This is a workaround so old that nobody remembers what buggy clients
it was for. It's also been broken in stable branches for two years and
nobody noticed (see
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1694/).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The underlying field returned by RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length() is an
unsigned int. The return type of the function should match that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In the event of an error in the HMAC function, leaks can occur because the
HMAC_CTX does not get cleaned up.
Thanks to the BoringSSL project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
been changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned
long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is
transferred.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This fixes a memory leak that can occur whilst duplicating a BIO chain if
the call to CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() fails. It also fixes a second memory leak
where if a failure occurs after successfully creating the first BIO in the
chain, then the beginning of the new chain was not freed.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
BUF_MEM_free() attempts to cleanse memory using memset immediately prior
to a free. This is at risk of being optimised away by the compiler, so
replace with a call to OPENSSL_clear_free() instead.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built. Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this. For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'. Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Check return value when calling ASN1_INTEGER_get to retrieve a certificate
serial number. If an error occurs (which will be caused by the value being
out of range) revert to hex dump of serial number.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.
With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier. Improve the test to match the real C
rules.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Here are the "rules" for handling flags that depend on #ifdef:
- Do not ifdef the enum. Only ifdef the OPTIONS table. All ifdef'd
entries appear at the end; by convention "engine" is last. This
ensures that at run-time, the flag will never be recognized/allowed.
The next two bullets entries are for silencing compiler warnings:
- In the while/switch parsing statement, use #ifdef for the body to
disable it; leave the "case OPT_xxx:" and "break" statements outside
the ifdef/ifndef. See ciphers.c for example.
- If there are multiple options controlled by a single guard, OPT_FOO,
OPT_BAR, etc., put a an #ifdef around the set, and then do "#else"
and a series of case labels and a break. See OPENSSL_NO_AES in cms.c
for example.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER
RT#3888
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Where we called openssl_cleanse, make sure we do it on all error
paths. Be consistent in use of sizeof(foo) when possible.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
