Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):
For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.
Fixes#6914
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
Also add build-time errors to keep them in sync.
Thanks to GitHub user YuDudysheva for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6874)
Goal here is to facilitate writing "thread-opportunistic" code that
withstands Thread Sanitizer's scrutiny. "Thread-opportunistic" is when
exact result is not required, e.g. some statistics, or execution flow
doesn't have to be unambiguous.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6786)
There are symbols we've marked for deprecation in OpenSSL 1.2.0. We
must ensure that they don't actually become deprecated before that.
Fixes#6814
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6824)
Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes#6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the
implementations between the two curve types being identical. This
commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m
forms just calling the generic functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075Fixes: #6012
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
These tiny functions only read from the input SSL, and we are
about to use them from functions that only have a const SSL* available,
so propagate const a bit further.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)
The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.
Fixes#6600
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)
By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder
implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint).
ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit
forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification
path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case.
With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and
is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it.
While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized
that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given
EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the
corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and
again in every single implementation (and actually some
implementations lacked some of the tests).
I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are
independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to
be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes
these changes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized
ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed
Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the
operands.
The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is
auto generated with tooling:
- see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the
`ladder_pre` implementation;
- see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3
for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in
`ladder_step`;
- see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m)
without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy
for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in
affine coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error
codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes,
i.e., `SM2_*`).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
Fix the NULL check lack in a different way that is more compatible with
non-NULL branch. Refer #6632
Also mark and pop the error stack instead of clearing all errors when something
goes awry in CONF_get_number.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6643)
We need to check that __GNUC__ is defined before trying to use it.
This demands a slightly different way to define DECLARE_DEPRECATED.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6680)
Previoulsy we just had max_early_data which controlled both the value of
max early_data that we advertise in tickets *and* the amount of early_data
that we are willing to receive from clients. This doesn't work too well in
the case where we want to reduce a previously advertised max_early_data
value. In that case clients with old, stale tickets may attempt to send us
more early data than we are willing to receive. Instead of rejecting the
early data we abort the connection if that happens.
To avoid this we introduce a new "recv_max_early_data" value. The old
max_early_data becomes the value that is advertised in tickets while
recv_max_early_data is the maximum we will tolerate from clients.
Fixes#6647
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6655)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the
random device present.
A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can
be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some
seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows
such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device
nodes being available.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6432)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Separate out as a new function the code to write out data which is specific
to a stateless ticket.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
This function is documented to be deprecated since OpenSSL 1.1.0. We
need to make it so in openssl/ssl.h as well.
Fixes#6565
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6588)
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.
For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.
For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
Use EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type to access
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6443)
(that is, until 1.2.0 comes along)
Since we allow future deprecation (and that shouldn't be affected
by 'no-deprecated'), we need to distinguish what to have deprecated
on the value of OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, not the existence of
OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED.
Note that the macro OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED still exists, in case
someone still uses it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6470)
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_priv_key() and EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_get_pub_key()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
Only applies to algorithms that support it. Both raw private and public
keys can be obtained for X25519, Ed25519, X448, Ed448. Raw private keys
only can be obtained for HMAC, Poly1305 and SipHash
Fixes#6259
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6394)
All tickets on a connection need to have a unique nonce. When this was
originally implemented we only ever sent one ticket on the conneciton so
this didn't matter. We were just using the value 0. Now we can get multiple
tickets to we need to start doing the ticket nonce properly.
Fixes#6387
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6415)
OpenSSL 1.1.0 made the X509_LOOKUP_METHOD structure opaque, so
applications that were previously able to define a custom lookup method
are not able to be ported.
This commit adds getters and setters for each of the current fields of
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, along with getters and setters on several associated
opaque types (such as X509_LOOKUP and X509_OBJECT).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6152)
