We also lay the ground work for various of other the basic AES ciphers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8700)
The comparator further down the call stack doesn't tolerate NULL, so
if we got that as input, use the empty string.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8781)
OPENSSL_LH_flush() frees the linked lists for each slot, but didn't
set the list head to NULL after doing so, with the result that an
operation that affects these lists is likely to cause a crash.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8781)
ossl_method_store_cache_get() and ossl_method_store_cache_set() were
called with a NULL argument for store, which means no caching is
done. Give them a real store instead.
Also, increment the refcount when we do get a method out of the cache.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8781)
|str| was used for multiple conflicting purposes. When using
'-strictpem', it's used to uniquely hold a reference to the loaded
payload. However, when using '-strparse', |str| was re-used to hold
the position from where to start parsing.
So when '-strparse' and '-strictpem' are were together, |str| ended up
pointing into data pointed at by |at|, and was yet being freed, with
the result that the payload it held a reference to became a memory
leak, and there was a double free conflict when both |str| and |at|
were being freed.
The situation is resolved by always having |buf| hold the pointer to
the file data, and always and only use |str| to hold the position to
start parsing from. Now, we only need to free |buf| properly and not
|str|.
Fixes#8752
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8753)
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8774)
The change is triggered by ThunderX2 where 3+1 was slower than scalar
code path, but it helps all processors [to handle <512 inputs].
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8776)
The callback should be called with 1 when a Miller-Rabin round marked
the candidate as probably prime.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
GH: #8742
The clang documentation in all sanitizers we currently use says this:
When linking shared libraries, the {flavor}Sanitizer run-time is
not linked, so -Wl,-z,defs may cause link errors (don’t use it
with {flavor}Sanitizer)
(in our case, {flavor} is one of Address, Memory, or UndefinedBehavior)
Therefore, we turn off that particular flag specifically when using
the sanitizers.
Fixes#8735
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8749)
Forward declare the dispatched functions using typedefs from
core_numbers.h. This will ensure that they have correct signatures.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8747)
This allows the provider digest_final operation to check that it
doesn't over-run the output buffer.
The EVP_DigestFinal_ex function doesn't take that same parameter, so
it will have to assume that the user provided a properly sized buffer,
but this leaves better room for future enhancements of the public API.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8747)
The rep parameter takes an int in C, but the assembly implementation
looks at the upper bits. While it's unlikely to happen here, where all
calls pass a constant, in other scenarios x86_64 compilers will leave
arbitrary values in the upper half.
Fix this by making the C prototype match the assembly. (This aspect of
the calling convention implies smaller-than-word arguments in assembly
functions should be avoided. There are far fewer things to test if
everything consistently takes word-sized arguments.)
This was found as part of ABI testing work in BoringSSL.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8108)
This happens in ec_key_simple_check_key and EC_GROUP_check.
Since the the group order is not a secret scalar, it is
unnecessary to use coordinate blinding.
Fixes: #8731
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8734)
A couple of minor tweaks to match the style introduced in #7854:
- BIO_connect: remove line break to make more grep friendly
- SSL_CTX_new: harmoise the format of the HISTORY section
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8729)
SEE ALSO before HISTORY is the more common pattern in OpenSSL manual
pages and seems to be the prevalent order based on sampling my system
manual pages.
Fixes#8631
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8729)
Check that the HISTORY section is located after the SEE ALSO section,
this is a much more frequent order in OpenSSL manual pages (and UNIX
manual pages in general).
Also check that SEE ALSO comes after EXAMPLES, so that the tool can
ensure the correct manual section sequence.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8729)
Change to check_section_location(), a generic function to ensure that
section SECTION appears before section BEFORE in the man pages.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8729)
These undocumented functions were never integrated into the EVP layer
and implement the AES Infinite Garble Extension (IGE) mode and AES
Bi-directional IGE mode. These modes were never formally standardised
and usage of these functions is believed to be very small. In particular
AES_bi_ige_encrypt() has a known bug. It accepts 2 AES keys, but only
one is ever used. The security implications are believed to be minimal,
but this issue was never fixed for backwards compatibility reasons.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8710)
Refer to NIST SP 800-90C section 5.4 "Prediction Resistance.l"
This requires the seed sources to be approved as entropy sources, after
which they should be considered live sources as per section 5.3.2 "Live
Entropy Source Availability."
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8647)
This fixes the "verifying the alias" case.
Actually, while working on it, I realized that conceptually we were
testing the 2 different behaviours of `EC_GROUP_check_named_curve()` at
the same time, and actually not in the proper way.
I think it's fair to assume that overwriting the curve name for an
existing group with `NID_undef` could lead to the unexpected behaviour
we were observing and working around.
Thus I decided to separate the lookup test in a dedicated simpler test
that does what the documentation of `EC_GROUP_check_named_curve()`
suggests: the lookup functionality is meant to find a name for a group
generated with explicit parameters.
In case an alternative alias is returned by the lookup instead of the
expected nid, to avoid doing comparisons between `EC_GROUP`s with
different `EC_METHOD`s, the workaround is to retrieve the `ECPARAMETERS`
of the "alias group" and create a new explicit parameters group to use
in `EC_GROUP_cmp()`.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555)
Setting arbitrary `p`, `a` or `b` with `EC_GROUP_set_curve()` might fail
for some `EC_GROUP`s, depending on the internal `EC_METHOD`
implementation, hence the block of tests verifying that
`EC_GROUP_check_named_curve()` fails when any of the curve parameters is
changed is modified to run only if the previous `EC_GROUP_set_curve()`
call succeeds.
`ERR_set_mark()` and `ERR_pop_to_mark()` are used to avoid littering the
thread error stack with unrelated errors happened during
`EC_GROUP_set_curve()`.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555)
Used to check that a test fails in fips mode i.e. ok_nofips(run(...))
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8661)
