)
To make this implementation possible, wrappers were added around the hash
function itself, allowing the use of existing hash implementations through
their respective OSSL_DISPATCH tables, but also retaining the dynamic fetch
of hash implementations when the digest_sign / digest_verify functionality
is used. This wrapper allows implementing the RSA+hash composites through
simple initializer function and a custom OSSL_DISPATCH table for each.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
The following API groups are extended with a new init function, as well
as an update and final function, to allow the use of explicitly fetched
signature implementations for any composite signature algorithm, like
"sha1WithRSAEncryption":
- EVP_PKEY_sign
- EVP_PKEY_verify
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
To support this, providers are required to add a few new functions, not
the least one that declares what key types an signature implementation
supports.
While at this, the validity check in evp_signature_from_algorithm() is
also refactored; the SIGNATURE provider functionality is too complex for
counters. It's better, or at least more readable, to check function
combinations.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
FIPS providers need to specify identifiable names and versions. Allow
to customize the fips provider name prefix, via VERSION.dat which
already allows to customize version & buildinfo. With this patch
in-place it removes the need of patching code to set customized
provider name.
E.g. echo FIPS_VENDOR=ACME >> VERSION.dat, results in
```
$ OPENSSL_CONF=fips-and-base.cnf ../util/wrap.pl ../apps/openssl list -providers --verbose
Providers:
base
name: OpenSSL Base Provider
version: 3.4.0
status: active
build info: 3.4.0-dev
gettable provider parameters:
name: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
version: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
buildinfo: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
status: integer (arbitrary size)
fips
name: ACME FIPS Provider for OpenSSL
version: 3.4.0
status: active
build info: 3.4.0-dev
gettable provider parameters:
name: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
version: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
buildinfo: pointer to a UTF8 encoded string (arbitrary size)
status: integer (arbitrary size)
security-checks: integer (arbitrary size)
tls1-prf-ems-check: integer (arbitrary size)
drbg-no-trunc-md: integer (arbitrary size)
```
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24368)
See FIPS 140-3 IG Section 10.3.A Part 11
Indicates ECDSA requires a sign and verify test.
Note 11 states that HashEdDSA is not required to be tested if PureEdDSA is tested.
Note 12 indicates that both ED25519 and X448 need to be tested.
Since ED uses the oneshot interface, additional API's needed to be exposed to the
FIPS provider using #ifdef FIPS_MODULE.
Changed ED25518 and ED448 to use fips=true in the FIPS provider.
Updated documentation for provider lists for EDDSA.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22112)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24821)
Sub-OIDs for {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
private(4) enterprise(1) 45605} are recorded in the document "Wi-SUN
Assigned Value Registry" (WAVR).
OID id-on-hardwareModule is defined in RFC 4108.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23428)
PR #18345 added some code for an event queue. It also added a test for it.
Unfortunately this event queue code has never been used for anything.
Additionally the test was never integrated into a test recipe, so it never
actually gets invoked via "make test". This makes the code entirely dead,
unnecessarily bloats the size of libssl and causes a decrease in our
testing code coverage value.
We remove the dead code.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25100)
If an HRR is sent then it MUST contain supported_versions according to the
RFC. We were sanity checking any supported_versions extension that was sent
but failed to verify that it was actually present.
Fixes#25041
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25068)
Add inline qualifier to avoid exporting a function for one unique use
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24968)
... due to a missing const.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24968)
FIPS doesn't permit message hashes to be processed by thee algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25032)
Added OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_get_params() and
OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_gettable_params()
This will allow a FIPS indicator parameter to be queried after keygen.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
Since FIPS provider performs lower bound check by default from v3.0, the
default value for new configurable item will be one.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24120)
There is a issue currently related to CMAC TDES, when the new provider
is tested against older branches.
The new strict check caused backwards compatibility issues when
using old branch with the new FIPS provider.
To get around this CMAC now allows TDES by default, but it can be either
enabled via config or a settable. (i.e it uses an indicator)
Where the TDES cipher check can be done turned out to be problematic.
Shifting the check in the TDES cipherout of the init doesnt work because
ciphers can run thru either final or cipher (and checking on every
cipher call seemed bad). This means it needs to stay in the cipher init.
So the check needs to be done in CMAC BEFORE the underlying TDES cipher
does it check.
When using an indicator the TDES cipher needs its "encrypt-check" set
so that needs to be propagated from the CMAC object. This requires
the ability to set the param at the time the cipher ctx is inited.
An internal function was required in order to pass params to CMAC_Init.
Note also that the check was done where it is, because EVP_Q_mac() calls
EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, cipher_param)
EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
EVP_MAC_init(ctx, key, keylen, params)
Where the second call to set_params would set up "encrypt-check" after
"cipher".
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25022)
In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.
A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).
Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)
This leaves 3DES with the FIPS query "FIPS=yes", which allows
Triple-DES to be used for Decryption by default.
Disallow CMAC using Triple-DES in FIPS.
This does not use a FIPS indicator.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24960)
This is a FIPS 140-3 requirement.
This uses a FIP indicator if either the FIPS configurable "dsa_sign_disabled" is set to 0,
OR OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_CHECK is set to 0 in the dsa signing context.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24799)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24854)
On the one hand, we have public macros that are collections of EVP_PKEY_OP
bits, like EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, obviously meant to be used like this:
if ((ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG) == 0) ...
On the other hand, we also have internal test macros, like
EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(), obviously meant to be used like this:
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)) ...
Unfortunately, these two sets of macros were completely separate, forcing
developers to keep them both sync, manually.
This refactor makes the internal macros use the corresponding public macros,
and adds the missing public macros, for consistency.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24854)
utility function to give us sane checking on strtoul conversions
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24861)
For some reason, DSA has been aliased with dsaWithSHA1 for an eternity.
They are not the same, though, and should never have been aliased in the
first place.
This was first discovered with 'openssl list':
$ openssl list -signature-algorithms
...
{ 1.2.840.10040.4.1, 1.2.840.10040.4.3, 1.3.14.3.2.12, 1.3.14.3.2.13, 1.3.14.3.2.27, DSA, DSA-old, DSA-SHA, DSA-SHA1, DSA-SHA1-old, dsaEncryption, dsaEncryption-old, dsaWithSHA, dsaWithSHA1, dsaWithSHA1-old } @ default
This isn't good at all, as it confuses the key algorithms signature
function with a signature scheme that involves SHA1, and it makes it
look like OpenSSL's providers offer a DSA-SHA1 implementation (which
they currently do not do).
Breaking this aliasing apart (i.e. aliasing DSA, DSA-old, dsaEncryption
and dsaEncryption-old separately from the names that involve SHA) appears
harmless as far as OpenSSL's test suite goes.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24828)
Add a FIPS indicator callback that can be set via
OSSL_INDICATOR_set_callback(). This callback is intended to be run
whenever a non approved algorithm check has occurred and strict checking
has been disabled.The callback may be used to
log non approved algorithms. The callback is passed a type and
description string as well as the cbarg specified in OSSL_INDICATOR_set_callback.
The return value can be either 0 or 1.
A value of 0 can be used for testing purposes to force an error to occur from the algorithm
that called the callback.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24623)
