A test in sslapitest.c was failing in a no-ec build because we were using
an EC based ciphersuite. That particular test doesn't require EC
specifically, so we swap to a non EC based ciphersuite.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9716)
Actually supply a chain and then test:
1) A successful check of both the ee and chain certs
2) A failure to check the ee cert
3) A failure to check a chain cert
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9442)
Make sure we only test TLSv1.2 things if TLSv1.2 is actually available.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9442)
Deprecate all xxx_F_ defines.
Removed some places that tested for a specific function.
Use empty field for the function names in output.
Update documentation.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9058)
Augment the cert_cb sslapitest to include a run that uses
SSL_check_chain() to inspect the certificate prior to installing
it on the SSL object. If the check shows the certificate as not
valid in that context, we do not install a certificate at all, so
the handshake will fail later on in processing (tls_choose_sigalg()),
exposing the indicated regression.
Currently it fails, since we have not yet set the shared sigalgs
by the time the cert_cb runs.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9157)
Now that we have TLSv1.3 FFDHE support there is no reason why we should
not allow TLSv1.3 to be used in a no-ec build. This commit enables that
to happen.
It also fixes no-ec which was previously broken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9156)
The recent TLSv1.3 FFDHE support missed a few OPENSSL_NO_DH guards.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9153)
This commit adds the SSL_sendfile call, which allows KTLS sockets to
transmit file using zero-copy semantics.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8727)
Add a unit-test for ktls receive side.
Change-Id: I890588681d05fba419f644f6d903be6dc83c9ed5
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7848)
Prior to this commit we were keeping a count of how many KeyUpdates we
have processed and failing if we had had too many. This simplistic approach
is not sufficient for long running connections. Since many KeyUpdates
would not be a particular good DoS route anyway, the simplest solution is
to simply remove the key update count.
Fixes#8068
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8299)
Add SSL_OP64_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, that can be set on either
an SSL or an SSL_CTX. When processing a ClientHello, if this flag
is set, do not indicate that the EMS TLS extension was received in
either the ssl3 object or the SSL_SESSION. Retain most of the
sanity checks between the previous and current session during
session resumption, but weaken the check when the current SSL
object is configured to not use EMS.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3910)
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message
exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses
some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means
that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly.
This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake
message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in
the normal way.
This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already
written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it,
KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications.
Fixes#8069
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
During a DTLS handshake we may need to periodically handle timeouts in the
DTLS timer to ensure retransmits due to lost packets are performed. However,
one peer will always complete a handshake before the other. The DTLS timer
stops once the handshake has finished so any handshake messages lost after
that point will not automatically get retransmitted simply by calling
DTLSv1_handle_timeout(). However attempting an SSL_read implies a
DTLSv1_handle_timeout() and additionally will process records received from
the peer. If those records are themselves retransmits then we know that the
peer has not completed its handshake yet and a retransmit of our final
flight automatically occurs.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8047)
Add a unit-test for ktls.
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
Fix some issues in tls13_hkdf_expand() which impact the above function
for TLSv1.3. In particular test that we can use the maximum label length
in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
Even though we already sent close_notify the server may not have recieved
it yet and could issue a CertificateRequest to us. Since we've already
sent close_notify we can't send any reasonable response so we just ignore
it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7114)
Add a test to check that we create the correct number of tickets after a
TLSv1.3 PSK.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7097)
We already have SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(). This just adds the SSL_CTX
equivalent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes#6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
This also adds the ability to control this through s_server
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6469)
Currently if you encounter application data while waiting for a
close_notify from the peer, and you have called SSL_shutdown() then
you will get a -1 return (fatal error) and SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL from
SSL_get_error(). This isn't accurate (it should be SSL_ERROR_SSL) and
isn't persistent (you can call SSL_shutdown() again and it might then work).
We change this into a proper fatal error that is persistent.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
In the case where we are shutdown for writing and awaiting a close_notify
back from a subsequent SSL_shutdown() call we skip over handshake data
that is received. This should not be treated as an error - instead it
should be signalled with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340)
Implement support for stateful TLSv1.3 tickets, and use them if
SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6563)
Because TLS 1.3 sends more non-application data records some clients run
into problems because they don't expect SSL_read() to return and set
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ after processing it.
This can cause problems for clients that use blocking I/O and use
select() to see if data is available. It can be cleared using
SSL_CTX_clear_mode().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #6260
