CLA: trivial
Changed names of internal functions to resolve symbol conflict when Openssl is used with intel/ISA-L.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21421)
Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
This can effectively reduce the binary size for platforms
that don't need ECX feature(~100KB).
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yi1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20781)
Similiar to the issue found in PR #20553 for DSA_sign().
ECDSA_sign() leaked memory if the signature was NULL
when i2d_ECDSA_SIG was called.
Note that this does not affect the higher level EVP
functions as they correctly handle NULL.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20554)
Similiar checks to the DSA code have been added for ECDSA also.
This should not be a problem when using named groups.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20384)
Since GCC commit e154242724b084380e3221df7c08fcdbd8460674 the flag "-many"
is sometimes not passed to the assembler. Use .machine "any" just like
ecp_nistz256-ppc64 to prevent compile errors when built with some
configurations of GCC.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20378)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20205)
Fixes#6277
Description:
Make each of the five EdDSA instances defined in RFC 8032 -- Ed25519,
Ed25519ctx, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph -- available via the EVP APIs.
The desired EdDSA instance is specified via an OSSL_PARAM.
All instances, except for Ed25519, allow context strings as input.
Context strings are passed via an OSSL_PARAM. For Ed25519ctx, the
context string must be nonempty.
Ed25519, Ed25519ctx, Ed448 are PureEdDSA instances, which means that
the full message (not a digest) must be passed to sign and verify
operations.
Ed25519ph, Ed448ph are HashEdDSA instances, which means that the input
message is hashed before sign and verify.
Testing:
All 21 test vectors from RFC 8032 have been added to evppkey_ecx.txt
(thanks to Shane Lontis for showing how to do that). Those 21 test
vectors are exercised by evp_test.c and cover all five instances.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19705)
This PR is based off the contributions in PR #9223 by Jemmy1228.
It has been modified and reworked to:
(1) Work with providers
(2) Support ECDSA and DSA
(3) Add a KDF HMAC_DRBG implementation that shares code with the RAND HMAC_DRBG.
A nonce_type is passed around inside the Signing API's, in order to support any
future deterministic algorithms.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18809)
ftmp4 is assigned immediately before receiving the reduced output of the
multiplication of ftmp and ftmp3, without being read inbetween these
assignments. Remove redundant assignment.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19766)
Originally the code to im/export the EC pubkey was meant to be consumed
only by the im/export functions when crossing the provider boundary.
Having our providers exporting to a COMPRESSED format octet string made
sense to avoid memory waste, as it wasn't exposed outside the provider
API, and providers had all tools available to convert across the three
formats.
Later on, with #13139 deprecating the `EC_KEY_*` functions, more state
was added among the params imported/exported on an EC provider-native
key (including `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT`, although it
did not affect the format used to export `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`).
Finally, in #14800, `EVP_PKEY_todata()` was introduced and prominently
exposed directly to users outside the provider API, and the choice of
COMPRESSED over UNCOMPRESSED as the default became less sensible in
light of usability, given the latter is more often needed by
applications and protocols.
This commit fixes it, by using `EC_KEY_get_conv_form()` to get the
point format from the internal state (an `EC_KEY` under the hood) of the
provider-side object, and using it on
`EVP_PKEY_export()`/`EVP_PKEY_todata()` to format
`OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`.
The default for an `EC_KEY` was already UNCOMPRESSED, and it is altered
if the user sets `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` via
`EVP_PKEY_fromdata()`, `EVP_PKEY_set_params()`, or one of the
more specialized methods.
For symmetry, this commit also alters `ec_pkey_export_to()` in
`crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c`, part of the `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD` for legacy EC
keys: it exclusively used COMPRESSED format, and now it honors the
conversion format specified in the EC_KEY object being exported to a
provider when this function is called.
Expand documentation about `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY` and mention the
3.1 change in behavior for our providers.
Fixes#16595
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19681)
(cherry picked from commit 926db476bc)
Comments in felem_inv refer to the logarithm with respect to in of the
element that has just been computed. The last two such annotations are
incorrect. By Fermat's last theorem, we hope to compute in^(p-2) in
GF(2^521-1), as such we expect the final index we reach to be 2^521-3.
CLA: Trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19765)
And so clean a few useless includes
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19721)
This mandates following SP 800-56A which, in 5.6.2.4, mandates a comparision
against a newly calculated public key.
Co-authored-by: Randall Steck <rsteck@thinqsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Mark J. Minnoch <mark@keypair.us>
Co-authored-by: Steve Weymann <steve@keypair.us>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- file name -> filename
- host name -> hostname
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
Also ASN1_OBJECT_free() never needs to be called on objects returned
from OBJ_nid2obj().
Fixes#19138
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19367)
Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
except those throwing ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19302)
The code is derived from @sftcd's work in PR #17172.
This PR puts the DHKEM algorithms into the provider layer as
KEM algorithms for EC and ECX.
This PR only implements the DHKEM component of HPKE as specified in
RFC 9180.
crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c has been added for fuctions that will
be shared between DHKEM and HPKE.
API's for EVP_PKEY_auth_encapsulate_init() and EVP_PKEY_auth_decapsulate_init()
have been added to support authenticated encapsulation. auth_init() functions
were chosen rather that a EVP_PKEY_KEM_set_auth() interface to support
future algorithms that could possibly need different init functions.
Internal code has been refactored, so that it can be shared between the DHKEM
and other systems. Since DHKEM operates on low level keys it needs to be
able to do low level ECDH and ECXDH calls without converting the keys
back into EVP_PKEY/EVP_PKEY_CTX form. See ossl_ecx_compute_key(),
ossl_ec_public_from_private()
DHKEM requires API's to derive a key using a seed (IKM). This did not sit
well inside the DHKEM itself as dispatch functions. This functionality
fits better inside the EC and ECX keymanagers keygen, since
they are just variations of keygen where the private key is generated
in a different manner. This should mainly be used for testing purposes.
See ossl_ec_generate_key_dhkem().
It supports this by allowing a settable param to be passed to keygen
(See OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DHKEM_IKM).
The keygen calls code within ec and ecx dhkem implementation to handle this.
See ossl_ecx_dhkem_derive_private() and ossl_ec_dhkem_derive_private().
These 2 functions are also used by the EC/ECX DHKEM implementations to generate
the sender ephemeral keys.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19068)
Derivation via ecx-methods did not properly set the length. Make the code
more similar to common code and set the length property.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19158)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18668)
Flags for ASM implementations of EC curves were only passed to the FIPS
provider and not to the default or legacy provider. This left some potential
for optimization. Pass the correct flags also to these providers.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18791)
This can be reproduced with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1656112173 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./x509-test ./corpora/x509/fe543a8d7e09109a9a08114323eefec802ad79e2
#0 0x7fb61945eeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x402f84 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand_internal crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:280
#4 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand2 crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:304
#5 0x7fb618ef819d in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:454
#6 0x7fb618e7aa13 in asn1_string_to_bn crypto/asn1/a_int.c:503
#7 0x7fb618e7aa13 in ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN crypto/asn1/a_int.c:559
#8 0x7fb618fd8e79 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:814
#9 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935
#10 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966
#11 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184
#12 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119
#13 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165
#14 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124
#15 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46
#16 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#17 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#18 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#19 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#20 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#21 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#22 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#23 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#24 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#25 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33
#26 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#27 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#28 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#29 0x402756 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/x509-test+0x402756)
=================================================================
==12221==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb61945309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fb618ef5f11 in BN_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:246
#3 0x7fb618ef82f4 in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:440
#4 0x7fb618fd8933 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:618
#5 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935
#6 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966
#7 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184
#8 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119
#9 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165
#10 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124
#11 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46
#12 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#13 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#14 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#15 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#16 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#17 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#18 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#19 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#20 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#21 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33
#22 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#23 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#24 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
Indirect leak of 56 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb61945309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fb619092430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand_internal crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:280
#3 0x7fb618ef7561 in bn_expand2 crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:304
#4 0x7fb618ef819d in BN_bin2bn crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:454
#5 0x7fb618fd8933 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:618
#6 0x7fb618fd98e8 in EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:935
#7 0x7fb618fd9aec in d2i_ECPKParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:966
#8 0x7fb618fdace9 in d2i_ECParameters crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1184
#9 0x7fb618fd1fc7 in eckey_type2param crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:119
#10 0x7fb618fd57b4 in eckey_pub_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:165
#11 0x7fb6191a9c62 in x509_pubkey_decode crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:124
#12 0x7fb6191a9e42 in pubkey_cb crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c:46
#13 0x7fb618eac032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#14 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#15 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#16 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#17 0x7fb618eacaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#18 0x7fb618ead288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#19 0x7fb618eab9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#20 0x7fb618eadd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#21 0x7fb618eade35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#22 0x40310c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/x509.c:33
#23 0x402afb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#24 0x402656 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#25 0x7fb618551f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18633)
Otherwise the information that the EC group was imported from
explicit parameters is lost when the key is moved across providers.
Fixes#18600
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18609)
evp_pkey_get_legacy() will return NULL on failure, however several
uses of it or its wrappers does not check the return value of
evp_pkey_get_legacy(), which could lead to NULL pointer dereference.
Fix those possible bugs by adding NULL checking.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17967)
This happens for instance with
fuzz/corpora/asn1/65cf44e85614c62f10cf3b7a7184c26293a19e4a
and causes the OPENSSL_malloc below to choke on the
zero length allocation request.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18365)
This is reproducible with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652710284 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./server-test ./corpora/server/4e48da8aecce6b9b58e8e4dbbf0523e6d2dd56dc
140587884632000:error:03078041:bignum routines:bn_expand_internal:malloc failure:crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:282:
140587884632000:error:10103003:elliptic curve routines:ec_key_simple_oct2priv:BN lib:crypto/ec/ec_key.c:662:
140587884632000:error:100DE08E:elliptic curve routines:old_ec_priv_decode:decode error:crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:464:
140587884632000:error:0D0680A8:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_check_tlen:wrong tag:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:1149:
140587884632000:error:0D07803A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_item_embed_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:309:Type=X509_ALGOR
140587884632000:error:0D08303A:asn1 encoding routines:asn1_template_noexp_d2i:nested asn1 error:crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:646:Field=pkeyalg, Type=PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO
140587884632000:error:0907B00D:PEM routines:PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey:ASN1 lib:crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:88:
=================================================================
==19676==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fdd2a6bb09f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fdd2a2fa430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fdd2a15df11 in BN_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:246
#3 0x7fdd2a15df88 in BN_secure_new crypto/bn/bn_lib.c:257
#4 0x7fdd2a247390 in ec_key_simple_oct2priv crypto/ec/ec_key.c:655
#5 0x7fdd2a241fc5 in d2i_ECPrivateKey crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c:1030
#6 0x7fdd2a23dac5 in old_ec_priv_decode crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c:463
#7 0x7fdd2a109db7 in d2i_PrivateKey crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c:46
#8 0x7fdd2a33ab16 in PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_pkey.c:84
#9 0x7fdd2a3330b6 in PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey crypto/pem/pem_all.c:151
#10 0x402dba in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:592
#11 0x40370b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#12 0x402846 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#13 0x7fdd297b9f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 24 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18366)
Rename x86-32 assembly files from .s to .S. While processing the .S file
gcc will use the pre-processor whic will evaluate macros and ifdef. This
is turn will be used to enable the endbr32 opcode based on the __CET__
define.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18353)
Both are the same issue and both as false positives. Annotate the line so
that this is ignored.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18012)
The assert added cannot ever fail because (current & 0xFFFF) != 0 from the
while loop and the trailing zero bit count therefore cannot be as large as 32.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17892)
Including e_os.h with a path from a header file doesn't work well on
certain exotic platform. It simply fails to build.
Since we don't seem to be able to stop ourselves, the better move is
to move e_os.h to an include directory that's part of the inclusion
path given to the compiler.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17641)
Add copyright to files that were missing it.
Update license from OpenSSL to Apache as needed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17606)
Description:
Mark Wooden and Franck Rondepierre noted that the square-root-mod-p
operations used in the EdDSA RFC (RFC 8032) can be simplified. For
Ed25519, instead of computing u*v^3 * (u * v^7)^((p-5)/8), we can
compute u * (u*v)^((p-5)/8). This saves 3 multiplications and 2
squarings. For more details (including a proof), see the following
message from the CFRG mailing list:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/qlKpMBqxXZYmDpXXIx6LO3Oznv4/
Note that the Ed448 implementation (see
ossl_curve448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_mul_by_ratio() in
./crypto/ec/curve448/curve448.c) appears to already use this simpler
method (i.e. it does not follow the method suggested in RFC 8032).
Testing:
Build and then run the test suite:
./Configure -Werror --strict-warnings
make update
make
make test
Numerical testing of the square-root computation can be done using the
following sage script:
def legendre(x,p):
return kronecker(x,p)
# Ed25519
p = 2**255-19
# -1 is a square
if legendre(-1,p)==1:
print("-1 is a square")
# suppose u/v is a square.
# to compute one of its square roots, find x such that
# x**4 == (u/v)**2 .
# this implies
# x**2 == u/v, or
# x**2 == -(u/v) ,
# which implies either x or i*x is a square-root of u/v (where i is a square root of -1).
# we can take x equal to u * (u*v)**((p-5)/8).
# 2 is a generator
# this can be checked by factoring p-1
# and then showing 2**((p-1)/q) != 1 (mod p)
# for all primes q dividing p-1.
g = 2
s = p>>2 # s = (p-1)/4
i = power_mod(g, s, p)
t = p>>3 # t = (p-5)/8
COUNT = 1<<18
while COUNT > 0:
COUNT -= 1
r = randint(0,p-1) # r = u/v
v = randint(1,p-1)
u = mod(r*v,p)
# compute x = u * (u*v)**((p-5)/8)
w = mod(u*v,p)
x = mod(u*power_mod(w, t, p), p)
# check that x**2 == r, or (i*x)**2 == r, or r is not a square
rr = power_mod(x, 2, p)
if rr==r:
continue
rr = power_mod(mod(i*x,p), 2, p)
if rr==r:
continue
if legendre(r,p) != 1:
continue
print("failure!")
exit()
print("passed!")
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17544)
Also update and slightly extend the respective documentation and simplify some code.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16251)
