Add -client_renegotiation flag support. The -client_renegotiation flag is
equivalent to SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION. Add support to the app,
the config code, and the documentation.
Add SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION to the SSL tests. We don't need to
always enable it, but there are so many tests so this is the easiest thing
to do.
Add a test where client tries to renegotiate and it fails as expected. Add
a test where server tries to renegotiate and it succeeds. The second test
is supported by a new flag, -immediate_renegotiation, which is ignored on
the client.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15184)
It can be useful to know what group was used for the handshake's
key exchange process even on non-TLS 1.3 connections. Allow this
API, new in OpenSSL 3.0.0, to be used on other TLS versions as well.
Since pre-TLS-1.3 key exchange occurs only on full handshakes, this
necessitates adding a field to the SSL_SESSION object to carry the
group information across resumptions. The key exchange group in the
SSL_SESSION can also be relevant in TLS 1.3 when the resumption handshake
uses the "psk_ke" key-exchange mode, so also track whether a fresh key
exchange was done for TLS 1.3.
Since the new field is optional in the ASN.1 sense, there is no need
to increment SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION (which incurs strong incompatibility
churn).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14750)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15230)
Less tersely: converted SSL_get_options, SSL_set_options,
SSL_CTX_get_options and SSL_CTX_get_options to take and return uint64_t
since we were running out of 32 bits.
Fixes: 15145
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15230)
The EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid() is renamed to
EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest() and implemented
via EVP_DigestSignInit_ex().
Fixes#14343
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15198)
TLS 1.3 allows for the "psk_ke" and "psk_dhe_ke" key-exchange modes.
Only the latter mode introduces a new ephemeral (Diffie-Hellman)
key exchange, with the PSK being the only key material used in the
former case.
It's a compliance requirement of RFC 8446 that the server MUST NOT
send a KeyShareEntry when using the "psk_ke" mode, but prior to
this commit we would send a key-share based solely on whether the
client sent one. This bug goes unnoticed in our internal test suite
since openssl communicating with openssl can never negotiate the
PSK-only key-exchange mode. However, we should still be compliant
with the spec, so check whether the DHE mode was offered and don't
send a key-share if it wasn't.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14749)
It's a MUST-level requirement that if the client sends a pre_shared_key
extension not accompanied by a psk_key_exchange_modes extension, the
server must abort the handshake. Prior to this commit the server
would continue on.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14749)
This helps compensating for deprecated functions such as HMAC()
and reduces clutter in the crypto lib, apps, and tests.
Also fixes memory leaks in generate_cookie_callback() of apps/lib/s_cb.c.
and replaces 'B<...>' by 'I<...>' where appropriate in HMAC.pod
Partially fixes#14628.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14664)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15167)
libimplementations.a was a nice idea, but had a few flaws:
1. The idea to have common code in libimplementations.a and FIPS
sensitive helper functions in libfips.a / libnonfips.a didn't
catch on, and we saw full implementation ending up in them instead
and not appearing in libimplementations.a at all.
2. Because more or less ALL algorithm implementations were included
in libimplementations.a (the idea being that the appropriate
objects from it would be selected automatically by the linker when
building the shared libraries), it's very hard to find only the
implementation source that should go into the FIPS module, with
the result that the FIPS checksum mechanism include source files
that it shouldn't
To mitigate, we drop libimplementations.a, but retain the idea of
collecting implementations in static libraries. With that, we not
have:
libfips.a
Includes all implementations that should become part of the FIPS
provider.
liblegacy.a
Includes all implementations that should become part of the legacy
provider.
libdefault.a
Includes all implementations that should become part of the
default and base providers.
With this, libnonfips.a becomes irrelevant and is dropped.
libcommon.a is retained to include common provider code that can be
used uniformly by all providers.
Fixes#15157
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15171)
Removed error codes, and the mention of the functions.
This removal is already documented in the CHANGES doc.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15140)
This option is only useful for the client, but it was previously
marked as only being applicable for servers.
Correct the entry to properly mark it as client-only, and update the
s_server/s_client manuals accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15127)
Previously we would set SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT by default in
SSL_CTX_new(), to allow connections to legacy servers that did not
implement RFC 5746.
It has been more than a decade since RFC 5746 was published, so
there has been plenty of time for implmentation support to roll out.
Change the default behavior to be to require peers to support
secure renegotiation. Existing applications that already cleared
SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT will see no behavior change, as
re-clearing the flag is just a little bit of redundant work.
The old behavior is still available by explicitly setting the flag
in the application.
Also remove SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT from SSL_OP_ALL, for
similar reasons.
Document the behavior change in CHANGES.md, and update the
SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_CONF_cmd manuals to reflect the change
in default behavior.
Fixes: 14848
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15127)
`strdup(propq)` failure is doing a `goto err;` from where `SSL_CTX_free` is called.
The possible call is made before reference and lock fields setup.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15052)
In TLS we process received messages like this:
1) Read Message Header
2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
3) Read Message Body
4) Process Message
In DTLS we read messages like this:
1) Read Message Header and Body
2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
3) Process Message
The difference is because of the stream vs datagram semantics of the
underlying transport.
In both TLS and DTLS we were doing finished MAC processing as part of
reading the message body. This means that in DTLS this was occurring
*before* the state transition has been validated. A crash was occurring
in DTLS if a Finished message was sent in an invalid state due to
assumptions in the code that certain variables would have been setup by
the time a Finished message arrives.
To avoid this problem we shift the finished MAC processing to be after
the state transition in DTLS.
Thanks to github user @bathooman for reporting this issue.
Fixes#14906
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14930)
One was related to probing for the combination of signature and hash
algorithm together. This is currently not easily possible. The TODO(3.0)
is converted to a normal comment and I've raised the problem as issue
number #14885 as something to resolve post 3.0.
The other TODO was a hard coded limit on the number of groups that could
be registered. This has been amended so that there is no limit.
Fixes#14333
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14886)
Add a "where did this EVP_{CIPHER,MD} come from" flag: global, via fetch,
or via EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_meth_new. Update EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_free to handle all
three origins. The flag is deliberately right before some function pointers,
so that compile-time failures (int/pointer) will occur, as opposed to
taking a bit in the existing "flags" field. The "global variable" flag
is non-zero, so the default case of using OPENSSL_zalloc (for provider
ciphers), will do the right thing. Ref-counting is a no-op for
Make up_ref no-op for global MD and CIPHER objects
Deprecate EVP_MD_CTX_md(). Added EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md() (same semantics as
the deprecated function) and EVP_MD_CTX_get1_md(). Likewise, deprecate
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() in favor of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(), and add
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get1_CIPHER().
Refactor EVP_MD_free() and EVP_MD_meth_free() to call new common
evp_md_free_int() function.
Refactor EVP_CIPHER_free() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() to call new common
evp_cipher_free_int() function.
Also change some flags tests to explicit test == or != zero. E.g.,
if (flags & x) --> if ((flags & x) != 0)
if (!(flags & x)) --> if ((flags & x) == 0)
Only done for those lines where "get0_cipher" calls were made.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14193)
It's possible to set an invalid protocol list that will be sent in a
ClientHello. This validates the inputs to make sure this does not
happen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14815)
It has always been the case that KTLS is not compiled by default. However
if it is compiled then it was automatically used unless specifically
configured not to. This is problematic because it avoids any crypto
implementations from providers. A user who configures all crypto to use
the FIPS provider may unexpectedly find that TLS related crypto is actually
being performed outside of the FIPS boundary.
Instead we change KTLS so that it is disabled by default.
We also swap to using a single "option" (i.e. SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) rather
than two separate "modes", (i.e. SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX and
SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX).
Fixes#13794
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14799)
This change includes swapping the PUT and SPT configuration,
includes of sys/stat.h and sys/types.h in the correct scope
to be picked up by SPT definitions.
Fixes: #14698Fixes: #14734
CLA: The author has the permission to grant the OpenSSL Team the right to use this change.
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14736)
The comment is bogus as that call for NID_sha256 does not do
anything else than looking up the string in an internal table.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14703)
Instead, they should be cached per SSL_CTX.
This also addresses a threading issue where multiple attempts to write the
same location occur. The last one winning. Under 1.1.1, this wasn't an issue
but under 3.0 with library contexts, the results can and will be different.
Fixes#13456
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14715)
Following on from CVE-2021-3449 which was caused by a non-zero length
associated with a NULL buffer, other buffer/length pairs are updated to
ensure that they too are always in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
As the variable peer_sigalgslen is not cleared on ssl rehandshake, it's
possible to crash an openssl tls secured server remotely by sending a
manipulated hello message in a rehandshake.
On such a manipulated rehandshake, tls1_set_shared_sigalgs() calls
tls12_shared_sigalgs() with the peer_sigalgslen of the previous
handshake, while the peer_sigalgs has been freed.
As a result tls12_shared_sigalgs() walks over the available
peer_sigalgs and tries to access data of a NULL pointer.
This issue was introduced by c589c34e61 (Add support for the TLS 1.3
signature_algorithms_cert extension, 2018-01-11).
Signed-off-by: Peter Kästle <peter.kaestle@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Sapalski <samuel.sapalski@nokia.com>
CVE-2021-3449
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Some functions that lock things are void, so we just return early.
Also make ossl_namemap_empty return 0 on error. Updated the docs, and added
some code to ossl_namemap_stored() to handle the failure, and updated the
tests to allow for failure.
Fixes: #14230
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14238)
While all the standardized groups would fit within the old limit,
with the addition of providers, some might want to experiment with
new and unstandardized groups. As such, their names might not fit
within the old limit.
Define it as GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH with value 64.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14502)
A trivial PR to remove some commonly repeated words. It looks like this is
not the first PR to do this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14420)
If we have TLSv1.3 enabled then we must have at least one TLSv1.3 capable
group available. This check was not always working
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14430)
If the EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl is deprecated the code will
generate deprecation warnings. So there is no point in marking
all EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() calls with TODOs.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14367)
In ssl_create_cipher_list() we make a pass through the ciphers to
remove those which are disabled in the current libctx. We are
careful to not include such disabled TLS 1.3 ciphers in the final
consolidated cipher list that we produce, but the disabled ciphers
are still kept in the separate stack of TLS 1.3 ciphers associated
with the SSL or SSL_CTX in question. This leads to confusing
results where a cipher is present in the tls13_cipherlist but absent
from the actual cipher list in use. Keep the books in order and
remove the disabled ciphers from the 1.3 cipherlist at the same time
we skip adding them to the active cipher list.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12037)