We leave it up to the EVP_MAC implemenations what to do with an update
where the data length is 0. In the TLS HMAC implemenation this is still
signficant.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
Previously it used EVP_MD_type(), which doesn't work when called inside
the FIPs module.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
Include more information about the new HMAC parameter. Also fill in some
missing documentation about the EVP_PKEY MAC bridge.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
The underlying MAC implementations may take ctx params. Therefore we allow
the bridge to pass these through.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
Previously we passed it the data plus mac size. Now we just pass it the
data size. We already know the mac size.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
This commit just moves the TLS1 and above implementation to use the TLS
HMAC implementation in the providers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
The TLS HMAC implementation should take care to calculate the MAC in
constant time in the case of MAC-Then-Encrypt where we have a variable
amount of padding.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12755)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12760)
Fix OPENSSL_realloc failure case; `provider->operation_bits` memory
is lost when `OPENSSL_realloc()` returns NULL.
`operation_bits_sz` is never set to the length of the allocated array.
This means that operation_bits is always reallocated in
`ossl_provider_set_operation_bit()`, possibly shrinking the array.
In addition, it means that the `memset()` always zeros out the
whole reallocated array, not just the new part. Also, because
`operation_bits_sz` is always zero, the value of `*result` in
`ossl_provider_test_operation_bit()` will always be zero.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12760)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12762)
* In the cmp app so far the -verbosity option had been missing.
* Extend log output helpful for debugging CMP applications
in setup_ssl_ctx() of the cmp app, ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(),
OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(), and OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform().
* Correct suppression of log output with insufficient severity.
* Add logging/severity level OSSL_CMP_LOG_TRACE = OSSL_CMP_LOG_MAX.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12739)
While here, check for failure from RAND_bytes_ex as well.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
- Apply the cipher list to the server context as well as the client
context. The tests still worked for AES-GCM cipher suites as those
are in the default list of ciphers. AES-CCM cipher suites are not
in the default list and require the cipher list to be set.
- Use the correct cipher name for AES-CCM.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
KTLS RX is not yet supported for TLS 1.3.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
This skips tests using KTLS RX when run on systems that only support
KTLS TX.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
Use the low 4 bits of the test number directly as flags for which of
the connection sides should use KTLS or not for each test instead of
having 16 nearly identical functions to do the same thing.
This makes it easier to skip tests that aren't supported (e.g. KTLS RX
on TLS 1.3).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
These functions are a bit large to inline and are not usable outside
of libssl.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
errno is only valid if ktls_read_record() fails with a negative return
value.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
Similar to KTLS receive for Linux, KTLS receive for FreeBSD is enabled
by passing a session key to the kernel via a new socket option. Once
KTLS receive is enabled on a socket, the socket returns records via
recvmsg(). A control message attached to each record supplies the
original TLS header, and the decrypted plaintext is returned in the
data buffer passed to recvmsg().
To support the case that the userland buffer may already contain
pending encrypted records (which is already handled by Linux's KTLS
receive), the socket option structure for FreeBSD has been extended to
include the initial sequence number.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
These are similar to the helpers added in 95badfeb60. I've adjusted
the arguments passed to ktls_check_supported_cipher and
ktls_configure_crypto so that FreeBSD and Linux can both use the same
signature to avoid OS-specific #ifdef's in libssl. This also required
moving the check on valid TLS versions into
ktls_check_supported_cipher for Linux. This has largely removed
OS-specific code and OS-specific #ifdef's for KTLS outside of
<internal/ktls.h>.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
This type is defined to hold the OS-specific structure passed to
BIO_set_ktls.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12111)
If we don't have MD5-SHA1 then we must be use (D)TLSv1.2 or above. We
check that this is consistent with the way we've been configured. We also
ensure that we never attempt to negotiate <(D)TLSv1.2 if MD5-SHA1 is not
available.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12733)
If a digest is not available we just get an "internal error" error
message - which isn't very helpful for diagnosing problems. Instead we
explicitly state that we couldn't find a suitable digest.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12733)
We reuse concepts such as PROV_CIPHER, and make use of some common code
in provider_util.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
The test only setup the generation of a key. It did not complete that
generation. We extend the test to complete the generation and to use the
generated key. We also compare the result with a key generated in a
different way.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Now that the all the legacy PKEY MAC bridge code has been moved to the
providers we no longer need the old bridge and it can be removed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
The previous commits added support for HMAC, SIPHASH and Poly1305 into
the provider MAC bridge. We now extend that for CMAC too.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
The previous commits added support for HMAC and SIPHASH into the provider
MAC bridge. We now extend that for Poly1305 too.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Some signature algorithms don't need a default digest, so don't fail if
we don't have one.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
The previous commits added support for HMAC into the provider MAC bridge.
We now extend that for SIPHASH too.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Convert various mac key creation function calls to use the _with_libctx
variants.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Fixes some issues with EVP_MD_CTX_* functions when doing EVP_DigestSign*
and EVP_DigestVerify* functions.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
Previously it was a macro. We now make it into a function that is params
aware.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)
evp_extra_test had a test that checks whether an EVP_PKEY_CTX can still
be created for HMAC even though there are no providers loaded because it
is a legacy algorithm. However after the earlier commits this is no longer
the case. We swap the check to a different legacy algorithm (SM2).
Hopefully before too long there will be no legacy algorithms left and the
test can be deleted.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12637)