This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should
become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing.
Fixes#11538
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
DH_set0_pqg() is now responsible for caching the nid, q and length.
DH with or without named safe prime groups now default to using the maximum private key length (BN_num_bits(q) - 1)
when generating a DH private key. The code is now shared between fips and non fips mode for DH key generation.
The OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN parameter can be used during keygen to override the maximum private key length to be
in the range (2 * strength ... bits(q) - 1). Where the strength depends on the length of p.
Added q = (p - 1) / 2 safe prime BIGNUMS so that the code is data driven (To simplify adding new names).
The BIGNUMS were code generated.
Fix error in documented return value for DH_get_nid
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11562)
Previously import_to just took an EVP_PKEY as the argument. However we
need to some additional context data as well - specifically the libctx.
Therefore we pass an EVP_PKEY_CTX instead to hold the combination of
both of these things.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11536)
Don't wrap conditionally-compiled files in global ifndef tests.
Instead, test if the feature is disabled and, if so, do not
compile it.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11263)
Moved some shared FFC code into the FFC files.
Added extra paramgen parameters for seed, gindex.
Fixed bug in ossl_prov util to print bignums.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11303)
The EC export_to function calls EC_POINT_point2buf that can later
generate a random number in some circumstances. Therefore we pass in a
BN_CTX associated with the library context. This means we have to change
the export_to function signature to accept the library context.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11493)
Since this is public, it is best to make the underlying structure opaque.
This means converting from stack allocation to dynamic allocation for all
usages.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11390)
The catalyst for this is the difficult of passing BNs through the other
OSSL_PARAM APIs.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11390)
Downgrading EVP_PKEYs from containing provider side internal keys to
containing legacy keys demands support in the EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.
This became a bit elaborate because the code would be almost exactly
the same as the import functions int EVP_KEYMGMT. Therefore, we end
up moving most of the code to common backend support files that can be
used both by legacy backend code and by our providers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11375)
The export-to-provider functions for DH, DSA and EC_KEY assumed that a
public key is always present, and would fail if not. This blocks any
attempt to export a key structure with only domain parameters.
While fixing this, we also modify the selection declaration to
evp_keymgmt_import() to be more adaptive, the diverse selection bits
are now added when the corresponding data is added to the OSSL_PARAM
array.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11374)
in particular X509_NAME*, X509_STORE{,_CTX}*, and ASN1_INTEGER *,
also some result types of new functions, which does not break compatibility
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10504)
The EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD function export_to() must check that the key
we're trying to export has a known libcrypto method, i.e. is a built
in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD, etc. Otherwise, the method may be defined
by the calling application, by an engine, by another library, and we
simply cannot know all the quirks hidden behind that method, if we
have access to the key data, or much anything.
Such keys are simply deemed impossible to export to provider keys,
i.e. have export_to() return 0. This cascades back to functions like
evp_pkey_export_to_provider() and evp_pkey_upgrade_to_provider() and
their callers. In most cases, this is fine, but if these get mixed in
with provider side keys in any function, that function will fail.
Fixes#11179Fixes#9915
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11193)
Made macro names that refer to a known base OID, an commented accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10557)
Embed libctx in dsa and dh objects and cleanup internal methods to not pass libctx (This makes it consistent with the rsa changes)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10910)
Use of the low level DSA functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10977)
The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few
assumptions:
1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In
other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded,
imported data, ...), it's set in stone.
2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the
key data.
This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a
bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers.
Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions
like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the
combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able
to hold:
- domain parameters only
- public key only
- public key + private key
- domain parameters + public key
- domain parameters + public key + private key
To remedy all this, we:
1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key
material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface.
As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection
argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the
key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows
a reduction of very similar functions into one.
2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key
objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and
get their data filled and extracted in through import and export.
(future work will see other key object constructors and other
functions to fill them with data)
Fixes#10979
squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics
Remedy 1 needs a rewrite:
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
This is required in order to share code for FIPS related parameter generation and validation routinues.
Note the 'counter' field is now stored as a integer (as that is the form required for generation/validation functions).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10860)
These fields are purely application data, and applications don't reach
into the bowels of the FIPS module, so these fields are never used
there.
Fixes#10835
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10837)
Previous macros suggested that from 3.0, we're only allowed to
deprecate things at a major version. However, there's no policy
stating this, but there is for removal, saying that to remove
something, it must have been deprecated for 5 years, and that removal
can only happen at a major version.
Meanwhile, the semantic versioning rule is that deprecation should
trigger a MINOR version update, which is reflected in the macro names
as of this change.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10364)
Add a new API to test for primes that can't be misused, deprecated the
old APIs.
Suggested by Jake Massimo and Kenneth Paterson
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #9272
Also added blanks lines after declarations in a couple of places.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9916)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
using PCC and KDSA instructions.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10004)
The output C code was made to use ERR_func_error_string() to see if a
string table was already loaded or not. Since this function returns
NULL always, this check became useless.
Change it to use ERR_reason_error_string() instead, as there's no
reason to believe we will get rid of reason strings, ever.
To top it off, we rebuild all affected C sources.
Fixes#9756
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9756)
Adds simple utility functions to allow both the default and fips providers to
encode and decode DSA-Sig-Value and ECDSA-Sig-Value (DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG
structures) to/from ASN.1 DER without requiring those providers to have a
dependency on the asn1 module.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9111)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9288)
The #7408 implemented mandatory digest checking in TLS.
However this broke compatibility of DSS support with GnuTLS
which supports only SHA1 with DSS.
There is no reason why SHA256 would be a mandatory digest
for DSA as other digests in SHA family can be used as well.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9015)
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_Q_BITS and EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DSA_PARAMGEN_MD are only
exposed from EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl, which means callers must write more error-prone
code (see also issue #1319). Add the missing wrapper macros and document them.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8093)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
This is in preparation for a switch to MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH versioning
and calling the next major version 3.0.0.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N,
otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7493)
Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that
triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs
prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack.
Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of
the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the
primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse
without leaking information.
Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7487)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)
`RSA_free()` and friends are called in case of error from
`RSA_new_method(ENGINE *e)` (or the respective equivalent functions).
For the rest of the description I'll talk about `RSA_*`, but the same
applies for the equivalent `DSA_free()`, `DH_free()`, `EC_KEY_free()`.
If `RSA_new_method()` fails because the engine does not implement the
required method, when `RSA_free(RSA *r)` is called,
`r->meth == NULL` and a segfault happens while checking if
`r->meth->finish` is defined.
This commit fixes this issue by ensuring that `r->meth` is not NULL
before dereferencing it to check for `r->meth->finish`.
Fixes#7102 .
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)
FIPS 186-4 does not specify a hard requirement on DSA digest lengths,
and in any case the current check rejects the FIPS recommended digest
lengths for key sizes != 1024 bits.
Fixes: #6748
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6749)
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.
This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.
Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
There are two undocumented DSA parameter generation options available in
the genpkey command line app:
dsa_paramgen_md and dsa_paramgen_q_bits.
These can also be accessed via the EVP API but only by using
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() or EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str() directly. There are no
helper macros for these options.
dsa_paramgen_q_bits sets the length of q in bits (default 160 bits).
dsa_paramgen_md sets the digest that is used during the parameter
generation (default SHA1). In particular the output length of the digest
used must be equal to or greater than the number of bits in q because of
this code:
if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++)
md[i] ^= buf2[i];
/* step 3 */
md[0] |= 0x80;
md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q))
goto err;
qsize here is the number of bits in q and evpmd is the digest set via
dsa_paramgen_md. md and buf2 are buffers of length SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH.
buf2 has been filled with qsize bits of random seed data, and md is
uninitialised.
If the output size of evpmd is less than qsize then the line "md[i] ^=
buf2[i]" will be xoring an uninitialised value and the random seed data
together to form the least significant bits of q (and not using the
output of the digest at all for those bits) - which is probably not what
was intended. The same seed is then used as an input to generating p. If
the uninitialised data is actually all zeros (as seems quite likely)
then the least significant bits of q will exactly match the least
significant bits of the seed.
This problem only occurs if you use these undocumented and difficult to
find options and you set the size of q to be greater than the message
digest output size. This is for parameter generation only not key
generation. This scenario is considered highly unlikely and
therefore the security risk of this is considered negligible.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5800)
information about the length of a value used in DSA operations from
a large number of signatures.
This doesn't rate as a CVE because:
* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
more information.
* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
to leak a small amount of information.
Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)
Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)
Names were not removed.
Some comments were updated.
Replace Andy's address with openssl.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4516)
Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).
Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.
Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
Add a new global DRBG for private keys used by RAND_priv_bytes.
Add BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() which use RAND_priv_bytes().
Change callers to use the appropriate BN_priv... function.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4076)
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.
Re-order seeding and stop after first success.
Add RAND_poll_ex()
Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.
Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.
Various code cleanups:
-Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
-Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
-Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
-Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
-Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
implementation of NIST DRBG.
-Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
Run perltidy on util/mkerr
Change some mkerr flags, write some doc comments
Make generated tables "const" when genearting lib-internal ones.
Add "state" file for mkerr
Renerate error tables and headers
Rationalize declaration of ERR_load_XXX_strings
Fix out-of-tree build
Add -static; sort flags/vars for options.
Also tweak code output
Moved engines/afalg to engines (from master)
Use -static flag
Standard engine #include's of errors
Don't linewrap err string tables unless necessary
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3392)
Replace all remaining uses of LONG and ZLONG with INT32 / ZINT32.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3126)
When setting the digest parameter for DSA parameter generation, the
signature MD was set instead of the parameter generation one.
Fortunately, that's also the one that was used for parameter
generation, but it ultimately meant the parameter generator MD and the
signature MD would always be the same.
Fixes github issue #2016
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2250)
Both strdup or malloc failure should raise à err.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1905)
prio openssl 1.1.0 seed_len < q was accepted and the seed argument was
then ignored. Now DSA_generate_parameters_ex() returns an error in such
a case but no error string.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1657)
We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL
before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs.
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
