Previous language was unclear. New language isn't pretty but I believe
it is more accurate.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There are a number of engines in the OpenSSL source code which are now
obsolete. The following engines have been removed: 4758cca, aep, atalla,
cswift, nuron, sureware.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
In some environments, such as firmware, the current system time is entirely
meaningless. Provide a clean mechanism to suppress the checks against it.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error. Also update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Make all mention of digest algorithm use "any supported algorithm"
RT2071, some new manpages from Victor B. Wagner <vitus@cryptocom.ru>:
X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir.pod
X509_check_ca.pod
X509_check_issued.pod
RT 1600:
Remove references to non-existant objects(3)
Add RETURN VALUES to BIO_do_accept page.
RT1818:
RSA_sign Can return values other than 0 on failure.
RT3634:
Fix AES CBC aliases (Steffen Nurpmeso <sdaoden@yandex.com>)
RT3678:
Some clarifications to BIO_new_pair
(Devchandra L Meetei <dlmeetei@gmail.com>)
RT3787:
Fix some EVP_ function return values
(Laetitia Baudoin <lbaudoin@google.com>)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
L<foo|foo> is sub-optimal If the xref is the same as the title,
which is what we do, then you only need L<foo>. This fixes all
1457 occurrences in 349 files. Approximately. (And pod used to
need both.)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Thanks folks:
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about
the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against
those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure.
Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Rewrite and tidy ASN1_INTEGER and ASN1_ENUMERATED handling.
Remove code duplication.
New functions to convert between int64_t and ASN.1 types without the
quirks of the old long conversion functions.
Add documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This gets BN_.*free:
BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free
Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Don't check for NULL before calling a free routine. This gets X509_.*free:
x509_name_ex_free X509_policy_tree_free X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free
X509_STORE_free X509_STORE_CTX_free X509_PKEY_free
X509_OBJECT_free_contents X509_LOOKUP_free X509_INFO_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Add new functions ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence and ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence:
these encode and decode ASN.1 SEQUENCE using an ASN1_TYPE structure.
Update ordinals.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
EVP_.*free; this gets:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality
is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in
the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may
return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then
both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the
error queue. They both return 1 on success.
Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an
error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not.
Frequently there are constructions of this form:
if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1)
goto err;
In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so
RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use.
This form is also seen:
if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...))
goto err;
This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is
incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as
an error.
Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy
pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded
entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off
using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes
being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by
insufficient entropy.
If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the
same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case.
Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security,
RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
