sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the
subject name in a given request.
Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'.
Submitted by: Massimiliano Pala <madwolf@hackmasters.net>
Reviewed by: Bodo Moeller
functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting
global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality,
one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro
"OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter
is normally done by Configure or something similar).
To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL
in the source file (foo.c) like this:
OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1;
OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar);
To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL
and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this:
OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo);
#define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo)
OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar);
#define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar)
The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the
header file everywere where the defined globals are used.
The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition
of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bt different.
The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with
better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should
go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code
cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted
lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites).
form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...)
&& !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of
special cases it was previously handling (some of them wrongly).
sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting
with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making
sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with
opensslconf.h.
I've checked fairly well that nothing breaks with this (apart from
external software that will adapt if they have used something like
NO_KRB5), but I can't guarantee it completely, so a review of this
change would be a good thing.
Remove the old broken bio read of serial numbers in the 'ca' index
file. This would choke if a revoked certificate was specified with
a negative serial number.
Fix typo in uid.c
Make ca.c correctly initialize the revocation date.
Make ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() and ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string() set the
string type: so they can initialize ASN1_TIME structures properly.
client code certificates to use to only check response signatures.
I'm not entirely sure if the way I just implemented the verification
is the right way to do it, and would be happy if someone would like to
review this.
Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. With this implementation, the expected
number of iterations never exceeds 2.
New semantics for BN_rand_range():
BN_rand_range(r, min, range) now generates r such that
min <= r < min+range.
(Previously, BN_rand_range(r, min, max) generated r such that
min <= r < max.
It is more convenient to have the range; also the previous
prototype was misleading because max was larger than
the actual maximum.)
certificates.
One is a valid CA which has no basicConstraints
but does have certSign keyUsage.
Other is S/MIME signer with nonRepudiation but
no digitalSignature.
