The regression from commit 05458fd was fixed, but there is
no test for that regression. This adds it simply by having
a certificate that we compare for -text output having
a different subject and issuer.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14353)
Removed the related TODOs.
Also adjusted the DH parameters used for the DH test to be acceptable
for FIPS as that now allows only known safe prime parameters.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14367)
The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until commit 0e7b1383e, which accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes#13427
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13590)
Also adds error output tests on loading key files with unsupported algorithms to 30-test_evp.t
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13023)
The check is applied only with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Fixes#12139
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12683)
A recently added certificate in test/certs expired causing test_verify to fail.
This add a replacement certificate with a long expiry date.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12549)
Move check that cert signing is allowed from x509v3_cache_extensions() to
where it belongs: internal_verify(), generalize it for proxy cert signing.
Correct and simplify check_issued(), now checking self-issued (not: self-signed).
Add test case to 25-test_verify.t that demonstrates successful fix
Fixes#1418
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10587)
Accept verification without -x509_strict and reject it with it.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463)
Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security
level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the
Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #10785
SM2 certificate signing request can be created and signed by OpenSSL
now, both in library and apps.
Documentation and test cases are added.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9085)
This follows #8321 which added the SM2 certificate verification feature.
This commit adds some test cases for #8321.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8465)
Some signature algorithms require special treatment for digesting, such
as SM2. This patch adds the ability of handling raw input data in
apps/pkeyutl other than accepting only pre-hashed input data.
Beside, SM2 requries an ID string when signing or verifying a piece of data,
this patch also adds the ability for apps/pkeyutil to specify that ID
string.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8186)
Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.
Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
unlike DNS names. Checked name must have at least two labels, with
all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
internal in each label. In addition to the usual LDH characters,
we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
all the standards.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.
Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
chain using two nested for loops.
Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.
Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4393)
Remove some incorrect copyright references.
Move copyright to standard place
Add OpenSSL copyright where missing.
Remove copyrighted file that we don't use any more
Remove Itanium assembler for RC4 and MD5 (assembler versions of old and
weak algorithms for an old chip)
Standardize apps/rehash copyright comment; approved by Timo
Put dual-copyright notice on mkcert
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3691)
