X509_CRL_digest() didn't check if the precomputed sha1 hash was actually
present. This also makes sure there's an appropriate flag to check.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2314)
The pointer that was freed in the SSLv2 section of ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list
may have stepped up from its allocated position. Use a pointer that is
guaranteed to point at the start of the allocated block instead.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2312)
Add a client authentication signature algorithm to simple
ssl test and a server signature algorithm. Since we don't
do client auth this should have no effect. However if we
use client auth signature algorithms by mistake this will
abort the handshake with a no shared signature algorithms
error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2290)
When the client reads DH parameters from the TLS stream, we only
checked that they all are non-zero. This change updates the check to
use DH_check_params()
DH_check_params() is a new function for light weight checking of the p
and g parameters:
check that p is odd
check that 1 < g < p - 1
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory (or bogus
MAC value is produced if x86 MD5 assembly module is involved). Since
hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
In test/ssl_test, parsing ExpectedClientSignHash ended up in the
expected_server_sign_hash field.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2289)
This function is used to validate application supplied parameters. An
assert should be used to check for an error that is internal to OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
When doing in place encryption the overlapping buffer check can fail
incorrectly where we have done a partial block "Update" operation. This
fixes things to take account of any pending partial blocks.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
The previous commit fixed a bug where a partial block had been passed to
an "Update" function and it wasn't properly handled. We should catch this
type of error in evp_test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
If we have previously been passed a partial block in an "Update" call then
make sure we properly increment the output buffer when we use it.
Fixes#2273
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
Lots of references to 16 replaced by AES_BLOCK_SIZE. Also a few other style
tweaks in that function
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2275)
Instead of looking for "200" and "established" (and failing all other
2xx responses or "Established"), let's look for a line that's not a
header (i.e. doesn't contain a ':') and where the first space is
followed by a '2'.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1664)
Remove duplicate defines from EVP source files.
Most of them were in evp.h, which is always included.
Add new ones evp_int.h
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK is now always defined in evp.h, so
remove conditionals on it
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2201)
Well, not as much, at least.
Commit 07afdf3c3a changed things so
that for SSLv2 format ClientHellos we store the cipher list in the
TLS format, i.e., with two bytes per cipher, to be consistent with
historical behavior.
However, the space allocated for the array still performed the computation
with three bytes per cipher, a needless over-allocation (though a relatively
small one, all things considered).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2281)
Add Poly1305 as a "signed" digest.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2128)
SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist() was a little too "raw" in the case of an SSLv2
compat ClientHello. In 1.0.2 and below, during version negotiation, if
we received an SSLv2 compat ClientHello but actually wanted to do SSLv3+
then we would construct a "fake" SSLv3+ ClientHello. This "fake" ClientHello
would have its ciphersuite list converted to the SSLv3+ format. It was
this "fake" raw list that got saved away to later be returned by a call to
SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist().
In 1.1.0+ version negotiation works differently and we process an SSLv2
compat ClientHello directly without the need for an intermediary "fake"
ClientHello. This meant that the raw ciphersuite list being saved was in
the SSLv2 format. Any caller of this function would not expect that and
potentially overread the returned buffer by one byte.
Fixes#2189
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2280)
ChaCha20 code uses its own custom cipher_data. Add EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV
and EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT so that the key and the iv can be set by
different calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2156)
- s == NULL can mean c is a new session *or* lh_insert was
unable to create a hash entry.
- use lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve to check for this error condition.
- If it happens simply remove the extra reference again.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2138)
According to the documentation, the return code should be -1 when
RAND_status does not return 1.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1886)
This comes from a comment in GH issue #1027. Andy wrote the code,
Rich made the PR.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2253)
It seems that the ssl test 20-cert-select.conf dislikes the lack of TLSv1.2
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2268)
it was getting the SerialNumber of a previous cert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2272)
In a non client-auth renegotiation where the original handshake *was*
client auth, then the server will expect the client to send a Certificate
message anyway resulting in a connection failure.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1982)
