In writing the quic stateless reset test we found that the quic rx code
wasn't checking for stateless reest conditions, as the SRT frames were
getting discarded due to failed lcdim lookups. Move the SRT check above
the lcdim lookup in the rx path to ensure we handle SRT properly in the
client.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23384)
Freeing the QUIC TLS object may make calls back into QUIC so we should
free it first.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23256)
The TLS object may make callbacks into QUIC during cleanup so we must
free it first.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23256)
We had two functions which were very similarly named, that did almost the
same thing, but not quite. We bring the two together. Doing this also fixes
a possible bug where some data may not be correctly freed when the
RECORD_LAYER_clear() version was used.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23256)
Using the client one when the server once should be used could cause a
later call to SSL_set_accept_state() to unexpectedly fail.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23256)
When we clear the record layer, we better make sure we clear all relevant
fields, otherwise we can get ourselves into an unexpected state.
Fixes#23255
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23256)
strstr() is used to match multiple characters in the haystack,
whereas strchr() is used to matched only single character.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23347)
The EVP_CIPHER api currently assumes that calls made into several APIs
have already initalized the cipher in a given context via a call to
EVP_CipherInit[_ex[2]]. If that hasnt been done, instead of an error,
the result is typically a SIGSEGV.
Correct that by adding missing NULL checks in the apropriate apis prior
to using ctx->cipher
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22995)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23307)
Don't check the Max Fragment Length if the it hasn't been negotiated. We
were checking it anyway, and using the default value
(SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH). This works in most cases but KTLS can cause the
record length to actually exceed this in some cases.
Fixes#23169
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23182)
Also document that it is ok to use this for control flow decisions.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23304)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23191)
