The s390x x448 implementation does not correctly reduce non-canonical
values i.e., u-coordinates >= p = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10339)
- add instructions: clfi, stck, stckf, kdsa
- clfi and clgfi belong to extended-immediate (not long-displacement)
- some cleanup
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10346)
i2v_GENERAL_NAME and GENERAL_NAME_print were assuming that the type of
of a GENERAL_NAME (OTHERNAME) that we read in was the type we expected
it to be. If its something else then this can cause unexpected
behaviour. In the added fuzz test case an OOB read was occurring.
This issue was recently added by commit 4baee2d.
Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10300)
i2v_GENERAL_NAMES call i2v_GENERAL_NAME repeatedly as required. Each
time i2v_GENERAL_NAME gets called it allocates adds data to the passed in
stack and then returns a pointer to the stack, or NULL on failure. If
the passed in stack is itself NULL then it allocates one.
i2v_GENERAL_NAMES was not correctly handling the case where a NULL gets
returned from i2v_GENERAL_NAME. If a stack had already been allocated then
it just leaked it.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10300)
This is a wrapper around OSSL_STORE.
This also adds necessary support functions:
- X509_STORE_load_file
- X509_STORE_load_path
- X509_STORE_load_store
- SSL_add_store_cert_subjects_to_stack
- SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_store
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_file
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_store
and deprecates X509_STORE_load_locations and SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations,
as they aren't extensible.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8442)
For some reason, OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_name() and OSSL_STORE_find()
accepted a non-const OSSL_STORE_SEARCH criterion, which isn't at all
necessary.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8442)
With provided algorithms, the library context is ever present, so of
course it should be specified alongside the algorithm name and
property query string.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10308)
There is a vagueness around how the provider data (algorithm name and
property query string) is initialized in the presence of an engine.
This change modifies this slightly so that the algorithm name for use
with providers is never set if the initilization was given an engine.
This makes it easier for other functions to simply check ctx->algorithm
to see if the context is meant to be used for strictly legacy stuff or
not.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10308)
The %zd format corresponds to ssize_t which is used for
function to either return a valid size or a negative value
to indicate an error. Since size_t is in [-1,SSIZE_MAX] it
is not a portable way to represent a pointer diff. For
the %td format which corresponds to ptrdiff_t is C11,
we chose to cast to long instead as it is already done
in other places.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10335)
clang imposes some restrictions on the assembler code that
gcc does not.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10330)
OSSL_PARAM_set_BN() filled the buffer from the left with as many bytes
as that the BIGNUM takes, regardless of buffer size or native
endianness. This was due to BN_bn2nativepad() being given the size of
the BIGNUM rather than the size of the buffer (which meant it never
had to pad anything).
The fix is to given BN_bn2nativepad() the size of the buffer instead.
This aligns well with the corresponding _set_ functions for native
integer types work.
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10326)
This system services is based on FreeBSD 12's getentropy(), and is
therefore treated the same way as getentropy() with regards to amount
of entropy bits per data bit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8926)
If no connection could be made, addr_iter will eventually end up being
NULL, and if the user didn't check the returned error value, the
BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT code will be performed again and will crash.
So instead, we add a state BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT_ERROR that we enter into
when we run out of addresses to try. That state will just simply say
"error" back, until the user does something better with the BIO, such
as free it or reset it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7630)
The artificial restriction of digests for the HMAC and HASH DRBGs is lifted.
Any fetchable digest is acceptable except XOF ones (such as SHAKE).
In FIPS mode, the fetch remains internal to the provider so only a FIPS
validated digest will be located.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10321)
ecp_s390x_nistp.c and ecx_meth.c need to include s390x_arch.h.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10317)
Free dukm in error handling of dh_cms_encrypt()
Fixes#10294
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10310)
Otherwise, should this function be called more than once on the same
EVP_PKEY_CTX, we get double free issues.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10292)
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10209)
- Check for the <sys/ktls.h> header to determine if KTLS support
is available.
- Populate a tls_enable structure with session key material for
supported algorithms. At present, AES-GCM128/256 and AES-CBC128/256
with SHA1 and SHA2-256 HMACs are supported. For AES-CBC, only MtE
is supported.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10045)
RSA-PSS keys use the same internal structure as RSA keys but do not
allow accessing it through EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA. This commit changes that
behavior.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10217)
Documenting the macros removes 14 undocumented items.
Merged three separate manpages into one.
Rename the DRBG CRYPTO_EX define into RAND_DRBG, but keep the old one
for API compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10216)
PR https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10122 introduced changes to
the BN_gcd function and the control logic inside it accessed `g->d[0]`
irrespective of `g->top`.
When BN_add is called, in case the result is zero, `BN_zero` is called.
The latter behaves differently depending on the API compatibility level
flag: normally `g->d[0]` is cleared but in `no-deprecated` builds only
`g->top` is set to zero.
This commit uses bitwise logic to ensure that `g` is treated as zero if
`g->top` is zero, irrespective of `g->d[0]`.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10232)
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9949)
HWCAP_S390_VX is missing on SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP1, so we
add a guard that checks the present of that macro. While we're at it,
we do the same with HWCAP_S390_STFLE, for consistency.
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9892)
This leaves minimal implementations of EVP_blake2b512 and EVP_blake2s256,
that are now only there to provide a name for implicit fetches.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9075)
It may be that the OSSL_PARAM array we used for getting parameter
values for a key had a few too many entries. These are detected by
their return_size == 0. Before making second export call, we prune
away these items so we only ask for parameters that exist.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10190)
rsa_set0_all_params() is used to set all the primes, exponents and
coefficients. rsa_get0_all_params() is used to get all the primes,
exponents and coefficients.
"All" includes p, q, dP, dQ and qInv without making them separate.
All arrays of numbers are implemented as stacks to make dynamic use
easier.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10190)
This commit replaces the current `BN_gcd` function with a constant-time
GCD implementation.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10122)
This commit aims at refactoring the `BN_rshift` by making it a wrapper
around `bn_rshift_fixed_top`, in order to match the current design of
`BN_lshift`, as suggested in the discussion at
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10122#discussion_r332474277 .
As described in the code, by refactoring this function, `BN_rshift`
provides a constant-time behavior for sufficiently[!] zero-padded inputs
under the following assumptions: `|n < BN_BITS2|` or `|n / BN_BITS2|`
being non-secret.
Notice that `BN_rshift` returns a canonical representation of the
BIGNUM, if a `fixed_top` representation is required, the caller should
call `bn_rshift_fixed_top` instead.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10196)
"name_cmp" caused a clash when linking with the static libcrypto.
The slight rename is better than nothing, as v3_ is an already existing
prefix.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9979)
Method data was passed down as provider to ossl_algorithm_do_all(),
which causes trouble as soon a it's non-NULL. Pass it via the data
structure instead.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9979)
The following new functions all do the same thing; they traverse
the set of names assigned to implementations of each algorithm type:
EVP_MD_names_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_names_do_all(),
EVP_MAC_names_do_all(), EVP_KEYMGMT_names_do_all(),
EVP_KEYEXCH_names_do_all(), EVP_KDF_names_do_all(),
EVP_SIGNATURE_names_do_all()
We add a warning to the documentation of EVP_CIPHER_name() and
EVP_MD_name(), as they aren't suitable to use with multiple-name
implementation.
We also remove EVP_MAC_name() and evp_KDF_name(), as they serve no
useful purpose.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9979)
This adds the missing functions that should be common for all
fetchable EVP sub-APIs:
EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(), EVP_KEYMGMT_do_all_provided(), EVP_KEYEXCH_is_a(),
EVP_KEYEXCH_do_all_provided(), EVP_KDF_is_a(), EVP_MD_is_a(),
EVP_SIGNATURE_do_all_provided(), EVP_SIGNATURE_is_a().
This also renames EVP_MD_do_all_ex(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_ex(),
EVP_KDF_do_all_ex(), EVP_MAC_do_all_ex() to change '_ex'
to '_provided'.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9979)
This control command should never be used with provided methods, but
since this is publically available, someone might still make the
mistake. We make sure it returns 1 so as not to be overly
disruptive.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10163)
Implement SP800-108 section 5.2 with CMAC support. As a side effect,
enable 5.1 with CMAC and 5.2 with HMAC. Add test vectors from RFC 6803.
Add OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER and PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10143)
This works as much as possible EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(), except it takes
data that's relevant for providers, algorithm name and property query
string instead of NID and engine.
Additionally, if EVP_PKEY_CTX_new() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id() was
called, the algorithm name in the EVP_PKEY context will be set to the
short name of the given NID (explicit or the one of the given
EVP_PKEY), thereby giving an easier transition from legacy methods to
provided methods.
The intent is that operations will use this information to fetch
provider methods implicitly as needed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10184)
CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9472)
We need to pass the SSL3 Master Secret down to the provider code in order
for SSLv3 to work correctly.
Fixes#10182
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10186)
Implementations are now spread across several libraries, so the assembler
related defines need to be applied to all affected libraries and modules.
AES_ASM define was missing from libimplementations.a which disabled AESNI
aarch64 changes were made by xkqian.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10180)
An unintended consequence of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808
is that when an explicit parameters curve is matched against one of the
well-known builtin curves we automatically inherit also the associated
seed parameter, even if the input parameters excluded such
parameter.
This later affects the serialization of such parsed keys, causing their
input DER encoding and output DER encoding to differ due to the
additional optional field.
This does not cause problems internally but could affect external
applications, as reported in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9811#issuecomment-536153288
This commit fixes the issue by conditionally clearing the seed field if
the original input parameters did not include it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10140)
Add a new API to test for primes that can't be misused, deprecated the
old APIs.
Suggested by Jake Massimo and Kenneth Paterson
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #9272
When using Miller-Rabin to test for primes, it's can be faster to first
do trial divisions, but when doing too many trial divisions it gets
slower again. We reduce the number of trial divisions to a point that
gives better performance.
Based on research by Jake Massimo and Kenneth Paterson
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #9272
This leaves minimal implementations of EVP_md2, EVP_md4, EVP_md5 and
EVP_mdc2, that are now only there to provide a name for implicit fetches.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10164)
If we remove these, the functions EVP_get_digestbyname() and
EVP_get_cipherbyname() will stop working entirely, and it's too early
to criple them yet.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10176)
EVP_Cipher() would return whatever ctx->cipher->ccipher() returned
with no regard for historical semantics.
We change this to first look if there is a ctx->cipher->ccipher(), and
in that case we treat the implementation as one with a custom cipher,
and "translate" it's return value like this: 0 => -1, 1 => outl, where
|outl| is the output length.
If there is no ctx->cipher->ccipher, we treat the implementation as
one without a custom cipher, call ctx->cipher->cupdate or
ctx->cipher->cfinal depending on input, and return whatever they
return (0 or 1).
Furthermore, we add a small hack in EVP_CIPHER_flags() to check if the
cipher is a provided one, and add EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER to the
flags to be returned if there is a cipher->ccipher. That way,
provided implementations never have to set that flag themselves, all
they need to do is to include a OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER function.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10137)
Prior to OpenSSL 3.0 EVP_Digest[Sign|Verify|Update were just macros for
EVP_DigestUpdate. They are now separate functions. Unfortunately some
code assumes that EVP_Digest[Sign|Verify]Update is interchangeable with
EVP_DigestUpdate. For example the dgst app uses an MD bio which always
calls EVP_DigestUpdate(). However the dgst app supports signing instead
of digesting and may initialise with EVP_DigestSignInit_ex() instead of
just EVP_DigestInit().
We now detect these differences and redirect to the correct function
where appropriate.
Fixes#10114
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10116)
There is no need for us to be diving inside the EVP_MD_CTX in the
implementation of an MD BIO. We can just use public APIs. By doing this
certain calls (such as getting the MD out of the BIO were not working
correctly) where providers are in use.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10116)
This is a flag that has lost its relevance. The new mechanism to do
the same thing is to fetch the needed digest explicitly with "-fips"
as property query, i.e. we remove any requirement for that property to
be set when fetching, even if the default property query string
requires its presence.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10138)
On systems with undefined AI_ADDRCONFIG and AI_NUMERICHOST:
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -I. -Icrypto/include -Iinclude -m64 -Wall -O3 -fno-ident ...
crypto/bio/b_addr.c: In function 'BIO_lookup_ex':
crypto/bio/b_addr.c:699:7: warning: label 'retry' defined but not used [-Wunused-label]
retry:
^~~~~
Regression from: 3f91ede9ae
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9856)
The end up in providers/common/include/prov/.
All inclusions are adjusted accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
From providers/{common,default,legacy}/ to providers/implementations/
However, providers/common/digests/digest_common.c stays where it is,
because it's support code rather than an implementation.
To better support all kinds of implementations with common code, we
add the library providers/libcommon.a. Code that ends up in this
library must be FIPS agnostic.
While we're moving things around, though, we move digestscommon.h
from providers/common/include/internal to providers/common/include/prov,
thereby starting on a provider specific include structure, which
follows the line of thoughts of the recent header file reorganization.
We modify the affected '#include "internal/something.h"' to
'#include "prov/something.h"'.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
We put almost everything in these internal static libraries:
libcommon Block building code that can be used by all
our implementations, legacy and non-legacy
alike.
libimplementations All non-legacy algorithm implementations and
only them. All the code that ends up here is
agnostic to the definitions of FIPS_MODE.
liblegacy All legacy implementations.
libnonfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE undefined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE isn't defined must end
up in this library.
libfips Support code for the algorithm implementations.
Built with FIPS_MODE defined. Any code that
checks that FIPS_MODE is defined must end up
in this library.
The FIPS provider module is built from providers/fips/*.c and linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libfips.
The Legacy provider module is built from providers/legacy/*.c and
linked with liblegacy, libcommon and libcrypto.
If module building is disabled, the object files from liblegacy and
libcommon are added to libcrypto and the Legacy provider becomes a
built-in provider.
The Default provider module is built-in, so it ends up being linked
with libimplementations, libcommon and libnonfips. For libcrypto in
form of static library, the object files from those other libraries
are simply being added to libcrypto.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
Also added blanks lines after declarations in a couple of places.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9916)
Even thought the underlying calls might return something other than 0
or 1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() and EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() were made to only
return those values regardless. That behaviour was recently lost, so
we need to restore it.
Fixes#10106
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10108)
Extensive documentation added in HISTORY section in doc/man5/config.pod
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9578)
This leaves minimal implementations of EVP_md5_sha1, which is now only
there to provide a name for implicit fetches.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9076)
The random bit caching was a residue of earlier code and isn't used any more.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10089)
This leaves minimal implementations of EVP_sha* and EVP_shake*, which
is now only there to provide a name for implicit fetches.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10059)
This modifies the treatment of algorithm name strings to allow
multiple names separated with colons.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8985)
EVP_DigestInit_ex forced following of the legacy path if ctx->pctx is
set (meaning we've actually been called via EVP_DigestSignInit_ex).
There is some code in the legacy path that calls the
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT ctrl on the pctx. Not going down the legacy path
if ctx->pctx is set means that ctrl message will neve get sent. However,
it turns out that all algs that understand that ctrl also set the
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT flag which forces legacy anyway. Therefore the
ctx->pctx check is not required and can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10082)
Otherwise a mem leak can occur since EVP_MD_free() calls
EVP_MD_CTX_reset() which then clears the contents of the ctx.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10013)
This resets the fields of the EVP_MD_CTX and means we can no longer
make calls using the EVP_MD_CTX, such as to query parameters.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10013)
If doing an EVP_DigestSign*() or EVP_DigestVerify*() operation we use
the embedded pctx for communication with the provider. Any MD params need
to use that ctx instead.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10013)
This flag is still relevant even for non-legacy code so we should check
it where appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10013)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10029)
So far, these two funtions have depended on legacy EVP_CIPHER
implementations to be able to do their work. This change adapts them
to work with provided implementations as well, in one of two possible
ways:
1. If the implementation's set_asn1_parameters or get_asn1_parameters
function pointers are non-NULL, this is a legacy implementation,
and that function is called.
2. Otherwise, if the cipher doesn't have EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_ASN1
set, the default AlgorithmIdentifier parameter code in libcrypto
is executed.
3. Otherwise, if the cipher is a provided implementation, the ASN1
type structure is converted to a DER blob which is then passed to
the implementation as a parameter (param_to_asn1) or the DER blob
is retrieved from the implementation as a parameter and converted
locally to a ASN1_TYPE (asn1_to_param).
With this, the old flag EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 has become
irrelevant and is simply ignored.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10008)
Several EVP_PKEY_xxxx functions return 0 and a negative value for
indicating errors. Some places call these functions with a zero return
value check only, which misses the check for the negative scenarios.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10055)
Unset data defaults to the empty string ("") or 0.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9948)
All instances of EVP_*_CTX_gettable_params functions have been renamed
to EVP_*_gettable_ctx_params. Except for the EVP_MD ones which were changed
already.
These functions do not take EVP_*_CTX arguments so their prior naming was
misleading.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10052)
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below
For the public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory), the guard
names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with
all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. For the
private header files files, an extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Implement SP800-108 section 5.1 with HMAC intended for use in Kerberos.
Add test vectors from RFC 8009.
Adds error codes PROV_R_INVALID_MAC and PROV_R_MISSING_MAC.
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9924)
Also includes CRMF (RFC 4211) and HTTP transfer (RFC 6712)
CMP and CRMF API is added to libcrypto, and the "cmp" app to the openssl CLI.
Adds extensive man pages and tests. Integration into build scripts.
Incremental pull request based on OpenSSL commit 8869ad4a39 of 2019-04-02
4th chunk: CMP context/parameters and utilities
in crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c, crypto/cmp/cmp_util.c, and related files
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9107)
This makes the legacy provider available regardless of building conditions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9637)
using PCC and KDSA instructions.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
of instruction parameter blocks.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
EVP_MD_CTX_gettable_params() and EVP_MD_CTX_settable_params() were
confusingly named because they did not take an EVP_MD_CTX parameter.
In addition we add the functions EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params() and
EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params() which do the same thing but are passed
an EVP_MD object instead.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9998)
The supported variants are
- SmtpUTF8Name
- xmppAddr
- MS UPN
- SRVName
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9965)
With multiple names, it's no longer viable to just grab the "first" in
the set and use that to find the legacy NID. Instead, all names for
an algorithm must be checked, and if we encounter more than one NID
asssociated with those names, we consider it an error and make that
method unloadable.
This ensures that all methods that do have an internal NID associated
will get that NID in their structure, thereby ensuring that other
parts of libcrypto that haven't gone away from using NIDs for
comparison will continue to work as expected.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9969)
The issue was encountered when testing parallel builds of OpenSSL on
Windows using `jom` instead of `nmake`. The builds persistently failed
with the following error message because the generated file "buildinf.h"
did not exist yet.
crypto\info.c(15): fatal error C1083:
cannot open include file: "buildinf.h": No such file or directory
Apparently this error does not occur on Linux because `make` parallelizes
the builds differently such that `crypto\cversion.c`, which has an
explicit dependency on `buildinf.h`, gets compiled first. Also, the
include dependency was added only recently in commit 096978f099.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9960)
It either makes the flow of control simpler and more obvious, or it is
just a "cleanup" so that the editing scripts will find and fixup things.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9441)
With some provider implementations, there are underlying ciphers,
digests and macs. For some of them, the name was retrieved from the
method, but since the methods do not store those any more, we add
different mechanics.
For code that needs to pass on the name of a cipher or diges via
parameters, we simply locally store the name that was used when
fetching said cipher or digest. This will ensure that any underlying
code that needs to fetch that same cipher or digest does so with the
exact same name instead of any random name from the set of names
associated with the algorithm.
For code that needs to check what kind of algorithm was passed, we
provide EVP_{type}_is_a(), that returns true if the given method has
the given name as one of its names.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9897)
Multiple names per implementation is already supported in the namemap,
but hasn't been used yet. However, as soon as we have multiple names,
we will get an issue with what name should be saved in the method.
The solution is to not save the name itself, but rather the number
it's associated with. This number is supposed to be unique for each
set of names, and we assume that algorithm names are globally unique,
i.e. there can be no name overlap between different algorithm types.
Incidently, it was also found that the 'get' function used by
ossl_construct_method() doesn't need all the parameters it was given;
most of what it needs, it can now get through the data structure given
by the caller of ossl_construct_method(). As a consequence,
ossl_construct_method() itself doesn't need all the parameters it was
given either.
There are some added internal functions that are expected to disappear
as soon as legacy code is removed, such as evp_first_name() and
ossl_namemap_num2name().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9897)
They now generally conform to the following argument sequence:
script.pl "$(PERLASM_SCHEME)" [ C preprocessor arguments ... ] \
$(PROCESSOR) <output file>
However, in the spirit of being able to use these scripts manually,
they also allow for no argument, or for only the flavour, or for only
the output file. This is done by only using the last argument as
output file if it's a file (it has an extension), and only using the
first argument as flavour if it isn't a file (it doesn't have an
extension).
While we're at it, we make all $xlate calls the same, i.e. the $output
argument is always quoted, and we always die on error when trying to
start $xlate.
There's a perl lesson in this, regarding operator priority...
This will always succeed, even when it fails:
open FOO, "something" || die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that '||' has higher priority than list operators (a
function is essentially a list operator and gobbles up everything
following it that isn't lower priority), and since a non-empty string
is always true, so that ends up being exactly the same as:
open FOO, "something";
This, however, will fail if "something" can't be opened:
open FOO, "something" or die "ERR: $!";
The reason is that 'or' has lower priority that list operators,
i.e. it's performed after the 'open' call.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
Since the arguments are now generated in the build file templates,
they should be removed from the build.info files.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9884)
This caused a SEGV inside tls13_enc() when using chacha_poly.
The tls code assigns the iv_length to a size_t (even though it is an int).
This is actually really bad since it could be -1, which will then trash the iv buffer.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9890)
Internally, we still need this function, so we make it internal and
then add a new ERR_get_state() that simply calls the internal variant,
unless it's "removed" by configuration.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9462)
ERR_print_errors_cb() used functionality that isn't suitable any more,
as that functionality couldn't integrate the error record function
name strings. We therefore refactor it a bit to use better adapted
methods.
Fixes#9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
ERR_func_error_string() essentially returns NULL, and since all
function codes are now removed for all intents and purposes, this
function has fallen out of use and cannot be modified to suit the
data, since its only function is to interpret an error code.
To compensate for the loss of error code, we instead provide new
functions that extracts the function name strings from an error
record:
- ERR_get_error_func()
- ERR_peek_error_func()
- ERR_peek_last_error_func()
Similarly, the once all encompasing functions
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and
ERR_get_error_line_data() lack the capability of getting the function
name string, so we deprecate those and add these functions to replace
them:
- ERR_get_error_all()
- ERR_peek_error_all()
- ERR_peek_last_error_all()
Finally, we adjust a few lines of code that used the now deprecated
functions.
Fixes#9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
The output C code was made to use ERR_func_error_string() to see if a
string table was already loaded or not. Since this function returns
NULL always, this check became useless.
Change it to use ERR_reason_error_string() instead, as there's no
reason to believe we will get rid of reason strings, ever.
To top it off, we rebuild all affected C sources.
Fixes#9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
There can be data to write in output buffer and data to read that were
not yet read in the input stream.
Fixes#9866
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9877)
It is undefined behaviour to send NULL as either the src, or dest params
in memcpy.
In pkey_kdf.c we had a check to ensure that the src address is non-NULL.
However in some situations it is possible that the dest address could also
be NULL. Specifically in the case where the datalen is 0 and we are using
a newly allocated BUF_MEM.
We add a check of datalen to avoid the undefined behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9868)
Make sure we pass the provider side ctx and not the libcrypto side ctx.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9865)
Since commit 7c226dfc43 a chained DRBG does not add additional
data anymore when reseeding from its parent. The reason is that
the size of the additional data exceeded the allowed size when
no derivation function was used.
This commit provides an alternative fix: instead of adding the
entire DRBG's complete state, we just add the DRBG's address
in memory, thereby providing some distinction between the different
DRBG instances.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9832)
Provides a little extra fork-safety on UNIX systems, adding to the
fact that all DRBGs reseed automatically when the fork_id changes.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9832)
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd0, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9832)
An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
Due to the dynamic allocation that was added to rand_pool_add_begin
this function could now return a null pointer where it was previously
guaranteed to succeed. But the return value of this function does
not need to be checked by design.
Move rand_pool_grow from rand_pool_add_begin to rand_pool_bytes_needed.
Make an allocation error persistent to avoid falling back to less secure
or blocking entropy sources.
Fixes: a6a66e4511 ("Make rand_pool buffers more dynamic in their sizing.")
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
There was a warning about unused variables in this config:
./config --strict-warnings --with-rand-seed=rdcpu
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9687)
An EVP_PKEY can be used for multiple different algorithm operations.
Only one can be used at a time, so we move those into a union.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9753)
We add new functions for getting parameters and discovering the gettable
and settable parameters. We also make EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md() a
function and implement it in terms of the new functions.
This enables applications to discover the set of parameters that are
supported for a given algorithm implementation.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9753)
It is valid for a pub_key and priv_key to be missing from a DH "key".
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9753)
This makes EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_PKEY_sign_init provider aware. It
also introduces the new type EVP_SIGNATURE to represent signature
algorithms. This also automatically makes the EVP_Sign* APIs provider
aware because they use EVP_Digest* (which is already provider aware)
and EVP_PKEY_sign(_init) under the covers.
At this stage there are no signature algorithms in any providers. That
will come in the following commits.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9753)
The check was missing in DH_check and DH_check_params.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9796)
Description
-----------
Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.
This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)
A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.
Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.
Motivation
----------
This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface
Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.
It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.
Related commits
---------------
While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).
The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:
- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats
Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.
Responsible Disclosure
----------------------
This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.
The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific
BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
This issue was partially addressed by commit
972c87dfc7, which hardened its callee
BN_num_bits_word() to avoid leaking the most-significant word of its
argument via branching and memory access pattern.
The commit message also reported:
> There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
> the bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those
> cases as we still only look at the top word.
BN_num_bits() is called directly or indirectly (e.g., through
BN_num_bytes() or BN_bn2binpad() ) in various parts of the `crypto/ec`
code, notably in all the currently supported implementations of scalar
multiplication (in the generic path through ec_scalar_mul_ladder() as
well as in dedicated methods like ecp_nistp{224,256,521}.c and
ecp_nistz256.c).
Under the right conditions, a motivated SCA attacker could retrieve the
secret bitlength of a secret nonce through this vulnerability,
potentially leading, ultimately, to recover a long-term secret key.
With this commit, exclusively for BIGNUMs that are flagged with
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, instead of accessing only bn->top, all the limbs of
the BIGNUM are accessed up to bn->dmax and bitwise masking is used to
avoid branching.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this should be already done at the top level
alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the
processed BIGNUM.
The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and
ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the
internal fixed length representation.
This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce
while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations.
The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack
varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the
ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the
size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM
representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture).
To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the
output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this
length is public.
Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and
BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top
through memory access patterns.
Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily
allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with
the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an
out-of-bound read.
As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not
leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM
buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation
while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside
setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls
BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of
BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed
in the next commit.
Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue
through responsible disclosure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present
during RSA key validation.
Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9779)
BUF_MEM_grow() returns the passed length, but also zero on error. If
the passed length was zero, an extra check to see if a returned zero
was an error or not is needed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
pkey_kdf_ctrl_str() has to do the same kind of special treatment as
pkey_kdf_ctrl() does.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
Undo the caching scheme, pass through most controls as parameters, except
for SEED and INFO, where we keep supporting adding data through additional
ctrl calls by collecting the data, and only passing it to the EVP_KDF
before calling its derive function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
This will only be required until everything is moved to providers and a NULL
provider pointer won't be possible.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9662)
The OpenSSL_version_num() function returns at runtime the
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER of the compiled OpenSSL library. This is a
used and useful interface, and should not (at least yet) be
deprecated, we just introduced the new versioning schema, it seems
too early to deprecate the old.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7853)
The cofactor argument to EC_GROUP_set_generator is optional, and SCA mitigations for ECC currently use it. So the library currently falls back to very old SCA-vulnerable code if the cofactor is not present.
This PR allows EC_GROUP_set_generator to compute the cofactor for all curves of cryptographic interest. Steering scalar multiplication to more SCA-robust code.
This issue affects persisted private keys in explicit parameter form, where the (optional) cofactor field is zero or absent.
It also affects curves not built-in to the library, but constructed programatically with explicit parameters, then calling EC_GROUP_set_generator with a nonsensical value (NULL, zero).
The very old scalar multiplication code is known to be vulnerable to local uarch attacks, outside of the OpenSSL threat model. New results suggest the code path is also vulnerable to traditional wall clock timing attacks.
CVE-2019-1547
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9827)
If the passed string length is zero, the function computes the string length
from the passed string.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9760)
This function re-implements EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(), but has a name that
isn't encumbered by legacy EVP_CIPHER construction functionality.
We also refactor most of EVP_CIPHER_meth_new() into an internal
evp_cipher_new() that's used when creating fetched methods.
EVP_CIPHER_meth_new() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() are rewritten in terms of
evp_cipher_new() and EVP_CIPHER_free(). This means that at any time, we can
deprecate all the EVP_CIPHER_meth_ functions with no harmful consequence.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9758)
This function re-implements EVP_MD_meth_free(), but has a name that
isn't encumbered by legacy EVP_MD construction functionality.
We also refactor most of EVP_MD_meth_new() into an internal
evp_md_new() that's used when creating fetched methods.
EVP_MD_meth_new() and EVP_MD_meth_free() are rewritten in terms of
evp_md_new() and EVP_MD_free(). This means that at any time, we can
deprecate all the EVP_MD_meth_ functions with no harmful consequence.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9758)
KEYMGMT methods were attached to other methods after those were fully
created and registered, thereby creating a potential data race, if two
threads tried to create the exact same method at the same time.
Instead of this, we change the method creating function to take an
extra data parameter, passed all the way from the public fetching
function. In the case of EVP_KEYEXCH, we pass all the necessary data
that evp_keyexch_from_dispatch() needs to be able to fetch the
appropriate KEYMGMT method on the fly.
Fixes#9592
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9678)
Use the header file internal/cryptlib.h instead.
Remove checks for OPENSSL_NO_ASM and I386_ONLY
in cryptlib.c, to match the checks in other
places where OPENSSL_ia32cap_P is used and
assumed to be initialized.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9688)
s390_aes naming issues with ofb128 and cfb128
Solaris missing include for camellia.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9702)
ENGINE_get_name() actually returns more of a long description of the
engine, whilst ENGINE_get_id() returns a shorter id.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9720)
Make sure references to ENGINE functions are appropriately guarded.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9720)
Don't modify the cipher/md we just fetched - it could be shared by multiple
threads.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9590)
Simplify the initialisation of the core by pre-initialising properties.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9590)
Some parts of OPENSSL_CTX intialisation can get quite complex (e.g. RAND).
This can lead to complex interactions where different parts of the library
try to initialise while other parts are still initialising. This can lead
to deadlocks because both parts want to obtain the init lock.
We separate out the init lock so that it is only used to manage the
dynamic list of indexes. Each part of the library gets its own
initialisation lock.
Fixes#9454
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9590)
'openssl version -r' prints the seed source based on compiler macros.
This does not necessarily reflect the library's idea of what seed
sources to use, so we reimplement the list of seed sources as a
OPENSSL_info() item and display that instead.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9689)
This commit addresses a side-channel vulnerability present when
PVK and MSBLOB key formats are loaded into OpenSSL.
The public key was not computed using a constant-time exponentiation
function.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9587)
Moved the relevant ciphers into default and restructed headers to allow the move.
This removed most of the cases of #ifdef NO_XXX (which are now specified in build.info)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9482)
The EVP_PKEY MAC implementations had a diversity of controls that were
really the same thing. We did reproduce that for the provider based
MACs, but are changing our minds on this. Instead of that, we now use
one parameter name for passing the name of the underlying ciphers or
digests to a MAC implementation, "cipher" and "digest", and one
parameter name for passing the output size of the MAC, "size".
Then we leave it to the EVP_PKEY->EVP_MAC bridge to translate "md"
to "digest", and "digestsize" to "size".
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9667)
A few declarations and static functions / arrays that are no longer
used were left behind when MACs moved to be implemented by providers.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9667)
There is a problem in the rand_unix.c code when the random seed fd is greater
than or equal to FD_SETSIZE and the FDSET overruns its limit and walks the
stack.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9686)
The current EVP_PEKY_ctrl for SM2 has no capability of parsing an ID
input in hexdecimal.
The newly added ctrl string is called: sm2_hex_id
Test cases and documentation are updated.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9584)
The aes code has been refactored into generic and algorithn specific parts,
so that most of the code can be shared.
The cipher related files have been broken up into smaller parts.
Add chunked variant of mode ciphers - aria uses this (many other ciphers will use this new code instead of the
generic code used by aes).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9451)
If these were passed NULL, the crashed with a SIGSEGV, when they
should do like all other freeing functions and become a no-op.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
If ossl_method_store_add() gets called with a method that already exists
(i.e. the store has one with matching provider, nid and properties), that
method should not be stored. We do this check inside ossl_method_store_add()
because it has all the locking required to do so safely.
Fixes#9561
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
Because this function affects the reference count on failure (the call
to impl_free() does this), it may as well handle incrementing it as
well to indicate the extra reference in the method store.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9650)
ossl_param_bld_push_{utf8,octet}_string() saved the constant string
pointer to a non-constant structure field, so we change that field to
a pointer to a constant. We also modify param_bld_convert() to
pretend the resulting pointer for PTR types points to a constant as
well.
Completes #9649
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9651)
Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed. Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.
This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions. However, this is no worse than the current situation.
An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence. Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process. Even one long running process will prevent this attack.
The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0. Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
Add Cleanups for gcm - based on the changes to ccm.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9280)
The macros are defined in include/openssl/core_names.h and follow the
naming standard OSSL_{OPNAME}_NAME_{ALGONAME}, where {OPNAME} is the
name of the operation (such as MAC) and {ALGONAME} is the name of the
algorithm. Example: OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9635)
More PR's related to self test will be derived from this PR.
Note: the code removed in core_get_params() was causing a freeze since the
fips module was being loaded from a config file, which then called core_get_params()
which then tried to init the config fle again...
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9596)
Requesting zero bytes from shake previously led to out-of-bounds write
on some platforms.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9433)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9607)
Recently, we added dispatched functions to get parameter descriptions,
and those for operation context parameters ended up being called
something_gettable_ctx_params and something_settable_ctx_params.
The corresponding dispatched functions to actually perform parameter
transfers were previously called something_ctx_get_params and
something_ctx_set_params, which doesn't quite match, so we rename them
to something_get_ctx_params and something_set_ctx_params.
An argument in favor of this name change is English, where you'd
rather say something like "set the context parameters".
This only change the libcrypto <-> provider interface.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9612)
For information processing.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
BLAKE2 MACs came with a set of new reason codes. Those talking about
lengths are consistently called PROV_R_INVALID_FOO_LENGTH, for any
name FOO. The cipher messages were briefer. In the interest of
having more humanly readable messages, we adjust the reasons used by
the ciphers (that's just IV length and key length).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
CRMF, SSKDF, TLS1_PRF and SIV are affected by this.
This also forces the need to check MAC names, which leads to storing
the names in the created methods, which affects all EVP APIs, not just
EVP_MAC. We will want that kind of information anyway (for example
for 'openssl list')... Consequently, EVP_MAC_name() is re-implemented.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Now that all our MACs have moved to the default provider, we let it
take over completely
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Instead of using evp_keccak_kmac128() and evp_keccak_kmac256(), we refer
to the hash implementation by name, and fetch it, which should get us the
implementation from providers/common/digests/sha3_prov.c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
This also moves the remaining parts of BLAKE2 digests to the default
provider, and removes the legacy EVP implementation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
Quite a few adaptations are needed, most prominently the added code
to allow provider based MACs.
As part of this, all the old information functions are gone, except
for EVP_MAC_name(). Some of them will reappear later, for example
EVP_MAC_do_all() in some form.
MACs by EVP_PKEY was particularly difficult to deal with, as they
need to allocate and deallocate EVP_MAC_CTXs "under the hood", and
thereby implicitly fetch the corresponding EVP_MAC. This means that
EVP_MACs can't be constant in a EVP_MAC_CTX, as their reference count
may need to be incremented and decremented as part of the allocation
or deallocation of the EVP_MAC_CTX. It may be that other provider
based EVP operation types may need to be handled in a similar manner.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8877)
for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using KDSA instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
which are already enabled for ECDH.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
for NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 using PCC instruction.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
It was argued that names like SOMETHING_set_param_types were confusing,
and a rename has been proposed to SOMETHING_settable_params, and by
consequence, SOMETHING_get_param_types is renamed
SOMETHING_gettable_params.
This changes implements this change for the dispatched provider and
core functions.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9591)
When OpenSSL is configured with 'no-stdio', TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_RC4_P_INIT
shouldn't be defined, as that test uses stdio.
Fixes#9597
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9598)
These functions were missing for a completes API:
EVP_MD_get_params(), EVP_CIPHER_get_params(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(),
and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params
Additionally, we also add all the corresponding parameter descriptor
returning functions, along the correspoding provider dispatches:
EVP_MD_gettable_params(), EVP_MD_CTX_settable_params(),
EVP_MD_CTX_gettable_params(), EVP_CIPHER_gettable_params(),
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_settable_params(), and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_gettable_params()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9576)
It isn't completely clear that this constitutes a race condition, but it will
always be conservative to access the locked data after getting the lock.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9579)
Fix a few places where calling ossl_isdigit does the wrong thing on
EBCDIC based systems.
Replaced with ascii_isdigit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9556)
We should not retry on EAI_MEMORY as that error is most probably
fatal and not depending on AI_ADDRCONFIG hint.
Also report the error from the first call if the second call fails
as that one would be most probably the more interesting one.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9535)
Do not try to discern the error return value on
getaddrinfo() failure but when retrying set the AI_NUMERICHOST
to avoid DNS lookups.
Fixes: #9053
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9535)
Also clean up EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(), which did use these interfaces, but
development since allows for more elegant code.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9391)
A lot of the different numbers associated with digests are really
algorithm parameters. block size, digest length, that sort of
thing.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9391)
These are utility functions that can be used to replace calls to
ctrl_str type functions with get_params / set_params types of calls.
They work by translating text values to something more suitable for
OSSL_PARAM, and by interpretting parameter keys in a compatible
fashion.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9303)
They do the same thing as OPENSSL_hexstr2buf() and OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(),
except they take a result buffer from the caller.
We take the opportunity to break out the documentation of the hex to /
from buffer conversion routines from the OPENSSL_malloc() file to its
own file. These routines aren't memory allocation routines per se.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9303)
A default digest of SHA256 was being returned for RSA PSS even if the
PSS parameters indicated a different digest must be used. We change this
so that the correct default digest is returned and additionally mark this
as mandatory for PSS.
This bug had an impact on sig alg selection in libssl. Due to this issue
an incorrect sig alg might be selected in the event that a server is
configured with an RSA-PSS cert with parameter restrictions.
Fixes#9545
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9553)
This should avoid half of the trial divisions in probable_prime_dh_safe
and avoid bn_probable_prime_dh generating primes with special properties.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9309)
We move an OPENSSL_init_crypto call slightly earlier in the process to
avoid calling it while holding the store lock. This can lead to deadlocks.
Fixes the no-engine build.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9547)
When creating a BN_CTX, make sure we store it in the right variable!
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9546)
If an implict EVP_CIPHER_fetch fails then ctx->cipher should not be set
otherwise strange things will happen when trying to free the ctx.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9531)
Previously we only loaded the config file by default for libssl. Now we do
it for libcrypto too.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9492)
The problem being that the "requires flush" flag was being cleared after the
the flush. The fix is to clear it before. This is a problem because the
cache flushing called RAND_bytes and if the DRBG hadn't been created yet, it
would be queried and added to the cache causing the flush code to repeat.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9477)
The alternative is to use a fast and small xorshift
random number generator. The stochastic flushing doesn't require good
random numbers, just enough variety to avoid causing problems.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9477)
Fix: crypto\whrlpool\wp_block.c(90) : warning C4164: '_rotl64' : intrinsic function not declared.
Fixes#9487
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9488)
The code has been modularized so that it can be shared by algorithms.
A fixed size IV is now used instead of being allocated.
The IV is not set into the low level struct now until the update (it uses an
iv_state for this purpose).
Hardware specific methods have been added to a PROV_GCM_HW object.
The S390 code has been changed to just contain methods that can be accessed in
a modular way. There are equivalent generic methods also for the other
platforms.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9231)
In ERR_add_error_vdata(), the size of err_data had 1 added to it in
some spots, which could lead to buffer overflow.
In ERR_vset_error(), ERR_MAX_DATA_SIZE was used instead of buf_size in
the BIO_vsnprintf() call, which would lead to a buffer overflow if
such a large buffer couldn't be allocated.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9491)
