Fixes#19488
Use the correct OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA CRT names fior the self tests.
The invalid names cause CRT parameters to be silently ignored.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19501)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19375)
Partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- host name -> hostname
- ipv6 -> IPv6
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
3.1 has been decided to be a FIPS 140-3 release, springing from the branch
openssl-3.0, and the master branch to continue with the development of
OpenSSL 3.2.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19350)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18833)
Longer private key sizes unnecessarily raise the cycles needed to
compute the shared secret without any increase of the real security.
We use minimum key sizes as defined in RFC7919.
For arbitrary parameters we cannot know whether they are safe
primes (we could test but that would be too inefficient) we have
to keep generating large keys.
However we now set a small dh->length when we are generating safe prime
parameters because we know it is safe to use small keys with them.
That means users need to regenerate the parameters if they
want to take the performance advantage of small private key.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18480)
Fixed#18489
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18550)
This removes a guard condition that prevents KTLS being enabled for
receiving in TLS 1.3. Use the correct sequence number and BIO for
receive vs transmit offload.
Co-authored-by: John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17942)
Provide a different mechanism to indicate that the application wants
to retry the verification. The negative result of the callback function
now indicates an error again.
Instead the SSL_set_retry_verify() can be called from the callback
to indicate that the handshake should be suspended.
Fixes#17568
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17825)
Supports Linux, MacOS and FreeBSD
Disabled by default, enabled via `enabled-tfo`
Some tests
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8692)
Co-authored-by: Matthias St. Pierre <matthias.st.pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17714)
Fixed the date in the heading of "Changes between 1.1.1l and 1.1.1m" to 14 Dec 2021
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17714)
The function/macro allow user get groups/extensions without memory allcations.
So we could calculate the ssl fignerprint(ja3) in low cost.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16910)
After OMC and OTC discussions, the 95% performance loss resulting from
the constant time code was deemed excessive for something outside of
our security policy.
The option to use the constant time code exists as it was in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17600)
Signed-off-by: Darshan Sen <raisinten@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17507)
When `PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey()` was passed an empty passphrase
string, `OPENSSL_memdup()` was incorrectly getting used for 0 bytes size
allocation, which resulted in malloc failures.
Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/17506
Signed-off-by: Darshan Sen <raisinten@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17507)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17274)
It uses AVX512_IFMA + AVX512_VL (with 256-bit wide registers) ISA to
keep lower power license.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14908)
Since TLS v1.3 eschews renegotiation entirely it’s misleading to have
these apps say it’s “not supported” when in fact the TLS version is
new enough not to need renegotiation at all.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16937)
This is the length of the tag they use and should be considered an upper bound
on their strength.
This lowers their security strength to level 0.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16652)
