partially revamped from #16712
- fall thru -> fall through
- time stamp -> timestamp
- host name -> hostname
- ipv6 -> IPv6
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19059)
Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and
at least handle the file name and line number they are called from,
there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called
directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason
`ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`.
There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported
even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was
called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where
{lib} is the name of that sub-system.
Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions
that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from
the CRYPTO sub-system.
Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc()
wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
This can be reproduced with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1653520461 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./cms-test ./corpora/cms/3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1
log file: cms-3eff1d2f1232bd66d5635db2c3f9e7f23830dfd1-32454-test.out
ERROR_INJECT=1653520461
#0 0x7fd5d8b8eeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x402fc4 in my_realloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:129
#2 0x7fd5d8893c49 in sk_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:198
#3 0x7fd5d8893c49 in OPENSSL_sk_insert crypto/stack/stack.c:242
#4 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push include/openssl/x509v3.h:168
#5 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:111
#6 0x7fd5d88d6d7f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#7 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#8 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#10 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#11 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#12 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#13 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#14 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#15 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#16 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#17 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#18 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#19 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#20 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#21 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#22 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#23 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#24 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#25 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#26 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#27 0x402706 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/cms-test+0x402706)
=================================================================
==29625==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd5d8b8309f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7fd5d87c2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#2 0x7fd5d889501f in OPENSSL_sk_new_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:209
#3 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in sk_ASN1_VALUE_new_null include/openssl/asn1t.h:928
#4 0x7fd5d85dcbc3 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:577
#5 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#6 0x7fd5d85db104 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:178
#7 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#8 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#9 0x7fd5d88f86d9 in X509V3_EXT_d2i crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c:142
#10 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_set_issuers crypto/x509/x_crl.c:97
#11 0x7fd5d88d6d3c in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:246
#12 0x7fd5d85dc032 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:432
#13 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#14 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#15 0x7fd5d85db2b5 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:259
#16 0x7fd5d85dc813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#17 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#18 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#19 0x7fd5d85dca28 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:633
#20 0x7fd5d85dd288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#21 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#22 0x7fd5d85dcaf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#23 0x7fd5d85dd7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#24 0x7fd5d85db9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#25 0x7fd5d85ddd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#26 0x7fd5d85dde35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#27 0x7fd5d85a77e0 in ASN1_item_d2i_bio crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c:69
#28 0x402845 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/cms.c:43
#29 0x402bbb in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#30 0x402626 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#31 0x7fd5d7c81f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18391)
This happens usually if an template object is created
and there is an out of memory error before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST
method is called, but asn1_item_embed_free calls now the
ASN1_OP_FREE_POST which may crash because the object is not
properly initialized. Apparently that is only an issue with
the ASN1_OP_FREE_POST handling of crypot/x509/x_crl.c, which
ought to be tolerant to incomplete initialized objects.
The error can be reproduced with the reproducible error injection patch:
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652890550 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./asn1-test ./corpora/asn1/0ff17293911f54d1538b9896563a4048d67d9ee4
#0 0x7faae9dbeeba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x408dc4 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7faae99f2430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7faae97f09e5 in ASN1_STRING_type_new crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:341
#4 0x7faae98118f7 in asn1_primitive_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:318
#5 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:78
#6 0x7faae9812401 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#7 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#8 0x7faae9812315 in asn1_template_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:240
#9 0x7faae9812a54 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:137
#10 0x7faae9812a54 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#11 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#12 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#13 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#14 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#15 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#16 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#17 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#18 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#19 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#20 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#21 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#22 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#23 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==1194==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000010 (pc 0x7faae9b0625f bp 0x7fffffe41a00 sp 0x7fffffe41920 T0)
==1194==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==1194==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7faae9b0625f in crl_cb crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258
#1 0x7faae9811255 in asn1_item_embed_free crypto/asn1/tasn_fre.c:113
#2 0x7faae9812a65 in asn1_item_embed_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:150
#3 0x7faae9812a65 in ASN1_item_ex_new crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c:39
#4 0x7faae980be51 in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:325
#5 0x7faae980c813 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:611
#6 0x7faae980d288 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:518
#7 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#8 0x7faae980caf5 in asn1_template_noexp_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:643
#9 0x7faae980d7d3 in asn1_template_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:494
#10 0x7faae980b9ce in asn1_item_embed_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:382
#11 0x7faae980dd1f in ASN1_item_ex_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:124
#12 0x7faae980de35 in ASN1_item_d2i crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c:114
#13 0x40712c in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/asn1.c:301
#14 0x40893b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x406b86 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7faae8eb1f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV crypto/x509/x_crl.c:258 in crl_cb
==1194==ABORTING
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18360)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16918)
Fixes#14809
PR #14752 attempted to pass the libctx, propq in a few places related to
X509 signing. There were a few places that needed additional NULL checks so that they behavethe same as they did before.
OCSP_basic_sign() was changed to call EVP_DigestSignInit_ex() which passed the parameter EVP_MD_name(dgst). Since dgst can be NULL EVP_MD_name() was segfaulting.
Adding an additional NULL check EVP_MD_name() resolves this issue.
The other NULL checks are required to produce errors rather than
segfaults if the certificate is NULL.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14826)
Fixes#13732
Fix a few places that were not using the '_ex' variants of
ASN1_item_sign/verify.
Added X509_CRL_new_ex().
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14752)
Some functions that lock things are void, so we just return early.
Also make ossl_namemap_empty return 0 on error. Updated the docs, and added
some code to ossl_namemap_stored() to handle the failure, and updated the
tests to allow for failure.
Fixes: #14230
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14238)
This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising
places.
This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
Many of the new types introduced by OpenSSL 3.0 have an OSSL_ prefix,
e.g., OSSL_CALLBACK, OSSL_PARAM, OSSL_ALGORITHM, OSSL_SERIALIZER.
The OPENSSL_CTX type stands out a little by using a different prefix.
For consistency reasons, this type is renamed to OSSL_LIB_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12621)
This adds the needed code to make the OSSL_STORE API functions handle
provided STORE implementations.
This also modifies OSSL_STORE_attach() for have the URI, the
library context and the properties in the same order as
OSSL_STORE_open_with_libctx().
The most notable change, though, is how this creates a division of
labor between libcrypto and any storemgmt implementation that wants to
pass X.509, X.509 CRL, etc structures back to libcrypto. Since those
structures aren't directly supported in the libcrypto <-> provider
interface (asymmetric keys being the only exception so far), we resort
to a libcrypto object callback that can handle passed data in DER form
and does its part of figuring out what the DER content actually is.
This also adds the internal x509_crl_set0_libctx(), which works just
like x509_set0_libctx(), but for X509_CRL.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12512)
... and only *define* them in the source files that need them.
Use DEFINE_OR_DECLARE which is set appropriately for internal builds
and not non-deprecated builds.
Deprecate stack-of-block
Better documentation
Move some ASN1 struct typedefs to types.h
Update ParseC to handle this. Most of all, ParseC needed to be more
consistent. The handlers are "recursive", in so far that they are called
again and again until they terminate, which depends entirely on what the
"massager" returns. There's a comment at the beginning of ParseC that
explains how that works. {Richard Levtte}
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10669)
in particular X509_NAME*, X509_STORE{,_CTX}*, and ASN1_INTEGER *,
also some result types of new functions, which does not break compatibility
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10504)
Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and
all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10755)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:
While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.
To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal'
This commit moves the private crypto headers from
'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto'
As a result, the include directives become unambiguous
#include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal'
#include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto'
hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.
The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
In some cases it's about redundant check for return value, in some
cases it's about replacing check for -1 with comparison to 0.
Otherwise compiler might generate redundant check for <-1. [Even
formatting and readability fixes.]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6860)
X509_CRL_digest() didn't check if the precomputed sha1 hash was actually
present. This also makes sure there's an appropriate flag to check.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2314)
More importantly, port CRL test from boringSSL crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1775)
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
