Fixes#22811
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22813)
(cherry picked from commit ba58e9f1e2)
If a single packet contains data from multiple streams we need to keep track
of the cummulative connection level credit consumed across all of the
streams. Once the connection level credit has been consumed we must stop
adding stream data.
Fixes#22706
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22718)
Fixes#7894
This allows SHAKE to squeeze multiple times with different output sizes.
The existing EVP_DigestFinalXOF() API has been left as a one shot
operation. A similar interface is used by another toolkit.
The low level SHA3_Squeeze() function needed to change slightly so
that it can handle multiple squeezes. This involves changing the
assembler code so that it passes a boolean to indicate whether
the Keccak function should be called on entry.
At the provider level, the squeeze is buffered, so that it only requests
a multiple of the blocksize when SHA3_Squeeze() is called. On the first
call the value is zero, on subsequent calls the value passed is 1.
This PR is derived from the excellent work done by @nmathewson in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7921
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21511)
There are comments in include/openssl/dh.h and include/internal/ffc.h
that they must be aligned with each other, and yet, clashes have been
introduced.
The simplest fix is to move the offending FFC flags out of the way, as they
are indeed internal and shouldn't affect any public interface, apart from
those that are aligned with the DH flags, which are public.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22453)
We already check for an excessively large P in DH_generate_key(), but not in
DH_check_pub_key(), and none of them check for an excessively large Q.
This change adds all the missing excessive size checks of P and Q.
It's to be noted that behaviours surrounding excessively sized P and Q
differ. DH_check() raises an error on the excessively sized P, but only
sets a flag for the excessively sized Q. This behaviour is mimicked in
DH_check_pub_key().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22453)
The macro was introduced in commit ed6dfd1e36 without an
openssl-specific prefix as mandated by the coding style.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22603)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22516)
Refer: https://github.com/apple/swift/pull/39143 for a description
of the algorithm.
It is optimal in the sense of having:
* no divisions
* minimal number of blocks of random bits from the generator
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22499)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22459)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-XTS mode, in this patch, we
have the specialized multi-block implementation for AES-128-XTS and
AES-256-XTS.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To enhance test coverage for AES-GCM mode, we provided longer additional
testing patterns for AES-GCM testing.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
To accelerate the performance of the AES-GCM mode, in this patch, we
have the specialized multi-block implementations for AES-128-GCM,
AES-192-GCM and AES-256-GCM.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Support zvbb-zvkned based rvv AES-128/192/256-CTR encryption.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Use rvv and zvbb extensions for CHACHA20 cipher.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
Replace old CBC implementation with optimized AES-128/192/256-CBC in
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
c8ddeb7e64/doc/vector/riscv-crypto-vector-zvkb.adoc
Create `RISCV_HAS_ZVKB()` macro.
Use zvkb for SM4 instead of zvbb.
Use zvkb for ghash instead of zvbb.
We could just use the zvbb's subset `zvkb` for flexibility.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen <phoebe.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvksh extension, that provides SM3-specific istructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvksed extension, that provides SM4-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvknhb extension, that provides sha512-specific istructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvknha extension, that provides sha256-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Charalampos Mitrodimas <charalampos.mitrodimas@vrull.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions provide
the Zvkned extension, that provides a AES-specific instructions.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The upcoming RISC-V vector crypto extensions feature
a Zvkg extension, that provides a vghmac.vv instruction.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The RISC-V vector crypto extensions features a Zvbc extension
that provides a carryless multiplication ('vclmul.vv') instruction.
This patch provides an implementation that utilizes this
extension if available.
Tested on QEMU and no regressions observed.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
The RISC-V vector extension comes with an implementation-defined
number of bits per vector register (VLEN), which can be read out at
run-time using the CSR 'vlenb' (which returns VLEN/8) followed by a
multiplication by 8 (to convert bytes to bits).
This patch introduces a RISC-V capability 'V' to specify the
availability of the vector extension. If this extension is found at
run-time, then we read out VLEN as described above and cache it.
Caching ensures that we only read the CSR once at startup.
This is necessary because reading out CSR can be expensive
(e.g. if CSR readout is implemented using trap-and-emulate).
Follow-up patches can make use of VLEN and chose the best strategy
based on the available length of the vector registers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@vrull.eu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21923)
This otherwise breaks compilation of applications using ssl.h on MingW.
Fixes#22296
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22316)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22485)
The 'rand_generate' method is not well suited for being used with
weak entropy sources in the 'get_entropy' callback, because the
caller needs to provide a preallocated buffer without knowing
how much bytes are actually needed to collect the required entropy.
Instead we use the 'rand_get_seed' and 'rand_clear_seed' methods
which were exactly designed for this purpose: it's the callee who
allocates and fills the buffer, and finally cleans it up again.
The 'rand_get_seed' and 'rand_clear_seed' methods are currently
optional for a provided random generator. We could fall back to
using 'rand_generate' if those methods are not implemented.
However, imo it would be better to simply make them an officially
documented requirement for seed sources.
Fixes#22332
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22394)
struct timeval doesn't support nanosecs but OSSL_TIME does. We round up
any nanosecs to ensure that a non-zero input always results in a non-zero
output.
This fixes a quic-client fuzzer hang.
Fixes#22437
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22440)
Return SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN and SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN with semantics
similar to TLS connections.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22408)
The `get_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks were add recently to the
dispatch table in commit 4cde7585ce. Instead of adding corresponding
`cleanup_user_{entropy,nonce}` callbacks, the `cleanup_{entropy,nonce}`
callbacks were reused. This can cause a problem in the case where the
seed source is replaced by a provider: the buffer gets allocated by
the provider but cleared by the core.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22423)
This is unnecessary and conceptualy wrong as
headers from internal should not include headers from crypto
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22432)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22323)
Although many of the QUIC tests use fake time, the time we pass to the
ossl_crypto_condvar_wait_timeout() must be a real time.
Passing fake time was causing the QUIC tserver test to hang because
ossl_crypto_convar_wait_timeout() always timed out immediately and never
relinquished the CPU.
If using fake time we adjust the time to real time just before using it.
Fixes#22020
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22301)
With pre-3.0 OpenSSL, EVP_PKEY_print_private() calls the EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
function "priv_print", effectively asking the backend to print whatever it
regards as private key components.
In all backends that were built into libcrypto, this function printed what
was included in the private key structure, which usually includes the
public key components as well.
With OpenSSL 3.0, some of the corresponding key2text encoders got a
slightly different behavior, where the presence of the selector
OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY without the presence of the selector
OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY would only get what would intuitively be
regarded as private key components printed. This isn't entirely consistent,
though, as the RSA key2text encoder will still print the public key
components regardless.
To compensate for the changed backend behavior, EVP_PKEY_print_private()
was made to ask the encoder to print the keypair rather than just the
private key, thereby moving the backend semantics to the application API.
Unfortunately, this causes confusion for providers where the key2text
encoder really should print the private key only.
This change restores the built-in 1.1.1 backend behavior in the encoders
that OpenSSL provides, and renders EVP_PKEY_print_private() more true to its
documented behavior, leaving it to the backend to decide what it regards as
"private key components".
Fixes#22233
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22237)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22247)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22247)
