This typedef is already created in aes_local.h as `typedef uint64_t u64;`.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22969)
In param_build.c, the functions OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string() and
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_ptr() use strlen() to compute the length of
the string when bsize is zero. However, the size_t returned by
strlen() might be too large (it is stored in an intermediate "int"),
so check for that.
There are analogous functions in params.c, but they do not use an
intermediate "int" to store the size_t returned by strlen(). So there
is some inconsistency between the implementations.
Credit to Viktor D and Tomas M for spotting these missing checks.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22967)
sscanf can return -1 on an empty input string. We need to appropriately
handle such an invalid case.
The instance in OSSL_HTTP_parse_url could cause an uninitialised read of
sizeof(unsigned int) bytes (typically 4). In many cases this uninit read
will immediately fail on the following check (i.e. if the read value
>65535).
If the top 2 bytes of a 4 byte unsigned int are zero then the value will
be <=65535 and the uninitialised value will be returned to the caller and
could represent arbitrary data on the application stack.
The OpenSSL security team has assessed this issue and consider it to be
a bug only (i.e. not a CVE).
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22961)
If p is set to 1 when calling BN_GF2m_mod_inv then an infinite loop will
result. Calling this function set 1 when applications call this directly
is a non-sensical value - so this would be considered a bug in the caller.
It does not seem possible to cause OpenSSL internal callers of
BN_GF2m_mod_inv to call it with a value of 1.
So, for the above reasons, this is not considered a security issue.
Reported by Bing Shi.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22960)
This fix removes explicit support for the SPT threading model in configurations.
This also reverts commit f63e1b48ac that were
required for SPT but broke other models.
Fixes: #22798
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22807)
Since the gen->type will not be set in a2i_GENERAL_NAME
the gen->d.otherName will not be automatically
cleaned up by GENERAL_NAME_free.
Also fixed a similar leak in a2i_GENERAL_NAME,
where ASN1_STRING_set may fail but gen->d.ia5
will not be automatically cleaned up.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22996)
Test the next arithmetic operation to safely determine if adding the
next digit in the passed property string will overflow
Also, noted a bug in the parse_hex code. When parsing non-digit
characters (i.e. a-f and A-F), we do a tolower conversion (which is
fine), and then subtract 'a' to get the hex value from the ascii (which
is definately wrong). We should subtract 'W' to convert tolower
converted hex digits in the range a-f to their hex value counterparts
Add tests to test_property_parse_error to ensure overflow checks work
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22874)
This function can be called during OPENSSL_cleanup() when
the cache was already flushed and deallocated.
Fixes#22939
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22941)
If the provider's output dispatch table is NULL, trying to parse it causes a
crash. Let's not do that.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22866)
Coverity issue 1551719 noted CRYPTO_secure_used referenced a shared
variable without taking the appropriate read lock. Add that.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22802)
And clean up partially created choice objects, which have
still the default type = -1 from ASIdentifierChoice_new().
Fixes#22700
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22745)
The little-endian optimization is doing some type-punning in a way
violating the C standard aliasing rule by loading or storing through a
lvalue with type "unsigned int" but the memory location has effective
type "unsigned long" or "unsigned long long" (BN_ULONG). Convert these
accesses to use memcpy instead, as memcpy is defined as-is "accessing
through the lvalues with type char" and char is aliasing with all types.
GCC does a good job to optimize away the temporary copies introduced
with the change. Ideally copying to a temporary unsigned int array,
doing the calculation, and then copying back to `r_d` will make the code
look better, but unfortunately GCC would fail to optimize away this
temporary array then.
I've not touched the LE optimization in BN_nist_mod_224 because it's
guarded by BN_BITS2!=64, then BN_BITS2 must be 32 and BN_ULONG must be
unsigned int, thus there is no aliasing issue in BN_nist_mod_224.
Fixes#12247.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22816)
Amend the assembler so it uses only 32bit value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22750)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22750)
When PKCS7_add_signed_attribute fails, the ASN1_TIME
object may be leaked when it was not passed in as
input parameter.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22772)
When an error happens after cms_encode_Receipt
the ASN1_OCTET_STRING object "os" may be leaked.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22758)
When PKCS7_add_signed_attribute fails, the ASN1_STRING
object may be leaked.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22744)
For armv4 - Only the first 4 parameters can be passed via registers
(r0..r3).
As all of the general registers are already used,
r11 was used to store the 'next' param.
R11 is now pushed/poped on entry/exit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22719)
Fix the conditional on the 'next' parameter passed into SHA3_squeeze.
Reported-by: David Benjamin <davidben@davidben.net>
Signed-off-by: Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22722)
AES gets a performance enhancement of 19-36%, similar to the M1 and M2.
SHA3 gets an improvement of 4-7% on buffers 256 bytes or larger.
Tested on an M3 Pro, but the CPU cores are the same on M3 and M3 Max.
Change-Id: I2bf40bbde824823bb8cf2efd1bd945da9f23a703
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22685)
In tracking down a hang, we found that nonstop platforms were falling
into the if #ifdef FIONBIO clause in the implementation of
BIO_sock_nbio. While the platform defines this macro, sockets set with
this continued to operate in blocking mode. Given that the platform
also support O_NONBLOCK, adjust the ifdef to have the nonstop platform
use that method to ensure that sockets enter blocking mode
Related-To #22588
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22696)
The low level SHA3_Squeeze() function needed to change slightly so
that it can handle multiple squeezes. Support this on s390x
architecture as well.
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22221)
Fixes#7894
This allows SHAKE to squeeze multiple times with different output sizes.
The existing EVP_DigestFinalXOF() API has been left as a one shot
operation. A similar interface is used by another toolkit.
The low level SHA3_Squeeze() function needed to change slightly so
that it can handle multiple squeezes. This involves changing the
assembler code so that it passes a boolean to indicate whether
the Keccak function should be called on entry.
At the provider level, the squeeze is buffered, so that it only requests
a multiple of the blocksize when SHA3_Squeeze() is called. On the first
call the value is zero, on subsequent calls the value passed is 1.
This PR is derived from the excellent work done by @nmathewson in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7921
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21511)
We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
differ. DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
sets a flag for the excessively sized Q. This behaviour is mimicked in
DH_check_pub_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22453)
The macro was introduced in commit ed6dfd1e36 without an
openssl-specific prefix as mandated by the coding style.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22603)
@mspncp noted that the condition should have been likely not unlikely.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22593)
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22499)
Refer: https://github.com/apple/swift/pull/39143 for a description
of the algorithm.
It is optimal in the sense of having:
* no divisions
* minimal number of blocks of random bits from the generator
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22499)
When successful, ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid() returns a pointer to an
X509_ALGOR object. Inside ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid(),
X509_ALGOR_set0() is called, and this passes ownership of the ASN1
object "los" (label octet string) to the X509_ALGOR object. When
ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid() fails, ownership has not been passed on and
we need to free "los".
Change the scope of "los" and ensure it is freed on failure (on
success, set it to NULL so it is not freed inside the function).
Fixes#22336
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22495)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22459)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22459)
This patch provides stream and multi-block implementations for
AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, and AES-256-ECB to accelerate AES-ECB.
Also, refactor functions to share the same variable
declaration in aes-riscv64-zvkned.pl.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
This patch updates the OSSSL_HWSM3_block_data_order_zvksh and enables
SM3 on platforms with VLEN >= 128.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-XTS mode, in this patch, we
have the specialized multi-block implementation for AES-128-XTS and
AES-256-XTS.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To enhance test coverage for AES-GCM mode, we provided longer additional
testing patterns for AES-GCM testing.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-GCM mode, in this patch, we
have the specialized multi-block implementations for AES-128-GCM,
AES-192-GCM and AES-256-GCM.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Support zvbb-zvkned based rvv AES-128/192/256-CTR encryption.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
This patch supports SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256 on platforms with
vlen greater than 128,
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Keep SHA-256 constant values in registers to save the loading time.
Move the constant loading for sha256 into a separate subroutine.
By creating a dedicated sub routine for loading sha256 constants, the
code can be made more modular and easier to modify in the future.
Relaxing the SHA256 constraint, zvknhb also supports SHA256.
Simplify the H and mask initialization flows.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Use rvv and zvbb extensions for CHACHA20 cipher.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-128/192/256-CBC block cipher
encryption, we used the vaesz, vaesem and vaesef instructions, which
implement a single round of AES encryption.
Similarly, to optimize the performance of AES-128/192/256-CBC block
cipher decryption, we have utilized the vaesz, vaesdm, and vaesdf
instructions, which facilitate a single round of AES decryption.
Furthermore, we optimize the key and initialization vector (IV) step by
keeping the rounding key in vector registers.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
c8ddeb7e64/doc/vector/riscv-crypto-vector-zvkb.adoc
Create `RISCV_HAS_ZVKB()` macro.
Use zvkb for SM4 instead of zvbb.
Use zvkb for ghash instead of zvbb.
We could just use the zvbb's subset `zvkb` for flexibility.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Interleave key loading and aes decrypt computing for single block aes.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Interleave key loading and aes encrypt computing for single block aes.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)